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ABSTRACT
Understanding Household Consumption and Saving Behavior using Account Data
by
Michael Gelman
Chair: Matthew D. Shapiro
This dissertation seeks to better understand household consumption and saving
behavior using account data from a personal finance app.
The first chapter examines the result that cash on hand is the most important
source of variation in explaining heterogeneity in the marginal propensity to consume
(MPC). While the standard hypothesis is that differences in financial circumstances
caused by temporary income shocks explain this result, this paper finds that differ-
ences across persistent characteristics are just as important. To reach this finding,
this paper develops a buffer stock model with discount factor heterogeneity and esti-
mates it using a novel panel data set from a personal finance app that jointly measures
spending, income, and liquid assets. In the model, within-individual variation in cash
on hand results from temporary income shocks while across-individual variation in
cash on hand results from differences in persistent characteristics. The panel nature
of the data separately identifies temporary and persistent drivers of the MPC while
previous studies using cross-sectional data typically confound these concepts. Sim-
ulations from the estimated model imply that ignoring heterogeneity in persistent
ix
characteristics leads to underestimating the aggregate MPC.
The second chapter examines how individuals adjusted spending and saving in
response to a temporary drop in income due to the 2013 U.S. government shutdown.
The shutdown cut paychecks by 40% for affected employees, which was recovered
within 2 weeks. Because it affected only the timing of payments, the shutdown
provides a distinct experiment allowing estimates of the response to a liquidity shock
holding income constant. Spending dropped sharply implying a näıve estimate of
the marginal propensity to spend of 0.58. This estimate overstates how consumption
responded. While many individuals had low liquidity, they used multiple strategies
to smooth consumption including delay of recurring payments such as mortgages and
credit card balances. This is joint work with Shachar Kariv, Matthew D. Shapiro,
Dan Silverman, and Steven Tadelis.
The third chapter estimates how overall consumer spending responds to changes
in gasoline prices. It uses the differential impact across consumers of the sudden,
large drop in gasoline prices in 2014 for identification. This estimation strategy is
implemented using comprehensive, daily transaction-level data for a large panel of
individuals. The estimated marginal propensity to consume (MPC) is approximately
one, a higher estimate than that found in less comprehensive or well-measured data.
This estimate takes into account the elasticity of demand for gasoline and potential
slow adjustment to changes in prices. The high MPC implies that changes in gasoline
prices have large aggregate effects. This is joint work with Yuriy Gorodnichenko,
Shachar Kariv, Dmitri Koustas, Matthew D. Shapiro, Dan Silverman, and Steven
Tadelis.
The fourth chapter examines the response of food expenditures to the receipt of
paychecks using financial account data from a personal finance app. Similar to pre-
vious studies, this paper finds that food expenditures increase during the week the
paycheck is received. While the standard explanation for this result is temporary
x
liquidity constraints, this paper argues otherwise. Intuitively, it’s unlikely that in-
dividuals will be liquidity constrained during the weeks they receive their paycheck.
Therefore, their decision to spend more during weeks in which they have more liquid-
ity likely reflects preferences and not constraints. The intuition is formalized through
specifying a buffer stock model of consumption. Model simulations show that indeed
consumption behavior is not affected by liquidity during the week of the paycheck.
The empirical results match the theoretical predictions and confirm that liquidity
constraints cannot explain excess sensitivity.
xi
CHAPTER I
What Drives Heterogeneity in the Marginal
Propensity to Consume? Temporary Shocks vs
Persistent Characteristics
1.1 Introduction
The marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of income changes is of inter-
est to both policymakers and academics. Studies analyzing the MPC have played
a prominent role in government reports documenting and forecasting the macroeco-
nomic effects of fiscal stimulus (Congressional Budget Office (2009), Council of Eco-
nomic Advisers (2010)). Moreover, academics study the MPC out of various forms
of changes in income to evaluate theoretical models of consumption (see Jappelli and
Pistaferri (2010) for an excellent survey).
A key result in the empirical literature is that individuals with low financial re-
sources (cash on hand) tend to have a higher MPC (See for example Parker et al.
(2013), Jappelli and Pistaferri (2014), and Parker (2015)). Yet the literature is divided
over the theoretical mechanisms that drive the negative correlation between the MPC
and cash on hand. The lack of consensus stems from the fact that most studies an-
alyzing the correlation between the MPC and cash on hand use cross-sectional data
that confounds the various theoretical mechanisms. For example, a cross-sectional
snapshot of cash on hand may be determined either by recent temporary shocks to
income or persistent characteristics such as time preference. The first contribution of
1
this paper is to overcome this identification obstacle by developing a novel panel data
set that captures the spending response to multiple tax refunds over several years.
The second contribution is to elucidate the theoretical mechanisms that drive MPC
heterogeneity and to map these mechanisms to the empirical results by specifying a
parsimonious buffer stock model with discount factor heterogeneity. The third contri-
bution is to show through model simulations that ignoring heterogeneity in persistent
characteristics leads to underestimating the aggregate MPC.
In general, there are a plethora of mechanisms that can explain the negative
correlation between the MPC and cash on hand. In order to make the discussion
manageable, I follow the dichotomy laid out in Parker (2015) between the two main
classes of models used to explain MPC heterogeneity. One view is that temporary
income shocks combined with precautionary savings or borrowing constraints play
the main role. Some examples include the textbook buffer stock model with ex-ante
identical individuals (Zeldes (1989), Deaton (1991), Carroll (1997)) and the wealthy
hand-to-mouth model of Kaplan and Violante (2014). Another view is that persistent
characteristics such as preferences or behavioral traits are the root cause. This may
arise from simple impatience such as in Campbell and Mankiw (1989) and Krusell
and Smith (1998). It may also arise from more complex mechanisms such as limited
attention, problems of self-control, or propensity to plan as in Reis (2006), Angeletos
et al. (2001), or Ameriks, Caplin and Leahy (2003). Simply put, the two views in the
literature boil down to temporary circumstances versus persistent characteristics and
hence I use the terms “circumstances view” and “characteristics view” to distinguish
the two.
The main impediment to disentangling these two views is that circumstances and
characteristics are not easily separately identified in existing datasets. Since cir-
cumstances vary over time while characteristics are constant, observing both within-
person cash on hand and MPC over time is vital to identification. Most data sets,
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however, only allow researchers to estimate the cross-sectional relationship between
the MPC and cash on hand. For example, the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX)
has detailed enough data to identify the consumption response to income changes, but
lacks a long enough panel structure to estimate multiple MPCs within an individual.
Conversely, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) has a long panel element,
but lacks enough detail to isolate the source of income changes. Without a combi-
nation of a long panel and detailed consumption, income, and liquid balance data, it
is difficult to disentangle circumstances from characteristics. Perhaps the study that
comes closest to disentangling circumstances from characteristics is Sahm, Shapiro
and Slemrod (2012). They directly ask individuals how two separate policy-induced
income changes affected their spending behavior. Their results show that changes in
within-individual financial conditions can explain differences in spending behavior.
Unfortunately, they do not have precise liquidity measures.
The first contribution of this paper is to empirically decompose the fraction of
MPC variance explained by within- and across-individual differences in cash on hand.
The key data innovation is developing a novel panel dataset that includes joint spend-
ing, income, and liquid saving behavior from a personal finance app over several years.
Using the detailed app data, I identify the receipt of several federal tax refunds within
the same individual. I then estimate the monthly spending response using the high-
frequency spending observations. Finally, I use the high-frequency liquid balance
data to capture within- and across-individual variation in cash on hand. I find that
within- and across-individual differences in cash on hand play roughly equal roles in
explaining MPC variance. This is consistent with the results in Parker (2015) that
show persistent characteristics such as time preferences are an important factor in
explaining heterogeneity in the MPC.
The second contribution of this paper is to interpret the empirical results I find
through the lens of a buffer stock saver model with discount factor heterogeneity.
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This relatively parsimonious model is able to capture the role of both circumstances
and characteristics. The role of circumstances is reflected in the model by temporary
shocks to income which induce within-individual differences in cash on hand. The
role of characteristics is reflected in the model by heterogeneity in the discount factor
which induces across-individual differences in cash on hand. Holding the variance of
temporary shocks constant, a higher dispersion in the discount factor will lead to a
more prominent role of across-individual variation in explaining MPC variance. Using
this logic, the mean and dispersion of the discount factor is estimated from the data
using the method of simulated moments. The estimates are roughly in line with the
literature and show that this procedure produces sensible results.
The third contribution of the paper is to use the estimated model to evaluate
the implications for fiscal stimulus. I estimate the model separately under the cir-
cumstances and characteristics view. Under the characteristics view, heterogeneity in
persistent characteristics leads to a higher aggregate MPC because the high MPC for
impatient individuals outweighs the low MPC for patient individuals. This effect is
amplified if temporary income shocks due to a recession are disproportionately concen-
trated on impatient individuals. The simulations show that under the characteristics
view where persistent characteristics are important, the distribution of preferences
will influence the aggregate MPC. Using the estimated parameters from the data
used in this paper, ignoring these persistent characteristics leads to underestimating
the aggregate MPC.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.4 lays out the theoretical
framework I use to generate predictions about consumption and saving behavior under
the two views which I will take to the data. Section 4.2 discusses the dataset and
provides some descriptive statistics. Section 1.4 presents the empirical results used
to evaluate which view is more consistent with the data. Section 1.5 estimates the
parameters of the model via the method of simulated moments. Section 1.6 discusses
4
policy implications and section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Theoretical framework
This section describes the theoretical framework used to analyze individual de-
cisions. It introduces a buffer stock model with discount factor heterogeneity and
formally defines the circumstances versus the characteristics view of MPC hetero-
geneity. It then generates predictions about MPC heterogeneity which are taken to
the data in later sections.
1.2.1 Model description
Individuals behave according to the standard “buffer-stock” saver model in the
spirit of Zeldes (1989), Deaton (1991), and Carroll (1997). The main difference with
previous studies is the introduction of preference heterogeneity via the discount factor
signified by the i subscript on β.















Ait+1 = (1 + r) (Ait + Yit − Cit) (1.2)
Ait+1 ≥ b (1.3)
Yit = Ȳi(1− ρ) + ρYit−1 + εit (1.4)
εit
iid∼ N(0, σ2Y ) (1.5)
where βi, r, Cit, Ait and Yit represent the time discount factor, the interest rate, con-
sumption, liquid assets, and income respectively.
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Normalization Carroll (2004) showed that this problem can be rewritten by nor-
malizing all variables by the level of permanent income. Following his notation, I
define lowercase variables as uppercase variables divided through by the level of per-
manent income. Therefore cit = Cit/Ȳi, ait = Ait/Ȳi and so on. This normalization is
very useful because the same solution to the model can be used to jointly characterize
the behavior of all individuals who share the same βi and Yit process while allowing
the actual level of Ȳi to differ.
Model Horizon An infinite horizon version of the model is chosen to abstract away
from life cycle features. Carroll (2004) shows that the infinite horizon framework can
be thought of as the limiting behavior of an individual when they are far away from
their end of life. This assumption is reasonable for the population analyzed in this
paper and will be discussed further in the data section. When buffer stock motives are
strong enough, agents are more concerned with smoothing short term shocks rather
than saving for retirement.
Income process Similarly to Zeldes (1989) and Deaton (1991), income follows an
AR(1) processes. Because the time series of the data only span 4 years, permanent
shocks are not well identified. To match the model, the subsequent empirical analysis
will condition on individuals who have a fairly stable income process and therefore
have not experienced any large permanent shocks in the data.
Solution The consumption problem specified above does not admit a closed form
solution and is therefore solved computationally. I reformulate the individual’s prob-
lem in terms of a functional equation and define cash on hand xit = ait + yit to
simplify the state space. This variable represents the amount of resources available
to the individual in the beginning of the period.
6
The individual then solves the optimization problem
V (xit) = max
ait+1
{u(cit) + βiE[V (xit+1)]} (1.6)
subject to
xit+1 = (1 + r) (xit − cit) + yit+1 (1.7)
and the previous constraints (4.4), (4.5), and (4.6).
Substituting in for cit and xit+1 results in an equation in terms of xit, ait+1, and
yit+1









+ βiE[V (ait+1 + yit+1)]
}
(1.8)
The individual maximizes utility by choosing next period saving (ait+1) conditional
on cash on hand (xit). The model is solved using the method of endogenous gridpoints
suggested in Carroll (2006). This solution method results in the value function V (xit)
and the policy function ait+1(xit) which maps the state variables xit into the optimal
control variable ait+1. The consumption function is calculated using constraint (4.4)
so that cit(xit) = xit − ait+11+r .
1.2.2 Circumstances and characteristics view
In order to understand the mechanisms that drive MPC heterogeneity, I adopt
the dichotomy laid out in Parker (2015) between classes of models that can explain
the relationship between cash on hand and the MPC. In the first class of models,
temporary circumstances cause cash on hand to fluctuate. If individuals have con-
cave consumption functions, low cash on hand leads to high MPCs and high cash on
hand leads to low MPCs. Therefore, the MPC will depend on what circumstances
individuals find themselves in and so I call this view the “circumstances view.” Some
examples include the textbook buffer stock model with ex-ante identical individuals
(Zeldes (1989), Deaton (1991), Carroll (1997)) and the wealthy hand-to-mouth model
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of Kaplan and Violante (2014). In the second class of models, persistent characteris-
tics drive the correlation between cash on hand and the MPC. This may arise from
simple impatience such as in Campbell and Mankiw (1989) and Krusell and Smith
(1998). It may also arise from more complex mechanisms such as limited attention,
problems of self-control, or propensity to plan as in Reis (2006), Angeletos et al.
(2001), or Ameriks, Caplin and Leahy (2003). Therefore, even though individuals
may find themselves in good or bad circumstances, their average behavior over time
will depend on differences across persistent characteristics such as the discount factor.
I call this view the “characteristics view.”
In the model described in the previous section, temporary shocks to income cap-
ture temporary circumstances while heterogeneity in the discount factor captures
persistent characteristics. In general, “characteristics” may refer to a broad range of
traits such as impatience, risk aversion, present bias, and inattention. I choose to
parametrize characteristics as heterogeneity in the discount factor for two reasons.
The first reason is that recent studies suggest heterogeneity in the discount factor
may be important for explaining the heterogeneity in the MPC. Parker (2015) shows
that lack of smoothing is correlated not with temporary fluctuations but with persis-
tent characteristics such as impatience.1 He concludes that this behavior is consistent
with models that exhibit heterogeneity in preference such as Campbell and Mankiw
(1989), Krusell and Smith (1998), and Hurst (2003). Along a similar vein, Baugh,
Ben-David and Park (2014) study the weekly response of spending to the receipt of a
tax refund and find a strong immediate spending response which decays very rapidly.
They argue that agents who are constrained but patient would exhibit a spike up in
spending but would then smooth spending over the following weeks. Therefore they
conclude that the spending response to tax refunds is consistent with some agents
1The measure is the answer to the question “In general, are you or other household members the
sort of people who would rather spend your money and enjoy it today or save more for the future?”
with a binary choice of ‘spend now’ and ‘save for the future.’
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who exhibit myopia.
The second reason I choose to model characteristics as heterogeneity in the dis-
count factor is that for purposes of modeling consumption behavior, the MPC is
largely a function of the curvature of the consumption function. Changes in the
discount factor alter the curvature of the consumption function is similar ways to
changes in risk aversion. Therefore, whether heterogeneity is introduced via the dis-
count factor or risk aversion is not well identified from consumption behavior. The
key is that introducing heterogeneity in the discount factor will capture persistent
characteristics which are not correlated with high-frequency shocks to income.
Under the circumstances view, MPC heterogeneity is driven entirely by temporary
shocks to income and so βi = β̄. Under the characteristics view, MPC heterogeneity
is driven both by temporary shocks to income and heterogeneity across individuals.
This is captured by defining βi ∼ U (β − ∆, β + ∆) as in Carroll et al. (2015) and
Krueger, Mitman and Perri (2016).
Figure 1.1 provides a simple characterization of the sources of heterogeneity under
the two views via the optimal consumption function and the distribution of cash on
hand. The solid line represents the consumption function while the dotted line rep-
resents the distribution of cash on hand conditional on a particular discount factor.
Panel (a) shows that under the circumstances view, heterogeneity is driven entirely
by differences in cash on hand. Differences between individuals are represented by
different points along the consumption function. For example, the individual repre-
sented by “x” may have received a negative shock and therefore exhibits lower cash
on hand than the individual represented by “+”. Because the consumption func-
tion is concave, a lower cash on hand level is associated with lower consumption and
a steeper slope (higher MPC). It is differences in circumstances that generates the
correlation between the MPC and cash on hand.
Alternatively, panel (b) depicts heterogeneity under the characteristics view. The
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main difference is that individuals with different discount factors have different con-
sumption functions and different distributions of cash on hand. For example, the
individual represented by “+” has a higher discount factor relative to the individual
represented by “x.” The more patient individual has a flatter consumption function
and a distribution of cash on hand that is shifted to the right. In the characteristics
view, the discount factor jointly determines average MPC and average cash on hand.
Impatient individuals will tend to have higher MPCs and lower cash on hand and
vice versa. Contrary to the circumstances view, persistent characteristics now play a
role in generating the correlation between the MPC and cash on hand.
Figure 1.1: Comparison of views
(a) Circumstances view




























































Notes: Panel (a) and (b) plot the consumption function and distribution of cash on hand under the circumstances
view and characteristics view respectively.
1.2.3 Target buffer stock behavior
A key mechanism to help distinguish between the two views is so called “target
buffer stock” behavior. Under such behavior, individuals target a cash on hand to in-
come ratio over time that is determined by their preferences and income uncertainty.
While cash on hand will fluctuate due to temporary shocks to labor income, indi-
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viduals will endogenously change their consumption behavior to achieve their target
cash on hand. This implies that any snapshot of cash on hand at a point in time
will reflect both recent temporary shocks and persistent characteristics. Because in-
dividuals react to temporary shocks by moving back towards their preferred buffer
stock, taking a time average of cash on hand should isolate the level of cash on hand
attributable to preferences.
Carroll (2004) defines the target buffer stock as the cash on hand value x∗ such
that E[x∗] = x∗. In other words, when cash on hand equals the target buffer stock,
inviduals do not desire a different level of cash on hand. If cash on hand is not equal
to the target buffer stock, individuals will alter their consumption behavior so that
xt converges back to x
∗. Carroll (2004) then shows that for each individual, this
value is unique and stable. This behavior can be understood by analyzing the well
known second order approximation of the euler equation derived from the first order













where cit is normalized consumption, δi =
1
βi
−1 is the discount rate, θ is the coefficient
of relative risk aversion, σ2it is a measure of consumption growth volatility, r is the
interest rate, and εit is a mean zero rational expectations error.
A buffer stock saver is influenced by two opposing factors. The first factor is that
they are impatient and so weigh consumption today more than consumption tomor-
row. This will tend to cause cash on hand to fall over time. Conversely, as pointed
out in Kimball (1990), a positive third derivative of the utility function induces a
precautionary savings motive which will tend to cause cash on hand to rise over time.
Individual behavior will then depend on which motive is stronger.
These opposing factors are captured by the terms labeled “impatience” and “pre-
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cautionary savings.” The impatience term reflects the standard life cycle permanent
income hypothesis (LC-PIH) motivation where consumption growth is a constant
function of the interest rate, discount factor, and coefficient of relative risk aversion
(or the elasticity of intertemporal substitution). Since this term is constant, the
relative strength of each factor is driven by the non-constant precautionary savings
term. The term σ2it+1(xit) represents consumption growth volatility and is a function
of cash on hand (xit). Because this term is a complicated function of preferences and
temporary shocks, it is hard to analytically derive the exact relationship. However,
we do know that it is decreasing in xit. The intuition is that when xit is small, an
individual is not able to smooth shocks very well leading to a wide range of possible
consumption values in the next period depending on the realization of the labor in-
come shock. This translates into high variability in consumption growth. Conversely,
when xit is high, an individual is easily able to smooth consumption in the face of
income shocks so there will be little variation in consumption growth. In the limit, as
xit →∞, precautionary fears become irrelevant and an individual will behave accord-
ing to the standard LC-PIH. The coefficient θ
2
implies that consumption growth is an
increasing function of the variance of consumption growth. Furthermore, the impact
of uncertainty is increasing in risk aversion. Intuitively, this means that risk averse
individuals will prefer not to put themselves in positions where they will face low
levels of consumption. They achieve this by holding enough buffer stock to weather
negative income shocks.
Figure 1.2 illustrates target buffer stock behavior by plotting expected consump-
tion growth as a function of cash on hand. The vertical green line represents the
target buffer stock level, and so behavior is determined by whether cash on hand is
to the right or left of this value. When cash on hand is to the right of the target
level, impatience dominates and cash on hand will fall back to the target level. More
specifically, higher values of xt will lead to lower values of σ
2
t+1(xt) and hence lower
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values of ∆ln(ct+1). As xt → ∞, ∆ln(ct+1) approaches r−δθ . Therefore, if cash on
hand is too high, impatience will lead individuals to spend down cash on hand to
finance consumption in the present period. Conversely, if cash on hand is to the left
of the target level, the precautionary savings term dominates behavior. Lower values
of xt will lead to higher values of σ
2
t+1(xt) and ∆ln(ct+1). Intuitively, if cash on hand
drops too low, the precautionary saving motive will prompt individuals to build back
up their buffer stock. These opposing forces will constantly push cash on hand to its
target level of x∗.
Figure 1.2: Target buffer stock behavior
















β: 0.99, θ = 1




Notes: The vertical line represents the stable target buffer stock
level. The horizontal line represents the consumption growth rate
in the absence of any precautionary savings motives. This figure
is in the spirit of Figure Ia in Carroll (1997) but uses a different
calibration.
Another important characteristic of target buffer stock x∗ is that holding all else
constant, it is a increasing function of the discount factor. While holding a buffer stock
is helpful for protecting against income shocks, maintaining a high buffer stock comes
at the expense of present consumption. Therefore, the more impatient individuals
are, the more they will prefer to consume today instead of holding a large buffer stock.
Figure 1.3 graphically demonstrates the positive relationship between x∗ and β. This
relationship will allow x∗ to be interpreted as a proxy for the discount factor.
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Figure 1.3: Target buffer stock and the discount factor





















Notes: β refers to the monthly discount factor.
Lastly, Figure 1.4 shows the time series behavior of simulated cash on hand within
an individual. The horizontal dashed line represents the target buffer stock level. As
expected, temporary shocks cause cash on hand to deviate from the target value
x∗. However, because the target buffer stock level is a stable equilibrium, individual
consumption xt will tend towards x
∗ over time. I utilize this behavior to decompose
cash on hand into a circumstances and characteristics component as xt = (xt−x∗)+x∗.
The next section will explore how these dynamics will aid in identifying the differential
relationship of cash on hand and the MPC under the two views.
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Figure 1.4: Cash on hand time series
















Notes: The horizontal line represents the stable target buffer
stock level.
1.2.4 Model simulation
Before analyzing the actual data, it’s helpful to understand how consumption
behavior differs under the circumstances and characteristics view. To this end, this
section simulates the consumption response to income under the two views. In order
to create a tight link with the data, I attempt to model the empirical environment
that I observe within the dataset as closely as possible.
The dataset used in the empirical section includes transaction-level consumption,
income, and cash on hand measures from a person finance app. I take advantage
of the transaction-level granularity of the data to identify receipts of multiple tax
refunds within individuals. These tax refund are then used in turn to calculate the
MPC out of a change in income.
The simulation environment is chosen to match this empirical environment very
closely. Therefore, I simulate the consumption reaction of 200 individuals to the
receipt of a tax refund every 12 months over a period of 4 years. For each tax refund
received, I calculate the MPC and cash on hand of each individual. I then explore how
the relationship between the MPC and cash on hand differ under the two different
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views.
The main result is that the relationship between the MPC and cash on hand
only differs when the panel structure of the data is used. Intuitively, cross-sectional
snapshots will confound the role of circumstances and characteristics in driving MPC
heterogeneity.
1.2.4.1 Calibration
The parameter values used to calibrate the model are listed in Table 4.4 below and
represent monthly time periods. The utility function is specified as constant relative
risk aversion (CRRA) with θ = 1. The parameters β and ∆ are set to the parameters
estimated in the later part of the paper. The parameters ρ and σy are estimated
using the income process observed in the dataset.2 refundit represents the average
tax refund to income ratio observed in the data set. The interest rate is set to the
monthly rate on checking/savings accounts and the borrowing limit is set to zero.
Table 1.1: Parameter values
Parameter Value Notes Description
u(x) x
1−θ
1−θ CRRA utility utility function
θ 1 standard coefficient of relative risk aversion
β 0.9894 average discount factor
∆ 0.0103 0 for circumstance model discount factor dispersion
ρ 0 estimated from dataset income shock persistence
σy 0.20 estimated from dataset S.D. of temporary shocks
refundit 0.6 estimated from dataset average normalized refund
r 0.01 / 12 monthly r on checking/saving interest rate
b 0 no borrowing condition borrowing limit
Notes: The parameters correspond to a monthly frequency.
2The estimate for ρ̂ = 0.065. Given how close it is to 0, I choose to set ρ to 0 in the simulation
because it greatly reduces the complexity of model by allowing me to remove a state variable that
normally needs to keep track of the previous value of income. The low estimate of ρ̂ reflects the fact
that the sample is selected on individuals who receive regular paychecks. This sample restriction is
made to fit the model which doesn’t have permanent shocks or periods of unemployment.
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1.2.4.2 Variable definitions
The main variables used in the analysis are the MPC and cash on hand. This
section provides definitions for these concepts.











Because each period in the model is one month, this value represents the quarterly
change in consumption as a fraction of the tax refund. For periods in which a tax
refund is not received, the MPC is undefined.






This measure captures the average level of cash on hand three months prior to re-
ceiving the tax refund. It is meant to mimic the measures of liquidity captured in
survey data commonly used in studies estimating the consumption response to income
changes.






This measure is meant to capture the target level of buffer stock for individual i
described in the previous section and is used as a proxy for the discount factor. This
measure is not usually captured in survey data such as the Consumer Expenditure
Survey because the panel dimension is relatively short.
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1.2.4.3 The relationship between MPC and cash on hand
After simulating the data, I calculate MPCit, coh
PR
it , and cohi for each individual.
Figure 1.5 shows the relationships between these variables under the assumptions of
the circumstances view where βi = β̄.
Panel (a) presents a scatter plot of the MPC and pre-refund cash on hand overlaid
with a local linear smoothed line. In this panel, each point represents an observation
for individual i and time t. For example, the green diamonds represent all observations
for a particular individual. Because each individual receives four refunds, there are
four points. There is a clear negative relationship between MPCit and coh
PR
it . This
pattern is consistent with the concavity of the consumption function suggested by
Carroll and Kimball (1996). Since the MPC is the slope of the consumption function,
a concave consumption function will result in a high MPC when cash on hand is low
and vice versa. Jappelli and Pistaferri (2014) also report a similar relationship when
they explicitly ask individuals what their MPC would be out of a hypothetical income
shock.
Panel (a) is analogous to plotting the relationship of the MPC and cash on hand
in a pooled cross-section. As discussed earlier, a snapshot of cash on hand in time
will reflect both circumstances as well as characteristics. In order to isolate the
characteristics component of cash on hand, panel (b) presents a scatter plot of the
average MPC and average cash on hand. Note that now each observation represents
one individual. This is reflected in the fact that the four green diamonds in panel
(a) are collapsed into one green diamond in panel (b). Once I collapse the data by
average across time within an individual, the strong negative relationship between
the MPC and cash on hand is no longer present. Under the circumstances view, the
lack of heterogeneity in the discount factor leads to all individuals having the same
target buffer stock level. Therefore, there should not be any systematic relationship
between average cash on hand and any other individual level variable. The temporary
18
shocks are beyond the control of the individual and so pre-refund cash on hand levels
will influence the response to tax refunds. After the shocks have occurred, however,
individuals will alter their behavior to return to their desired buffer stock level. Over
a long enough horizon, this preference-driven behavior is the main determinant of the
level of cash on hand. Under our parametrization, four years is a long enough time
horizon for average cash on hand to reflect the theoretical target buffer stock level.
Figure 1.5: Relationship between MPC and cash on hand under the circumstances
view
(a) Pooled cross-section



































Notes: Panel (a) plots the relationship between pre-refund cash on hand and the MPC for individual i at time t
using simulated data. Panel (b) plots the relationship between average cash on hand and the avearge MPC for
individual i. In both plots, the solid red line represents a local-linear smoothed curve and the green diamond
represents all observations for a randomly chosen individual. The first 100 periods of the simulations are discarded
to allow individuals to reach steady-state.
Figure 1.6 repeats the exercise in Figure 1.5 under the assumptions of the char-
acteristics view where βi ∼ U (β −∆, β + ∆). The results in panel (a) look similar
across the two views. Once again, a strong negative relationship exists between
MPCit and coh
PR
it ; however, it’s not clear whether this is driven by the concavity of
the consumption function or the differences in the discount factor across individu-
als. This formalizes the idea that observing the relationship between the MPC and
cash on hand in the cross-section cannot identify which view is likely to be correct.
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Once again, the problem stems from the fact that any snapshot of cash on hand is
influenced both by recent changes to temporary circumstances as well as persistent
characteristics. Plotting panel (b) under the characteristics view reveals that the
relationship between MPCi and cohi exhibits a strong negative relationship. This
result is driven by the fact that discount factors are allowed to vary across individ-
uals. On average, impatient individuals with low discount factors will tend to hold
low cash on hand and have high MPCs and vice versa. Even after averaging out
the temporary shocks, these persistent characteristics drive the negative correlation
between the average MPC and average cash on hand.
Figure 1.6: Relationship between MPC and cash on hand under the characteristics
view
(a) Pooled cross-section



































Notes: Panel (a) plots the relationship between pre-refund cash on hand and the MPC for individual i at time t
using simulated data. Panel (b) plots the relationship between average cash on hand and the avearge MPC for
individual i. In both plots, the solid red line represents a local-linear smoothed curve and the green diamond
represents all observations for a randomly chosen individual. The first 100 periods of the simulations are discarded
to allow individuals to reach steady-state.
In summary, estimating the cross-sectional relationship between the MPC and
pre-refund cash on hand will lead to similar results under both views. A negative
correlation is observed regardless of which view actually holds in the data. The
views can only be distinguished by isolating the persistent characteristics compo-
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nent by calculating the average MPC and average cash on hand within individuals.
The circumstances view implies a very weak relationship between the average MPC
and average cash on hand while the characteristics view implies a strong negative
relationship.
1.2.4.4 Variance decomposition
While the previous section helps to visualize the differences between the two views,
it is also helpful to introduce a more quantitative measure that captures which view
is more consistent with the data.
Regardless of which view is correct, the analysis in the previous section shows
that MPCit is a function of cash on hand. Furthermore, the section on buffer stock
behavior showed that cash on hand can be decomposed into a circumstances and
characteristics component. This decomposition can be used to determine which view
is more likely to hold in the data. If the circumstances view is more likely, MPCit
should mainly be a function of changes in circumstances due to temporary labor in-
come shocks. Alternatively, if the characteristics view is more likely, MPCit should
also be a function of characteristics such as the discount factor. To test this hypoth-
esis, the MPCit in specified in the following way.
MPCit = α + γ1 × cohi︸ ︷︷ ︸
characteristics
+ γ2 × (cohPRit − coh
PR
i )︸ ︷︷ ︸
circumstances
+εit (1.13)
where E[εit] = 0. While the discount factor is not explicitly observed, the buffer
stock model implies that average cash on hand is a function of the discount factor.
Therefore cohi is used to capture the characteristics component of cash on hand. The
circumstances component of cash on hand is captured by using pre-refund cash on
hand (cohPRit ). Because the level of coh
PR
it is still related to the discount factor, it is
demeaned by its average (coh
PR
i ) in order to extract the temporary component that
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is orthogonal to the individual level average.
Under this specification, the variance is easily decomposed because all the terms
are uncorrelated with each other (see appendix section 1.8.1 for more details). The
following equation applies the variance operator to both sides.
var(MPCit) = var(α)+var(γ1×cohi)+var(γ2×(cohPRit −coh
PR
i ))+var(εit) (1.14)
Defining var(γ1×cohi) = σ2char and var(γ2×(cohPRit −coh
PR
i )) = σ
2
circ, these terms
capture the variance contribution of the characteristics and circumstances component
of cash on hand respectively. Another way to think about this equation is that the
characteristics component captures across-individual variation and the circumstances
component captures within-individual variation. Under the circumstances view, σ2circ
should be very high relative to σ2char. This captures the idea that the variance in
MPCit is mostly driven by circumstances. Analogously, most of the variation in
MPCit should be driven by within-individual differences. Under the characteris-
tics view, σ2char is around the same size or larger than σ
2
circ. This captures the fact
that variance in MPCit is driven by both circumstances and characteristics. Stated
differently, both within- and across- individual variation is important in explaining






, this value represents the fraction of var(MPCit) ex-
plained by cash on hand that is attributable to characteristics. Since φchar is bound
between 0 and 1, it can be used to determine which view is more likely. A value
near 0 is consistent with the circumstances view while values away from 0 are more
consistent with the characteristics view.
The characteristics share of variance (φchar) can also be connected back to the
model. Recall that under the circumstances view βi = β, while under the character-
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istics view βi ∼ U (β − ∆, β + ∆). Higher values of the dispersion in the discount
factor (∆) lead to greater heterogeneity in average cash on hand levels. Holding the
variance of temporary shocks constant, this should lead to a greater contribution of
the characteristics component of cash on hand in explaining the MPC. Figure 1.7
shows this relationship by calculating φchar under different values of ∆ while holding
all other parameters constant. As expected, φchar is an increasing function of ∆.
Figure 1.7: Relationship between the dispersion of β and φchar






























Notes: This figure plots the relationship between the dispersion
in the discount factor ∆ against the characteristics component
variance share (φchar).
In summary, calculating φchar in the data will identify which view is more consis-
tent with the data. Furthermore, φchar will later be used to help estimate ∆ using
the method of simulated moments.
1.3 Data




This paper utilizes a novel dataset derived from de-identified transactions and
account data, aggregated and normalized at the individual level. The data are cap-
tured in the course of business by a personal finance app.34 More specifically, the
app offers financial aggregation and bill-paying services. Users can link almost any
financial account to the app, including bank accounts, credit card accounts, utility
bills, and more. Each day, the app logs into the web portals for these accounts and
obtains central elements of the user’s financial data including balances, transaction
records and descriptions, the price of credit and the fraction of available credit used.
Prior to analysis, the data are stripped of personally identifying information such
as name, address, or account number. The data have scrambled identifiers to allow
observations to be linked across time and accounts.
We draw on the entire de-identified population of active users and data derived
from their records from December 2012 until July 2016. For a subset of the data,
we have made use of demographic information provided to the app by a third party.
Table 4.1 compares the age, education, gender, and geographic distributions in the
sample that matched with an email address to the distributions in the U.S. Census
American Community Survey (ACS), representative of the U.S. population in 2012.
3These data have previously been used to study the high-frequency responses of households to
shocks such as the government shutdown (Gelman et al., 2015) and anticipated income, stratified
by spending, income and liquidity (Gelman et al., 2014).
4Similar account data has been used in Baugh, Ben-David and Park (2014), Baker (2015), Kuchler
(2015), and Ganong and Noel (2016).
24
Table 1.2: App user demographics
Education Not Completed College Completed College Completed Graduate School
ACS 66.62 24.02 9.36
App 70.42 23.76 5.83
Ages 25 and over. Sample size - ACS: 2,176,103 App: 28,057
Age 18-20 21-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+
ACS 5.85 7.28 17.44 17.24 18.78 16.00 17.41
App 0.59 5.26 37.85 30.06 15.00 7.76 3.48




Sample size - ACS: 2,436,714 App: 59,072
Region Northeast Midwest South West
ACS 17.77 21.45 37.36 23.43
App 20.61 14.62 36.66 28.11
Sample size - ACS: 2,441,532 App: 63,745
Source: Gelman et al. (2014).
Figure 4.2.1 compares the income distribution in the app to total family income
in the ACS. Users who use the app are on average higher income than individuals
surveys in the ACS.
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Source: Gelman et al. (2014).
In summary, the app is not perfectly representative of the US population, but it is
heterogeneous, including large numbers of users of different ages, education, income,
and geographic location.
1.3.2 Sample filters
The sample is filtered on various characteristics to ensure that the analysis sample
matches the model specified in the earlier sections.
First, the model assumes the researcher observes a comprehensive view of spend-
ing, income, and liquid assets. Therefore, I require data from individuals who add
all (or most) of their accounts, generate a long time series of observations, and have
positive income in each month. This reduces the sample size because there is a large
amount of churn from users who try out the app but later decide not to continue
using it. Moreover, there are some users that only want to track one or two credit
cards without adding all their other accounts.
Second, the model is meant to abstract away from life cycle motives and large per-
manent shocks to income so that reactions stem from either temporary circumstances
or persistent characteristics. Therefore, I condition on individuals who receive regular
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paychecks.
Lastly, since the MPC is estimated from the consumption reaction to tax refunds,
I condition on individuals who received more than 1 tax refund in the sample.
In summary, I select users based on length of panel, number of accounts, connect-
edness of accounts, regular paycheck status, no missing income data, and whether
they received more than 1 tax refund.
1.3.2.1 Defining account linkage
The analysis may be biased if all accounts that are used for receiving income
and making expenditures are not observed. For example, an individual may have a
checking account that is used to pay most bills and a credit card that it used when
income is low. If credit card expenditures are not properly observed the MPC will be
biased downwards.
In order to identify linked accounts, I use a method that calculates how many
credit card balance payments are also observed in a checking account. I define the
variable linked as the ratio of the number of credit card balance payments observed
in all checking accounts that matches a particular payment that originated from all
credit card accounts. For example, a typical individual will pay their credit card
bill once a month. If they existed in the data for the whole year, they will have 12
credit card balance payments. If 10 of those credit card payments can be linked to a
checking account the variable linked = 10
12
≈ 0.83.
One drawback to this approach is that it requires individuals to have a credit
card account. To ensure that those without credit cards are still likely to have linked
accounts, I also condition on individuals who have three or more accounts.
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1.3.2.2 Defining regular paycheck
In order to identify regular paychecks, I start by using keywords that are com-
monly associated with these transactions (see appendix section 1.8.2 for more details).
I condition on four statistics to ensure that these transactions represent regular pay-
checks.
1. Number of paychecks ≥ 5
2. Median paycheck amount > $200
3. Median absolute deviation of days between paychecks is ≤ 5
4. Coefficient of variation of the paycheck amount ≤ 1
1.3.2.3 Sample size
Table 1.3 shows the evolution of the sample size from all users in the sample to
those that survive the selection criteria. The criteria selects users who have a long
time series (≥ 40 months), a high linked account ratio (≥ 0.8), a reasonable number
of accounts linked ([3,15]), receive a regular paycheck, receive positive income in each
month, and receive more than 1 tax refund. I choose to drop users that have over 15
accounts linked because these accounts typically represent business users. The final
sample may seem small but this is due to fact that most individuals only try out the
app for a short amount of time. Baker (2015) uses a similar sample selection criteria
that results in a final sample that is also roughly 5% of the full sample.
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Table 1.3: Sample Filters
N %
Full sample as of December 2012 883,529 100
Long time series (N ≥ 40) 341,841 39
Linked ratio ≥ 0.8 264,043 30
Linked accounts ∈ [3,15] 197,530 22
Has regular paycheck 146,112 17
Has no months with zero income 77,052 9
Has > 1 tax refund 48,059 5
1.3.3 Variable definitions
Most survey data sets such as the consumer expenditure survey (CEX), panel
study of income dynamics (PSID), and survey of consumer finances (SCF) are created
with the explicit goal of facilitating academic research. The data set used in this study
is naturally occurring and was not explicitly designed for use in academic studies.
Constructing variables in this data set to match our models is not necessarily a trivial
exercise. In order to study the relationship between the MPC out of tax refunds and
cash on hand, the main variables I utilize are consumption, income, tax refunds, and
liquid assets.
1.3.3.1 Consumption
The empirical analysis will focus on non-durable consumption because durable
goods are not explicitly modeled. In particular, I attempt to match the composition
of the widely used “strictly non-durable” definition from Lusardi (1996).
The raw data consists of individual transactions with characteristics such as
amount, transaction type (debit or credit), and transaction description. While the
type of spending (non-durable, durable) is not directly observed, I use a machine
learning (ML) algorithm (see appendix section 4.8.1 for more details) to aid in cate-
gorization. The goal of the ML algorithm is to provide a mapping from transaction
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descriptions to spending categories. For example, any transaction with the keyword
“McDonalds” should map into “Fast Food”. A subset of these categories are then
combined to create the consumption variable.
The finest level of categorization is derived from merchant category codes (MCCs)
which are directly observable in two of the account providers in the data. MCCs are
four digit codes used by credit card companies to classify spending and are also
recognized by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service for tax reporting purposes. The ML
algorithm works by using a subset of the data where the truth is known in order to
create a mapping from transaction description to MCCs.
After training the ML algorithm on the data where the truth is known, the al-
gorithm is then applied to the rest of the data set. I then define consumption as
spending on restaurants, groceries, gasoline, entertainment, and services.
1.3.3.2 Tax refunds
In order to disentangle temporary circumstances from persistent characteristics,
it’s important to observe several MPCs across time within an individual. While many
studies have analyzed the MPC out of tax rebates, one disadvantage of tax rebates
is that they occur at a fairly low frequency. Since most people receive federal tax
refunds in multiple years, this study utilizes the MPC out of tax rebates over time
within individuals.
Federal tax refunds are identified by searching for identifying keywords in the
transaction description (all tax refunds include the keywords “TAX”, “TREAS”, and
“REF”). I exclude individuals that receive multiple tax refunds within the same year.
Figure 1.9 shows the time series of the count of tax refunds observed in the data from
December 2012 to July 2016. The figure shows that most tax refunds are received in
February, March, April, and May.
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Income is important in determining the variance of temporary shocks as well as
an input into cash on hand. Total income is defined as the sum of all inflows from
checking and saving accounts minus incoming transfers.
In order to calibrate the income process in the model, I first estimate the time
series properties of the income process using the equation below. To fit the model, I
subtract out any tax refunds and normalize by average income. The equation specifies
an AR(1) model in non-tax refund normalized income and controls for seasonality
using monthly indicator variables.
yit = ρyit−1 +montht + εit (1.15)
Table 1.4 shows the results of estimating equation (4.5). The value of 0.065
indicates that there is a small amount of persistence in the income process. This is
much lower than standard estimates because the sample conditions on individuals
who receive a regular paycheck.
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Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
I also estimate the variance of temporary shocks as var(εit) = 0.041. This is the
value that is used throughout the analysis to calibrate the model.
1.3.3.4 Cash on hand and liquid assets
As discussed in section 4.4 (theoretical framework), cash on hand plays a crucial
role in identifying changes in circumstances as well as providing a proxy for charac-
teristics. Cash on hand is defined as Xit = Ait−1 + Yit where Ait−1 represents liquid
balances for individual i in the previous period and Yit represents income received in
the current period.
Liquid balances (A) are defined as the sum of checking and saving account balances
observed in the app. These balances are captured daily as the app takes a snapshot
of the balance from each provider.
1.3.3.5 Normalization
To match the theoretical framework, the main variables in the empirical analysis
are normalized by individual average income. The normalization is denoted with
lower case variables and so cit = Cit/Ȳi, xit = Xit/Ȳi and so on. The observed level of
average income serves as a proxy for unobserved permanent income.
32
1.3.4 Summary statistics
This section provides summary statistics of the main variables used in the analysis.
The mean and median values for spending and income are roughly in line with the
data used in Baker (2015) from a different personal finance app.
Table 1.5: Summary statistics
Variable Mean p25 p50 p75
Spending $6,107 $2,779 $4,509 $7,365
Income $6,290 $3,375 $5,035 $7,642
Liquid balance $8,306 $876 $2,365 $7,153
Tax refund $2,981 $1,090 $2,205 $4,241
Notes: N=48,059
1.4 Empirical results
This section discusses the empirical results used to test whether the circumstances
view or characteristics view is more consistent with the data. Using various different
approaches, it finds that even after controlling for within-individual variation in cash
on hand, across-individual cash on hand still explains a large portion of MPC hetero-
geneity. This finding is more consistent with the characteristics view rather than the
circumstances view.
1.4.1 Tax refund impulse response function
As a preliminary step, I estimate the consumption impulse response function to re-
ceiving a tax refund. This analysis helps to confirm that the variables are constructed
properly and behave according to economic theory. More specifically, I estimate the











it, where q ∈ {1, .., 5} (1.16)
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The q superscript represent quintiles of average cash on hand (cohi), cit represents
normalized consumption, refit−j represents the normalized tax refund, δit represents
month fixed effects, and εit is the error term. Figure 1.10 below plots the MPCj
for each cash on hand quintile. The estimates show that there is little anticipatory
response of consumption to receiving a tax refund and much of the response occurred
within the first three months. The magnitude of the response is roughly in line with
Souleles (1999) which examines the consumption response to income tax refunds in
the CEX. Souleles (1999) does not calculate the MPC across cash on hand quintiles so
I compare those results with the average response across all individuals in this paper.
The average response is very similar to the third quintile in Figure 1.10 (see appendix
Figure 1.8.1). A more recent paper by Baugh, Ben-David and Park (2014) studies the
weekly response of spending to the arrival of tax refunds using similar account data.
This paper does not explicitly calculate the MPC but finds that individual spending
reacts strongly when the refund is received followed by a quick decay.
Splitting the sample up into quintiles of average cash on hand reveals the hetero-
geneous response in the data. Individuals in the lowest quintile of cash on hand tend
to react much more strongly to the receipt of a tax refund relative to those in the
highest quintile of cash on hand. This relationship is broadly consistent with most of
the literature examining the consumption response to income changes (for example,
many of the studies discussed in Jappelli and Pistaferri (2010)).
In summary, the estimated response of consumption to receiving a tax refund is
similar in dynamics and magnitude to previous studies. This fact helps to confirm
that both consumption, tax refunds, and cash on hand are identified properly in the
data set.
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Notes: 1,445,560 observations from 48,059 individuals. The vertical bars on
each coefficient represent 95% confidence intervals using heteroskedasticity
robust errors clustered at the individual level.
1.4.2 The relationship between the MPC and cash on hand
In order to determine which view the data is more consistent with, this section
analyzes the relationship between the MPC and cash on hand using two different
levels of aggregation. The first level of aggregation is at the individual-refund level
and the second level of aggregation is at the quantile level.
1.4.2.1 Individual-refund level analysis
I estimate the quarterly MPC out of tax refunds for individual i at time t is using
the following specification.
cit = αir +MPCit × refit + δt + εit (1.17)
where i represents individual, t represents month, αir represents a dummy variable
for each individual-refund year5, refit represents the refund amount, δt represents time
5More specifically, this variable represents a series of dummy variables for each individual that
takes a value of 1 for the three month windows before after a refund is received and 0 for all other
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fixed effects, and εit is the error term.
The estimated MPC measures from this specification are then plotted against
different concepts of cash on hand in Figure 1.11. Panel (a) plots the results of a
smoothed local linear kernel regression of the relationship between the individual-
refund level MPC (MPCit) and pre-refund cash on hand (coh
PR
it ). The MPC is
falling rapidly as cash on hand increases until it starts to level out around a value
of 1.6. This empirical relationship is consistent with the simulation results presented
earlier in Figure 1.5 and 1.6. While previous studies have shown that a negative
correlation exists between the MPC and cash on hand, this is the first paper to
estimate the relationship using smooth kernel regressions with such a high level of
precision. This high level of flexibility and precision provides novel evidence that
the relationship between the MPC and cash on hand is consistent with a concave
consumption function as argued by Carroll and Kimball (1996).
Panel (b) plots the relationship between the average MPC (MPCi) and average
cash on hand (cohi). The results imply a statistically significant negative relation-
ship between MPCi and cohi. To my knowledge, this is the first paper to use panel
data to estimate this relationship. This is important because averaging across time
within individual isolates the role of persistent characteristics in driving the relation-
ship between the MPC and cash on hand. The earlier simulation results showed that
estimating the cross-sectional relationship between the MPC and cash on hand is not
sufficient to separately disentangle the circumstances view from the characteristics
view. This is made clear when comparing panel (a) in 1.5 and 1.6. The two views
can only be disentangles by isolating the characteristics component by estimating
the relationship between the average MPC and average cash on hand represented in
panel (b) of 1.5 and 1.6. The significant negative relationship between MPCi and
periods. This variable ensures that the MPC captures the change in consumption during the three
months after receiving the refund relative to the three months prior to receiving the refund. This is
the definition of the quarterly MPC.
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cohi imply that the characteristics view is more likely to hold in the data. Recall that
under the characteristics view, differences in the discount factor across individuals
generates a correlation between the average MPC and average cash on hand. Impa-
tient individuals will tend to have higher average MPCs and lower average cash on
hand and vice versa.
Figure 1.11: MPC and cash on hand
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Notes: 129,823 observations from 48,059 individuals in panel (a). 48,059 observations from 48,059 individuals in panel
(b). The vertical bars on each coefficient represent 95% confidence intervals using heteroskedasticity robust errors
clustered at the individual level. Variables are winsorized at the 5% level.
1.4.2.2 Quantile level estimates
This section estimates the MPC at the quantile level. More specifically, it esti-
mates the MPC for each group defined by the interaction of cohPRit and cohi quintiles.
The econometric specification is
cit = αjk +MPCjk × refit + δt + εit (1.18)
where i represents individual, t represents month, j refers to pre-refund cash on hand
quintile, and k refers to average cash on hand quintile.
More concretely, MPCjk represents the MPC for individuals with pre-refund cash
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on hand quintile j and average cash on hand quintile k. The average cash on hand
quintile is an individual-level trait and so does not vary within i. On the other hand,
j is allowed to vary within individual based on the level of cash on hand that is
observed before the tax refund is received. To understand these concepts better,
table 1.6 tabulates the median levels of each quintile.
Table 1.6: Quintile sample statistics
cohPRit cohi
Quintile median N median N
1 0.78 26,681 1.20 26,681
2 1.09 26,680 1.36 26,680
3 1.38 26,680 1.58 26,680
4 1.85 26,680 2.00 26,680
5 3.51 26,680 3.49 26,680
Total 1.38 133,401 1.59 133,401
Figure 1.12 plots the coefficients of MPCjk. When the coh
PR
it quintile is low,
the MPCs are ordered highest to lowest by the quintiles of cohi. For example, when
cohPRit is 1, the point estimate is approximately 0.3 for individuals in the lowest cohi
quintile and approximately 0.18 for those in the highest cohi quintile. The dispersion
of the MPC within cohPRit falls as we move from the lowest to the highest quintile.
6
6While this appears at odds with the large negative point estimate for those in the lowest cohi
quintile when the cohPRit is high, this estimate is extremely noisy and we cannot reject that the point
estimate is different from the other cohi quintiles estimates at the 5% level.
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This phenomenon is consistent with the heterogeneity in the discount factor laid
out by the characteristics view. To illustrate, Figure 1.13 plots the consumption
function and distribution of cash on hand for an impatient and patient individual. The
solid black line represents the impatient individual and the solid blue line represents
the patient individual. The dotted lines represent the kernel density estimates of the
distribution of cash on hand for each individual. If the tax refund is received when
individuals hold low cash on hand, the dispersion in the MPC will be relatively high
because the consumption functions have very different slopes at this point. Under
the circumstances view, all individuals have the same consumption function, so there
would be no heterogeneity in the MPC conditional on pre-refund cash on hand.
The distribution of pre-refund cash on hand is also consistent with the characteris-
tics view. Figure 1.13 shows that in the simulated data, the cash on hand distribution
of impatient individuals is more tightly centered around a lower mean. Conversely,
the cash on hand distribution for patient individuals is more dispersed around a higher
mean.
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Figure 1.13: Theoretical consumption function and distribution of cash on hand




























To check whether this same pattern of the distribution of cohPRit holds in the
data, Figure 1.14 plots the empirical cohPRit distribution by cohi quintiles. Consistent
with the theory, individuals with low average cash on hand tend to have a tighter
distribution of pre-refund cash on hand centered around a lower mean. Conversely,
individuals with high average cash on hand tend to have a more disperse distribution
of pre-refund cash on hand centered around a higher mean. This pattern explains the
size of the confidence intervals for each estimate of MPCjk in Figure 1.12. For indi-
viduals with low average cash on hand, estimates at the lower quintiles of pre-refund
cash on hand are measured with relatively high precision. However, the estimates for
pre-refund cash on hand quintiles 4 and 5 are rather imprecise because it is rare that
these individuals hold such high levels of pre-refund cash on hand.
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To summarize, this section estimated the relationship between the MPC and cash
on hand at both the individual-refund and quantile level. Both levels of aggregation
confirm that persistent characteristics play a role in explaining MPC heterogeneity
above and beyond temporary circumstances. I interpret these findings as evidence in
favor of the characteristics view. The analysis also provides novel evidence that the
joint income, consumption, and saving behavior is consistent with the buffer stock
model which includes heterogeneity in the discount factor.
1.4.3 Variance decomposition
This section decomposes the variance of the MPC that is attributable to cash on
hand into circumstances and characteristics components. The analysis first starts by
adapting the quintile level analysis in the previous section to isolate the circumstances
and characteristics components of cash on hand. The MPCs for the adjusted quintile
interactions are estimated and plotted to visualize the decomposition. Lastly, the
point estimates of the share of the variance in the MPC explained by both circum-
stances and characteristics components of cash on hand are calculated.
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1.4.3.1 Graphical analysis
The graphical analysis starts by adjusting the quintiles in the previous section
to capture the effect of circumstances and characteristics. The previous section esti-
mated the MPC using the interactions of quintiles of pre-refund (cohPRit ) and average
cash on hand (cohi). Previous sections showed that cohi captures the characteristics
component of cash on hand because it acts as a proxy for the discount factor in the
buffer stock theory. cohPRit does not, however, isolate the circumstances component
of cash on hand because it is also influenced by the discount factor. To isolate the
circumstances component, demeaned pre-refund cash on hand is used. More pre-
cisely, the quintiles are based on cohPRit − coh
PR
i instead of coh
PR
it . Table 1.7 shows
the mean of the demeaned pre-refund cash on hand quintiles and the median of the
average cash on hand quintiles. As expected, cohPRit − cohPRi has a mean of 0 and is
approximately normally distributed.
Table 1.7: Quintile sample statistics
cohPRit − cohPRi cohi
Quintile mean N median N
1 -0.77 26,681 1.20 26,681
2 -0.22 26,680 1.36 26,680
3 -0.02 26,680 1.58 26,680
4 0.17 26,680 2.00 26,680
5 0.84 26,680 3.49 26,680
Total 0.00 133,401 1.59 133,401
The MPC for each quintile interaction is estimated using the following specification
cit = αdk +MPCdk × refit + δt + εit (1.19)
where i represents individual, t represents months, d represents demeaned pre-refund
cash on hand quintiles , and k represents average cash on hand quintiles.
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Figure 1.15 plots the coefficients of MPCdk. The main difference with Figure 1.12
in the previous section is that now the demeaned pre-refund cash on hand quintiles
represent different actual cash on hand levels. This isolates the circumstances com-
ponent of cash on hand and also leads to a more even distribution of observations
across the quintiles. This is reflected in the fact that the standard errors are fairly
consistent across cohPRit −cohPRi quintiles relative to using the raw quintiles of cohPRit .
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This figure can be thought of as decomposing the circumstances and characteristics
components of cash on hand represented by within and across individual variation.
For example, consider the top blue line which represents individuals with low average
cash on hand. The MPC drops from about 0.3 to about 0.08 when moving from the
first to the last quintile of cohPRit − cohPRi. Because the blue line holds average cash
on hand constant, this drop from 0.3 to 0.08 represents the change in MPC when cash
on hand changes within a person due to a change in circumstances. Another pattern
that emerges is that the MPC drops more for low average cash on hand individuals
relative to high relative cash on hand individuals. This pattern is explained by once
again referring to the simulated consumption functions in Figure 1.13. For impatient
individuals (identified in the data via low average cash on hand), their pre-refund
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cash on hand distribution is tightly centered around a lower mean. The left tail of the
distribution includes regions where the consumption function is very steep while the
consumption function flattens out as cash on hand increases. This is consistent with
the large change in MPC seen for the low average cash on hand individuals as cash
on hand moves from the lowest to the highest quintile of cohPRit − cohPRi. Conversely,
patient individuals (identified in the data via high average cash on hand) have a more
dispersed distribution around a larger mean. The cash on hand distribution rarely
falls into areas where the consumption function is very steep. Therefore, there will
be a less dramatic change in the size of the MPC as cash on hand moves from the
lowest to the highest quintile of cohPRit − cohPRi.
A change in the persistent characteristics component of cash on hand holding
circumstances constant is represented by looking at how the MPC changes when
holding the cohPRit − cohPRi quintile constant and moving across cohi quintiles. For
example, cohPRit −cohPRi quintile 3 represents the case where pre-refund cash on hand
is close to the mean for each individual. At this quintile, the MPC ranges from about
0.23 for those with low cohi and about 0.02 for those with high cohi. This distance
represents across individual variation or variation that results from the persistent
characteristics component of cash on hand which is a proxy for the discount factor.
To better understand how circumstances and characteristics influence the esti-
mates in this section, Figure 1.16 shows how Figure 1.15 would look if only one
source of variation was important.
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Figure 1.16: Alternative scenarios
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For example, panel (a) shows the scenario in which circumstances drives all the
variation in the MPC. In this case, the MPC will fall as demeaned pre-refund coh
increases. However, there will is no variation across average cash on hand quintiles.
Conversely, panel (b) shows the scenario in which characteristics drives all the vari-
ation in the MPC. In this case, the MPC does not change as demeaned pre-refund
cash on hand quintiles change. All the variation is driven by across individual vari-
ation and so the result is horizontal parallel lines. The estimates plotted in Figure
1.15 represent a middle ground between the extremes in Figure 1.16. The next sec-
tion builds upon this intuition and quantitatively estimates the contribution of the
circumstances and characteristics component in explaining the variance of the MPC.
1.4.3.2 Regression analysis
The previous section estimated the MPC for each interaction of cohPRit −coh
PR
i and
cohi quintiles. This section uses the same variables to calculate the point estimates
of the share of the variance in the MPC explained by both the circumstances and
characteristics components of cash on hand. I use the same framework defined earlier
in section 1.2.4.4 which approximates the relationship between the MPC and the
different concepts of cash on hand as follows.
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MPCit = α + γ1 × cohi︸ ︷︷ ︸
characteristics
+ γ2 × (cohPRit − coh
PR
i )︸ ︷︷ ︸
circumstances
+εit (1.20)
where E[εit] = 0. Under this specification, the variance is easily decomposed because
all the terms are uncorrelated with each other. The following equation applies the
variance operator to both sides.
var(MPCit) = var(α)+var(γ1×cohi)+var(γ2×(cohPRit −coh
PR
i ))+var(εit) (1.21)
Defining var(γ1×cohi) = σ2char and var(γ2×(cohPRit −coh
PR
i )) = σ
2
circ, these terms
capture the variance contribution of the persistent characteristics and circumstances






represents the fraction of var(MPCit) explained by cash on hand that is attributable
to characteristics.
The results from estimating specification (1.20) are presented in table 1.8 below.




i ) vary negatively
with the MPC. This is consistent with economic theory, the earlier empirical analysis,






that about half of the variance of the MPC that is explained by cash on hand is driven
by the characteristics component. This is in line with the graphical results in the
previous section that showed both the characteristics and circumstances component
play a role in explaining the variance of the MPC.
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Table 1.8: Variance decomposition
VARIABLES γ̂ ˆV ar γ̂2 × ˆV ar ˆV arShare




i ) -0.093*** 0.370 0.0032 0.54***
(0.004) (0.033)
Observations 129,823 129,823 129,823 129,823
For γ̂, heteroskedasticity and cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
For ˆV arShare, cluster bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis with 10,000 draws.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
There are some alternative ways to calculate the characteristics variance share
using the framework laid out in this section. The first alternative is to define the cir-
cumstances share differently. In this section, the circumstances component is defined
as pre-refund cash on hand subtracted by its mean (cohPRit − coh
PR
i ). The alternative
methodology is to demean pre-refund cash on hand by total average cash on hand
instead of just the average of pre-refund cash on hand (cohPRit − cohi). The differ-
ence arises because the circumstances component only captures the state of liquidity
preceding the receipt of a refund that occurs once a year. Demeaning using coh
PR
i
represents deviations from average liquidity right before the refund is received while
demeaning using cohi also includes seasonal fluctuations in liquidity over the course
of the year. Appendix 1.8.5 discusses the calculation of the characteristics variance
share using this alternative method. While the estimate of the characteristics share
is qualitatively different under the alternative specification, it is still large enough
(0.42) to favor the characteristics view over the circumstances view.
The second alternative is to include higher order terms in specification (1.20).
While including higher order terms helps to better capture the total variance of the
MPC, it results in roughly the same characteristics variance share as not including
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the terms. Appendix 1.8.6 presents the analysis with the higher order terms included.
To summarize, this section used both graphical and regression analysis to show
that the data is more consistent with the characteristics view rather than the circum-
stances view.
1.5 Structural estimation
This section connects the empirical results back to the model by estimating the
model parameters via the method of simulated moments. The estimation proceeds
in two steps. In the first step, I estimate and calibrate the parameters of the model
that don’t rely on the explicit solution of the model. In the second stage, I estimate
the remaining parameters of the model that rely on the model solution conditional
on the first stage estimates.
1.5.1 First stage estimation and calibration
I calibrate the coefficient of risk aversion (θ), the interest rate (r), and the borrow-
ing limit (b) by setting them to reasonable values. As mentioned earlier, the discount
factor (β) and θ are not easily separately identified so I choose to set θ = 1 which
allows me to compare β to other papers using similar methods such as Carroll et al.
(2015) and Krueger, Mitman and Perri (2016).
The income process is governed by the level of persistent (ρ) and the standard
deviation of income shocks (σy). I estimate these parameters directly from the data by
using the panel nature of the income process. The estimation process was presented
earlier in section 1.3.3.3. The average level of tax refunds in the data is also estimated
directly from the data by taking the unconditional mean of normalized tax refunds.
The values of the first stage parameters are listed below in table 1.9.
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Table 1.9: First stage parameter values
Parameter Value Source Description
u(x) x
1−θ
1−θ CRRA utility utility function
θ 1 standard coefficient of relative risk aversion
ρ 0 income time series income shock persistence
σy 0.20 income time series S.D. of temporary shocks
refundit 0.6 tax refund distribution average normalized refund
r 0.01 / 12 external savings data interest rate
b 0 no borrowing condition borrowing limit
Notes: The parameters correspond to a monthly frequency.
1.5.2 Second stage estimation
In the second stage, I use the method of simulated moments to estimate the
parameters that rely explicitly on the model. This estimation procedure is used
because there is no simple analytic expression for the theoretical moments in the
model.
More specifically, the average discount factor (β) and the dispersion in the discount
factor (∆) are estimated by matching the fraction of var(MPCit) explained by cash on
hand that is attributable to characteristics (φchar) and median cash on hand (C̃oH i).
The parameters are exactly identified because I use two moments to estimates two
parameters.
The parameter estimate Θ̂ = {β̂, ∆̂} is the solution to the criterion function
Θ̂ = arg min
Θ
(mdata −msim(Θ))(mdata −msim(Θ))′ (1.22)
where m = {φchar, C̃oH i}, mdata represent moments calculated from the data, and
msim(Θ) represent moments calculated from simulating the model under parameters
Θ.
The parameter estimates and empirical moments are shown in table 1.10.
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Table 1.10: Second stage parameter and moment estimates
Parameter Value Description
β̂ 0.9894 average discount factor
∆̂ 0.0103 discount factor dispersion
Moment
φ̂char 0.4600 characteristics variance share
ˆ̃
CoH i 1.5900 median cash on hand
Notes: The parameters correspond to a monthly frequency.
The estimate of the average discount factor (β) is mainly driven by the fact that
the median level of cash on hand is 1.59 times monthly income. This moment rep-
resents the target buffer stock conditional on the first stage value of the variance of
income and risk aversion. The estimate of discount factor dispersion (∆) is mainly
driven by the fact that roughly half of the variance in the MPC is driven by the
characteristics component of cash on hand. This implies a fairly important role of
across individual heterogeneity and is reflected in the 0.0103 value.
The estimated parameters are roughly in line with Carroll et al. (2015) who cal-
ibrate their model at the quarterly level by matching either liquid financial and re-
tirement assets.
The method of simulated moments jointly estimates Θ = {β,∆} by matching the
moments m = {φchar, C̃oH i}. Plotting how the simulated moments msim(Θ) vary
with Θ is helpful in developing intuition about identification. Figure 1.17 plots φchar
as a function of each parameter. Changes in ∆ are represented on the x-axis and
changes in β are represented by different colored lines. The figure shows that φchar is
much more sensitive to changes in ∆ relative to changes in β̂. φchar can be thought of
as measuring across individual variation in the MPC. Therefore, holding the variance
of temporary shocks constant while increasing the dispersion of types of individuals
will lead to a higher share of the variance being driven by persistent differences across
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individuals. The actual level of β does not influence this measure as much. Therefore,
we can think of ∆ being identified primarily through φchar.
Figure 1.17: Characteristics component share






































Similarly, Figure 1.18 plots C̃oH i as a function of each parameter. The figure
shows that C̃oH i is much more sensitive to changes in β relative to changes in ∆.
Earlier analysis showed that more patient individuals tend to hold a higher buffer
stock. Therefore, the relationship between β is straightforward. While ∆ does have
some effect on C̃oH i it is relatively minor. Therefore, we can think of β being iden-
tified primarily through C̃oH i.
Figure 1.18: Median cash on hand





























1.5.3 Fit of other variables
This section assesses the fit of variable that weren’t explicitly targeted in the
estimation procedure.
Cash on hand distribution Figure 1.19 compares the average cash on hand dis-
tribution in the model to the data. The fitted model is able to replicate the long
right tail of the average cash on hand distribution in the cross-section. This partly
explains why the estimates are similar to Carroll et al. (2015). Their paper estimates
the dispersion of the discount factor by matching the shape of the liquid assets dis-
tribution. Therefore, introducing heterogeneity in the discount factor is important to
explaining the relationship between the MPC and cash on hand as well as explaining
inequality in the wealth distribution.
Figure 1.19: Average cash on hand distribution




















MPC The aggregate MPC in the model is 0.19 compared to 0.14 in the data.
While this paper doesn’t focus on the aggregate MPC, it is reassuring to know that
the model is able to capture it relatively well.
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1.5.4 Alternative specification
This section shows the results of estimating alternative specifications. In one case,
I estimate risk aversion while holding the time discount factor constant. In another
case, I estimate the present-bias term in a quasi-hyperbolic discounting model.
1.5.4.1 Estimating risk aversion
An alternative way to specify the model is to fix time preference (β) and vary risk
aversion (θ). I fix β = 0.9894 and allow θ to be distributed uniformly. Table 1.11
shows the estimated parameters under this alternative specification. The estimated
θ falls within the range commonly seen in other studies.
Table 1.11: Alternative parameter estimates
Parameter Value Description
θ̂ 1.1353 average risk aversion
∆̂ 0.8081 risk aversion dispersion
Moment
φ̂char 0.4600 characteristics variance share
ˆ̃
CoH i 1.5900 median cash on hand
Notes: The parameters correspond to a monthly frequency.
1.5.4.2 Estimating present-bias
Another way of interpreting characteristics is the level of present bias of indi-
viduals. This section estimates heterogeneity in the present-bias term of a quasi-
hyperbolic discount model while holding the long run discount factor and risk aversion
parameters constant. I use the buffer-stock consumption model with quasi-hyperbolic
discounting from Harris and Laibson (2002).7 The individual is now modeled as a
sequence of autonomous temporal selves. These selves are indexed by the respective
7Without a commitment device, a quasi-hyperbolic individual behaves much the same as an
impatient exponential discounter.
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where I allow for heterogeneity in β and a common value for δ. In order to
match the highest level of patience under the exponential discounting model, I set
δ = 0.9997.





(Wit+1 − εiU ◦ g ◦W ′it+1)((1 + r)(Xit − Cit + yit+1)
]
(1.24)
where εi = 1− βi and g = (U ′)−1
I solve the model numerically using an endogenous grid method suitably modified
to account for the new terms introduced by quasi-hyperbolic preferences. This makes
use of the quasi-hyperbolic euler equation which is
U ′(C(Xit) ≥ (1 + r)Et
[(





I estimate the parameters using the method of simulated moments and display
the results in table 1.12.
54
Table 1.12: Alternative parameter estimates
Parameter Value Description
β̂ 0.8943 average present bias factor
∆̂ 0.0495 present bias dispersion
Moment
φ̂char 0.4600 characteristics variance share
ˆ̃
CoH i 1.5900 median cash on hand
Notes: The parameters correspond to a monthly frequency.
1.6 Policy Implications
1.6.1 Tax rebate simulation
This section analyzes the consumption response to a tax rebate under the two
different views. While tax refunds are modeled as anticipated changes to income, I
model the tax rebate as an unanticipated shock. Since tax rebates are often issued
in times of recession, I perform the simulation with and without aggregate shocks to
income.8
Great recession shock I calibrate the magnitude of income shocks due to the great
recession from the PSID. In order to match the model, I first split the sample up into
different quintiles of cash on hand.9 I use the average over the period 2001-2007
to create the quintiles. I then calculate income shocks by taking the log difference
between labor income in 2009 relative to average income using the period 2001-2007.
Table 1.13 shows the mean value for cash on hand and the income shock for each
quintile.
8Since the model is not a general equilibrium model, the concept of aggregate shock is an income
shock above and beyond the standard temporary shock.
9The corresponding PSID variable is total balance in saving and checking accounts.
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Table 1.13: Quintile sample statistics
Quintile cash on hand income shock N
1 0.005 -0.123 542
2 0.042 -0.124 612
3 0.114 -0.087 611
4 0.293 -0.077 587
5 15.72 -0.058 459
Total 0.00 -0.095 2811
The MPC is then calculated by simulating 10,000 individuals under each view and
shocking all individuals with unexpected income equivalent to one month of income.
In order to understand the role of heterogeneity, I also calculate the MPC at different
quintiles of average cash on hand. Table 1.14 shows the results of the simulation.
The columns are divided into two sections based on whether the great recession
shock is applied or not. Under each shock scenario the MPC is calculated under
the circumstances and the characteristics view. For the great recession shock the
characteristics view is further split into two cases. In one case I shock all individuals
with the average income shock. In another case, I use the true distribution of income
shocks across individuals. As expected, under the circumstances view there is no
heterogeneity along the persistent characteristics dimension which is captured by the
average cash on hand quintiles. Also as expected, under the characteristics view,
individuals with low average cash on hand tend to have high MPCs while those with
high average cash on hand tend to have lower MPCs. Under the estimated parameters,
this leads to a larger aggregate MPC under the characteristics view relative to the
circumstances view.
The simulation under the great recession shock shows similar patterns in hetero-
geneity but the gap between the aggregate MPC is slightly higher. By breaking out
the response into an average shock and individual shock case, we see that the higher
MPC is due to the fact that individuals with low average cash received a larger shock
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than those with high cash on hand.
Table 1.14: Tax rebate simulation
No aggregate shock Great recession shock
Circumstances Characteristics Circumstances Characteristics Characteristics
(average shock) (individual shock)
Aggregate 0.32 0.37 0.51 0.55 0.58
cohi Q1 0.32 0.63 0.50 0.85 0.96
cohi Q2 0.32 0.47 0.51 0.68 0.77
cohi Q3 0.32 0.34 0.51 0.54 0.54
cohi Q4 0.32 0.27 0.52 0.46 0.44
cohi Q5 0.31 0.13 0.51 0.24 0.19
β 0.991 0.989 0.991 0.989 0.989
∆ 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.010 0.010
Notes: Simulated N=10,000
In summary, the tax rebate simulation shows that the aggregate MPC can differ
under the two views. However, the are some important caveats. First, the sample
used in this study is not necessarily representative of the U.S. population. Second, the
uniform distribution assumption is made partially for convenience and simplicity. In
future work, using a more representative sample and more realistic assumptions about
the distribution of preferences will lead to more accurate estimates of the aggregate
MPC.
1.6.2 MPC targeting
Tax rebates are usually issued as part of an economic stimulus package to boost
consumption and are loosely targeted based on income. For example, the 2008 tax
rebates started to phase out for taxpayers with adjusted gross income greater than
$75,000 for single individuals and $150,000 for joint filers.
The results from this paper imply that it is possible to target the MPC much more
precisely. For example, Figure 1.20 shows that the MPC varies predictably based on
interactions of pre-refund and average cash on hand quintiles. Individuals with low
pre-refund and low average cash on hand tend to have the highest MPCs. Conversely
57
individuals with high pre-refund and high average cash on hand tend to have the
lowest MPCs. This implies that in order to maximize the MPC, individuals with low
pre-refund and average cash on hand should receive higher rebates. In terms of the
terminology used in this paper, the fiscal authority can choose to target circumstances
or characteristics.
In order to target circumstances, the fiscal authority can calculate recent devia-
tions in income from permanent income (proxied using a recent average). Character-
istics can be estimated by calculating target buffer stock levels using interest income
filed on recent tax returns.















1 (Low avg coh) 2 3
4 5 (High avg coh)
While targeting the MPC in a way suggested by the model may be politically
or operationally unfeasible, the analysis highlights that understanding the sources
of heterogeneity in the MPC can provide fiscal authorities more levers in tailoring
stimulus packages.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper tests the two leading views in the literature on what theoretical mech-
anisms drive the negative correlation between the MPC and cash on hand. Under the
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circumstances view, individuals are ex-ante identical but differ in the circumstances
they face. Under the characteristics view, the economy is populated by different
types of individuals. These views are represented using a parsimonious buffer stock
model with discount factor heterogeneity. Testing the two views is complicated by
the fact that most data sources are not able to disentangle the effect of circumstances
and characteristics. This paper overcomes these challenges by by using a novel panel
dataset on joint spending, income, and liquid saving behavior from a personal finance
app. Identification is achieved by comparing the MPC within individuals over time
relative to the MPC across individuals.
The empirical results show that conditional on cash on hand levels in a certain
year, average cash on hand levels explain a significant amount of MPC heterogeneity.
Stated in terms of the model, even conditional on temporary circumstances, persis-
tent characteristics are important in explaining MPC heterogeneity. Furthermore, a
variance decomposition shows that persistent characteristics explain roughly half of
the variance in the MPC while temporary circumstances explain the other half. This
evidence shows that the characteristics view is much more consistent with the data
than the circumstance view.
Lastly, the dispersion of the discount factor is estimated using the simulated
method of moments and is roughly in line with other studies. Using the estimated
parameters, the spending response to a tax rebate is simulated under the two views.
The results show that ignoring heterogeneity in persistent characteristics will under
predict the aggregate MPC. Therefore, the simulations show that which view obtains
in the data can have important implications for policy relevant outcomes such as the
aggregate MPC. Future research should focus on estimating the parameters under a
more representative sample and relaxing the assumptions on the preference distribu-
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1.8 Appendix
1.8.1 Proof for variance decomposition
In equation 1.13, α, γ1, γ2 are assumed to be constant while εit is assumed to
be uncorrelated with any of the other regressors. Therefore, the only terms that can





theoretical covariance is calculated using the standard covariance formula as follows:
E[(cohi − E[cohi])(cohPRit − coh
PR
i − E[cohPRit − coh
PR
i ]) = (1.26)
E[E[(cohi − E[cohi])(cohPRit − coh
PR
i − E[cohPRit − coh
PR
i )|i]] = (1.27)
E[(cohi − E[cohi])E[(cohPRit − coh
PR
i − E[cohPRit − coh
PR
i )|i]] = (1.28)
E[(cohi − E[cohi])0] = (1.29)
0 (1.30)
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where the second line uses the law of iterated expectations and the third line uses the
fact that cohi − E[cohi] is a constant once we condition on individual i. Intuitively,
any variable that is invariant at the individual level should not be correlated with
any variable that is demeaned at the individual level.
1.8.2 Identifying paychecks
Keywords used to identify paychecks are “dir dep”,“dirde p”,“salary”,“treas xxx
fed”,“fed sal”,“payroll”,“ayroll”,“payrll”,“payrl”,“payrol”,“pr payment”,“adp”,“dfas-
cleveland”,“dfas-in” and DON’T include the keywords “ing direct”,“refund”,“direct
deposit advance”,“dir dep adv.”
1.8.3 Tax refund impulse response function
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Months since Tax Refund
Notes: 1,445,560 observations from 48,059 individuals. The vertical bars on
each coefficient represent 95% confidence intervals using heteroskedasticity
robust errors clustered at the individual level.
1.8.4 Machine learning algorithm
Most transactions in the data do not contain direct information on spending cat-
egory types. However, category types can be inferred from existing transaction data.
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In general, the mapping is not easy to construct. If a transaction is made at “McDon-
alds,” it’s easy to surmise that the category is “Fast Food Restaurants.” However, it
is much harder to identify smaller establishments such as “Bob’s store.” “Bob’s store”
may not uniquely identify an establishment in the data and it would take many hours
of work to look up exactly what types of goods these smaller establishments sell.
Luckily, the merchant category code (MCC) is observed for two account providers in
the data. MCCs are four digit codes used by credit card companies to classify spend-
ing and are also recognized by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service for tax reporting
purposes. If an individual uses an account provider that provides MCC information
“Bob’s store” will map into a spending category type.
The mapping from transaction data to MCC can be represented as Y = f(X)
where Y represents a vector of MCC codes and X represents a vector of transactions
data. The data is partitioned into two sets based on whether Y is known or not.10
The sets are also commonly referred to as training and prediction sets. The strategy
is to then estimate the mapping f̂(·) from (Y1, X1) and predict Ŷ0 = f̂(X0).
One option for the mapping is to use the multinomial logit model since the de-
pendent variable is a categorical variable with no cardinal meaning. However, this
approach is not well suited to textual data because each word would need its own
dummy variable. Furthermore, interactions may be important for classifying spend-
ing categories. For example “jack in the box” refers to a fast food chain while “jack s
surf shop” refers to a retail store. Including a dummy for each word can lead to about
300,000 variables. Including interaction terms will cause the number of variables to
grow exponentially and will typically be unfeasible to estimate.
In order to handle the textual nature of the data I use a machine learning algorithm
called random forest. A random forest model is composed of many decision trees that
map transaction data to MCCs. This mapping is created by splitting the sample up
10Y0 represents the set where Y is not known and Y1 represents the set where Y is known.
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into nodes depending on the features of the data. For example, for transactions that
have the keyword “McDonalds” and transaction amounts less that $20, the majority
of the transactions are associated with a MCC that represents fast food. To better
understand how the decision tree works, Figure 4.8.11 shows an example. The top
node represents the state of the data before any splits have been made. The first
row “transaction amount ≤ 19.935” represents the splitting criteria of the first node.
The second row is the Gini measure which is explained below. The third row show
that there are 866,424 total transactions to be classified in the sample. The fourth
row “value=[4202,34817,. . . ,27158,720]” shows the number of transactions in each
spending category. The last row represents the majority class in this node. Because
“Restaurants” has the highest number of transactions, assigning a random transaction
to this category minimizes the categorization error without knowing any information
about the transaction. At each node in the tree, the sample is split based on a
feature. For example, the first split will be based on whether the transaction amount
is ≤ 19.935. The left node represents all the transactions for which the statement
is true and vice versa. Transactions ≤ 19.935 are more likely to be “Restraunts”
spending while transactions > 19.934 are more likely to be “Gas and Grocery.” In
our example, the sample is split further to the left of the tree. Transactions with
the string “mcdonalds” are virtually guaranteed to be “Restaurant” spending. A
further split shows that the string “amazon” is almost perfectly correlated with the
category “Retail Shopping.” How does the algorithm decide which features to split
the sample on? The basic intuition is that the algorithm should split the sample based
on features that lead to the largest disparities in the different groups. For example,
transactions that have the word “mcdonalds” will tend to split the sample into fast
food and non-fast food transactions so it is a good feature to split on. Conversely,
“bob” is not a very good feature to split on because it can represent a multitude of
different types of spending depending on what the other features are.
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value = [4202, 34817, 19656, 198096, 24857, 10180, 29834, 887, 18074





value = [1259, 17899, 9809, 86867, 7595, 1928, 13651, 115, 6478, 16220
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35241, 79070, 96222, 15886, 596]
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value = [1259, 17899, 9809, 86862, 7595, 1928, 13602, 115, 6478, 16199




value = [0, 0, 0, 4, 0, 0, 49, 0, 0, 21, 0, 9791, 0, 0]
class = Retail Shopping
I state the procedure more formally by adapting the notation used in (Pedregosa
et al., 2011). Define the possible features as vectors Xi ∈ Rn and the spending
categories as vector y ∈ Rl. Let the data at node m be presented by Q. For each
candidate split θ = (j, tm) consisting of a feature j and threshold tm, partition the
data into Qleft(θ) and Qright(θ) subsets so that
Qleft(θ) = (X, y)|xj ≤ tm (1.31)
Qright(θ) = Q \Qleft(θ) (1.32)
The goal is then to split the data at each node in the starkest way possible. A






where pmk = 1/Nm
∑
xi∈Rm I(yi = k) represents the proportion of category k obser-
vations in node m.
If there are only two categories, the function is is minimized at 0 when the transac-
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tions are perfectly split into the two categories11 and maximized when the transactions
are evenly split between the two categories.12
Therefore, the algorithm should choose the feature to split on that minimizes the








The algorithm acts recursively so the same procedure is performed on Qleft(θ
∗)
and Qright(θ
∗) until a user-provided stopping criteria is reached. The final outcome is
a decision rule f̂(·) that maps features in the transaction data to spending categories.
This example shows that decision trees are much more effective in mapping high
dimensional data that includes text to spending categories. However, fitting just one
tree might lead to over-fitting. Therefore, a random forest fits many trees by boot-
strapping the samples of the original data and also randomly selecting the features
used in the decision tree. With the proliferation of processing power, each tree can
be fit in parallel and the final decision rule is based on all the decision trees. The
most common rule is take the majority decision of all the trees that are fit.
1.8.5 Demeaning by cohi instead of coh
PR
i
This section compares the results for the characteristics variance share when de-
meaning cohPRit by cohi instead of coh
PR
i . The difference is that cohi is no longer the
mean of cohPRit so the demeaned term will not have mean 0. This also means that the
demeaned term will not be orthogonal to cohi.
Taking the variance of both sides under the alternative demeaned term results in
the following equation that now involves a covariance term.
11because 0*1 + 1*0 = 0.
12because 0.5*0.5 + 0.5*0.5 = 0.5.
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it − cohi) + var(εit) (1.35)
Table 1.15 shows the variance-covariance matrix of the MPC and coh terms.












i ) -0.034 0.000 0.370
(cohPRit − cohi) -0.046 -0.130 0.368 0.530
In order calculate the variance shares, I first estimate the γ̂ terms. Table 1.16
shows the results when the different methods of demeaning are used.









(cohPRit − cohi) -0.10***
(0.00)
Observations 129,823 129,823
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Using the input from table 1.15 and 1.16, table 1.17 shows the results of the
variance decomposition for each method of demeaning. The column “share” calculates
the share of each component among the terms that represent cash on hand.
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value share value share
var(MPCit) 0.8169 - 0.8169 -





i ) 0.0032 0.54 - -
γ22var(coh
PR
it − cohi) - - 0.0055 0.69
2γ1γ2cov(cohi, (coh
PR
it − cohi)) - - -0.0017 -0.21
var(ε) 0.8110 - 0.8089 -
Under the baseline specification, the characteristics variance share is 0.46. If we
assume the covariance term is split evenly between the characteristics and circum-
stances component in the alternative specification, the characteristics variance share
is 0.42.
1.8.6 Including higher order terms
This section calculates the characteristics variance share after including higher
order terms for the circumstances and characteristics components.
MPCit = α + γ1 × cohi + γ2coh
2
i + . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
characteristics
+
γn+1 × (cohPRit − coh
PR
i ) + γn+2 × (cohPRit − coh
PR
i )




where E[εit] = 0 and n is the number of terms included for each component. The
variance of both sides is calculated as
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var(MPCit) = var(α) + var
(
γ1 × cohi + γ2coh
2





γn+1 × (cohPRit − coh
PR
i ) + γn+2 × (cohPRit − coh
PR
i )
2 + . . .
)
+ var(εit) (1.37)
I define the variance contribution as σ2char = var
(
γ1 × cohi + γ2coh
2





γn+1 × (cohPRit − coh
PR
i ) + γn+2 × (cohPRit − coh
PR
i )
2 + . . .
)
. These terms
capture the variance contribution of the characteristics and circumstances component





, this value represents the
fraction of var(MPCit) explained by cash on hand that is attributable to character-
istics.
The polynomial approximation stops improving after the sixth degree polynomial.
Table 1.18 shows the coefficient estimates for the cash on hand terms.
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Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
With up to the sixth-order terms included, σ2char = 0.0038, σ
2
circ = 0.0046, and
φchar = 0.45.
The following figures show the relationship between the MPC and each component
of cash on hand under a zero degree kernel smoother and the sixth degree polynomial
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function.
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Average cash on hand
Non−parametric Sixth degree polynomial
Notes: The non-parametric figure is created using a kernel smoothing method using
only the mean. The gray area represents a 95% confident interval.
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Demeaned pre−refund cash on hand
Non−parametric Sixth degree polynomial
Notes: The non-parametric figure is created using a kernel smoothing method using
only the mean. The gray area represents a 95% confident interval.
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CHAPTER II
How Individuals Smooth Spending: Evidence from
the 2013 Government Shutdown Using Account
Data
2.1 Introduction
How consumers respond to changes in income is a central concern of economic
analysis and is key for policy evaluation. This paper uses the October 2013 U.S.
Federal Government shutdown and a newly developed dataset of financial account
records to examine how consumers with different levels of liquidity, income, and
spending respond to a short-lived and entirely reversed drop in income. For affected
government employees, the shutdown caused a sharp decline in income that was
recovered within two weeks. The new dataset, derived from the de-identified account
records of more than 1 million individuals living in the United States, provides a
granular and integrated view of how individuals in different economic circumstances
adjusted spending, saving, and debt in response to the shock.
The most important findings are, first, that many workers routinely have very low
levels of liquidity, especially in the days just before their regular paycheck arrives. Sec-
ond, and consistent with low liquidity, spending by affected workers declined sharply
in response to the drop in income caused by the shutdown – though the drop lasted
at most two weeks and was then offset by an equal increase. Third, the granularity
and integration of the data reveal the means used by affected workers to smooth
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consumption—if not spending—most notably their delay of recurring expenses such
as mortgage payments and credit card balances. Last, though many workers found
very low-cost ways to weather the shock, some with low liquidity who were already
relying on credit card debt accumulated still more credit card debt.
Prior studies that measure the response of individuals to changes in income have
faced two challenges. First, the optimal reaction to an income change depends both on
whether the change is anticipated, and on its persistence; but standard data sources
make it difficult to identify shocks to expected income and the longevity of these
shocks. Second, analysis and policy prescriptions often require a comprehensive view
of the heterogeneous responses to an income change. Existing data typically capture
only some dimensions with sufficient resolution. They may measure total spending
with precision, but not savings or debt; or they measure spending and debt well, but
do not measure income with similar accuracy.
We overcome the challenge of identifying income shocks and their persistence
by using the 2013 U.S. Federal Government shutdown, which produced a significant,
temporary, and easily identified negative shock to the incomes of a large number of em-
ployees. We address the challenge of measuring a household’s full range of responses
to this shock by exploiting a new dataset derived from the integrated transactions
and balance data of more than 1 million individuals in the U.S.1
More specifically, the data allow us to distinguish Federal government employees
subject to the shutdown. They are distinguished by the transaction description as-
sociated with direct deposit of their paychecks to their bank accounts. Knowing who
was subject to the income shock, we can examine their responses in terms of spend-
ing and other variables before, during, and after the government shutdown. These
responses are estimated by a difference-in-difference approach, where the outcomes of
1The data are captured in the course of business by a mobile banking app. While newly developed,
this dataset has already proved useful for studying the high-frequency response of spending to
regular, anticipated income by levels of spending, income, and liquidity (Gelman et al. 2014). The
related literature section below discusses other studies that use similar types of account data.
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affected government workers are compared with those of a control group consisting
of workers that have the same biweekly pay schedule as the Federal government, but
who were not subject to the shutdown. The control group is mainly non-Federal
workers, though also includes some Federal workers not subject to the shutdown.
The pay of a typical affected worker was 40% below normal during the shutdown
because the government was closed from October 1 to October 16, 2013, thus including
the last four days of the previous ten-day pay period. By the next pay period,
however, government operations had resumed and workers were reimbursed fully for
the income lost during the shutdown. The transaction data clearly show this pattern
for affected workers. This event combined with the distinctive features of the data,
which link income, spending, and liquid assets at a high frequency for each individual,
provides an unusual opportunity to study the response to a relatively sizeable shock
that affected just the timing of income for individuals across the income distribution,
without any net effect on their lifetime incomes. See the related literature section
below for a discussion of the distinctions of this study.
An important fact revealed by the balance records is that many affected employees
maintained low levels of liquid assets (checking and saving account balances), espe-
cially in the days just before their regular paychecks arrive. Prior to the shutdown,
the median worker in the data held an average liquid assets balance sufficient to cover
just eight days of average spending. Moreover, liquidity exhibits systematic changes
over the pay-cycle. Just before payday, the median level of liquidity is only five days
of average spending. Indeed, a substantial fraction of this population barely lives
paycheck-to-paycheck. On the day before their paycheck arrives, the bottom third of
the liquidity distribution has, on average, a liquid asset balance of zero.
Given such low levels of liquidity, it is perhaps unsurprising that the transaction
records show a sharp drop in total spending by affected workers during the week of
missing paycheck income. Weekly spending declined by roughly half the reduction
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in income and then recovered roughly equally over the two pay periods following the
end of the shutdown. Econometric analysis reveals a marginal propensity to spend
of about 0.58 as a response to the income shock. Most individuals reversed this drop
in spending immediately after they receive the paychecks that reimbursed them for
their lost income.
On its face, it is troubling that so many affected workers maintained such low
liquidity and exhibited such a sharp spending response to an unexpected but brief
delay in income. It suggests either that benchmark theories founded on a taste for
smoothing consumption are badly specified; that households are inadequately buffered
against even very temporary shocks; or that the financial markets that make smooth-
ing possible are functioning poorly.
Further examination of the data reveals, however, that even consumers with low
liquidity can smooth consumption better than spending using low-cost methods to
shift the timing of payments for committed forms of expenditure. More detailed
analysis shows that affected workers delayed mortgage payments, in particular; and
many individuals shifted credit card balance payments. At the same time, the data
show no increase in spending on credit cards; average debt only increased due to
delays in debt payments. Hence, while they responded to the temporary shock by
reducing spending, a large part of their reaction was to delay recurring payments
that impose little to no penalty. This shows how consumers make use of short-term
margins of adjustment that are mostly overlooked in the literature on methods of
smoothing consumption in response to at least temporary income shocks. As such,
it also reveals a potentially important welfare benefit of, especially, mortgages with
low interest rates. Mortgages can function as a (cheap) line of credit that can help
smooth even large, if brief, shocks to income at relatively low cost.
While the data show that many affected workers were able to use perhaps uncon-
ventional means to smooth consumption, if not spending, for some with low liquidity
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these methods were either inadequate or unavailable. This group, who was carrying
some credit card debt already, emerged from the shutdown with still more debt owing
to failure to make payments rather than new borrowing.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the paper’s
relationship to prior studies of individual responses to income shocks. Section 3
provides key facts about the circumstances surrounding the shutdown. Section 4
describes the data and our research design. It establishes that many workers regularly
have low liquidity prior to receiving their paycheck. Section 5 estimates the average
response of spending and liquid assets to the shock. Section 6 considers heterogeneity
in these responses across the liquidity distribution and examines the consequences for
credit card debt.
2.2 Related Literature
The literature concerned with individual responses to income shocks is large.
Jappelli and Pistaferri (2010) offer an insightful review. Relative to that large lit-
erature, a principal distinction of our paper is the integrated, administrative data
that allow accurate observation of liquidity, of the income shock itself, and of sev-
eral forms of response to the shock. These data thus provide measures of important
constraints and outcomes that allow improved inference from the heterogeneous and
multi-dimensional reactions to this change in income.
Prior studies of income shocks have mostly relied on the self-reports of survey
respondents to provide information either about the shock or about the response of
spending and savings and debt.2 Carroll, Crossley, and Sabelhaus (2013), Dillman
and House (2013), Einav and Levin (2014), and others, have called for increased use of
administrative records to augment survey research. So far, however, the administra-
2See, for example, Souleles (1999), Browning and Crossley (2001), Shapiro and Slemrod (2003),
and Johnson et al. (2006).
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tive records available for research have typically represented just a slice of economic
activity, either providing information about spending at just one retailer, or about
the use of a few credit cards, or about just one form of spending.3 Other approaches
blend survey and administrative data. For example, Broda and Parker (2014) and
Parker (2015) use consumer-based scanner data to study the response of spending to
an income shock; and use surveys for measuring income.4 This paper is different from
these studies of purely administrative data and from those of blended data sources:
The integrated data we use provide an accurate, high-resolution, and high frequency
picture of liquidity before the shock, and both the spending and net saving responses
to the shock.
By using integrated account records, this paper is part of a new and still small
literature that includes Baker (2014), Kuchler (2014), Gelman et al. (2014), and Baker
and Yannelis (2015). Baker (2014) uses account records from an online banking app,
links them to external data on employers, and instruments for individuals’ income
changes with news about their employers. Because they are persistent, theory suggests
that some of these income shocks (from layoffs or plant closings, e.g.) should have
different implications for spending from the one caused by the government shutdown.
Nevertheless, like the present paper, Baker (2014) finds evidence of the importance of
liquidity (more than debt) for the spending response to an income shock. The present
paper is distinct in its study of the methods by which those with very little liquidity
smooth consumption through a temporary income shock.
Kuchler (2014) studies integrated account records from an online financial man-
agement service that elicits from its customers plans for paying down credit card
debt. Kuchler (2014) uses those plans, along with the spending responses to income
3See, for example, Gross and Souleles (2002), Agarwal, Liu, and Souleles (2007), and Aguiar and
Hurst (2005).
4Einav, Leibtag, and Nevo (2010) discuss the challenges that even scanner technologies like
Nielsen Consumer Panel (formerly Homescan), and Feenstra and Shapiro (2003) discuss the chal-
lenges of using store-based scanner data to measure expenditure and prices.
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changes, to evaluate a model of present-biased time preferences.
Gelman et al. (2014) use a small subsample of the same data we use in this
paper to study the spending response to the arrival of predictable (paycheck and
Social Security benefit) income. That paper did not examine other outcomes besides
spending. Finally, in a complementary study completed shortly after ours, Baker
and Yannelis (2015) use data from the same banking app used in Baker (2014) to
describe the response of affected government workers to the 2013 shutdown. Baker
and Yannelis (2015) focuses on income and spending, but does not integrate those
outcomes with financial positions. Their analysis confirms that the spending and
income response to the government shutdown is identifiable in these data sets. From
these initial facts, their paper analyzes time allocation and home production. Our
paper focuses on the precarious liquidity position individuals find themselves in near
the end of the paycheck cycle and the different channels through which individuals
smoothed their consumption.
The shutdown also is a distinctive shock. The shock is large, negative, and propor-
tional to income. These features stand in contrast to shocks arising from government
stimulus payments, which are positive and often weakly related to income. See, for
example, Shapiro and Slemrod (1995, 2003), Johnson et al. (2006), Parker et al.
(2013), Agarwal et al. (2007), Bertrand and Morse (2009), Broda and Parker (2014),
Parker (2015), and Agarwal and Qian (2014). The government shutdown caused a
40% drop in anticipated paycheck income for individuals across a wide range of the
income distribution. Thus, unlike the stimulus payments, the shutdown represented
a sizeable, albeit temporary, shock even to high-income households.
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2.3 The 2013 U.S. Government Shutdown
2.3.1 Background
The U.S. government was shut down from October 1 to October 16, 2013 because
Congress did not pass legislation to appropriate funds for fiscal year 2014. While
Federal government shutdowns have historical precedent, it was difficult to anticipate
whether this shutdown would occur and how long it would last.5 The shutdown was
preceded by a series of legislative battles surrounding the Affordable Care Act (ACA),
also known as Obamacare. Key events and their timing are described in Figure 1.
Opponents of the ACA in the House of Representatives sought to tie FY 2014
appropriations to defunding the ACA. They used the threat of a shutdown as a lever
in their negotiations and thus generated considerable uncertainty about whether a
shutdown would occur. Just days before the deadline to appropriate funding and
avoid a shutdown, there was substantial uncertainty over what would happen. A
YouGov/Huffington Post survey conducted on September 28-29, 2013 showed that
44% of U.S. adults thought Congress would reach a deal to avoid a shutdown while
26% thought they would not, and 30% were unsure. A similar survey taken after
the shutdown began on October 2-3, 2013 showed substantial uncertainty over its ex-
pected duration. 7% thought the shutdown would last less than a week, 31% thought
one or two weeks, 19% thought three or four weeks, and 10% thought the shutdown
would last more than a month. 33% were unsure of how long it would last.6 For
most federal employees, therefore, the shutdown and its duration were likely difficult
to anticipate at the outset. While it was not a complete surprise, it was a shock to
many that the shutdown did indeed occur. On the other hand, as we will discuss in
the next subsection, the shutdown was essentially resolved contemporaneously with
5There have been 12 shutdowns since 1980 with an average length of 4 days. The longest previous
shutdown lasted for 21 days in 1995-1996. See Mataconis (2011).
6Each survey was based on 1,000 U.S. adults. See YouGov/Huffington Post (2013a, b).
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the receipt of the paycheck affected by the shutdown. Hence, there was no reason
based on permanent income to respond to the drop in income.
2.3.2 Impact on Federal Employees
Our analysis focuses on the consequences of the shutdown for a group of the
approximately 2.1 million federal government employees. The funding gap that caused
the shutdown meant that most federal employees could not be paid until funding
legislation was passed. The 1.3 million employees deemed necessary to protect life and
property were required to work. They were not, however, paid during the shutdown
for work that they did during the shutdown. The 800,000 “non-essential” employees
were simply furloughed without pay.7 In previous shutdowns, employees were paid
retroactively (whether or not they were furloughed). Of course, it was not entirely
clear what would happen in 2013. On October 5, however, the House passed a bill to
provide back pay to all federal employees after the resolution of the shutdown. While
not definitive, this legislation was strong reassurance that the precedent of retroactive
pay would be respected, as in fact it was when the shutdown concluded. After the
October 5 Congressional action, most of the remaining income risk to employees was
due to the uncertain duration of the shutdown and to potential cost-cutting measures
that could be part of a deal on the budget.
Unlike most private sector workers, Federal workers are routinely paid with a lag
of about a week, so the October 5 House vote came before reduced paychecks were
issued. For most government employees, the relevant pay periods are September 22 -
October 5, 2013 and October 6 - October 19, 2013. Because the shutdown started in
the latter part of the first relevant pay period, employees did not receive payment for
5 days of the 14 day pay period. For most employees on a Monday to Friday work
7Some federal employees were paid through funds not tied to the legislation in question and were
not affected. The Pentagon recalled its approximately 350,000 employees on October 5, reducing
the number of furloughed employees to 450,000.
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schedule, this would lead to 4 unpaid days out of 10 working days, so they would
receive 40% less than typical pay. The actual fraction varies with hours and days
worked and because of taxes and other payments or debits. Since the government
shutdown ended before the next pay date, employees who only received a partial
paycheck were fully reimbursed in their next paycheck.
Federal government employees are a distinctive subset of the workforce. Accord-
ing to a Congressional Budget Office report (CBO 2012), however, federal employees
represent a wide variety of skills and experiences in more than 700 occupations. Com-
pared to private sector employees, they tend to be older, more educated, and more
concentrated in professional occupations. Table 1 below reproduces Summary Ta-
ble 1 in the CBO report. Overall, total compensation is slightly higher for federal
employees. Breaking down the compensation difference by educational attainment
shows that federal employees are compensated relatively more at low levels of edu-
cation while the opposite holds for the higher end of the education distribution. In
the next section, we make similar comparisons based on Federal versus non-Federal
employees in our data. The analysis must be interpreted, however, with the caution
that Federal employees may not have identical behavioral responses as the general
population. We return to this issue in the discussion of the results.
2.4 Data and Design
2.4.1 Data
The source of the data analyzed here is a financial aggregation and bill-paying
computer and smartphone application that had approximately 1.5 million active users
in the U.S. in 2013.8 Users can link almost any financial account to the app, including
8We gratefully acknowledge the partnership with the financial services application that makes
this work possible. All data are de-identified prior to being made available to the project researchers.
Analysis is carried out on data aggregated and normalized at the individual level. Only aggregated
results are reported.
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bank accounts, credit card accounts, utility bills, and more. Each day, the application
logs into the web portals for these accounts and obtains key elements of the user’s
financial data including balances, transaction records and descriptions, the price of
credit and the fraction of available credit used.
We draw on the entire de-identified population of active users and data derived
from their records from late 2012 until October 2014. The data are de-identified and
the analysis is performed on normalized and aggregated user-level data as described
in the Appendix. The firm does not collect demographic information directly and
instead uses a third party business that gathers both public and private sources of
demographics, anonymizes them, and matches them back to the de-identified dataset.
Appendix Table A (replicated from Table 1 of Gelman et al. 2014) compares the
gender, age, education, and geographic distributions in a subset of the sample to
the distributions in the U.S. Census American Community Survey (ACS) that is
representative of the U.S. population in 2012. The app’s user population is not
representative of the U.S. population, but it is heterogeneous, including large numbers
of users of different ages, education levels, and geographic locations.
We identify paychecks using the transaction description of checking account de-
posits. Among these paychecks, we identify Federal employees by further details in
the transaction description. The appendix describes details for identifying paychecks
in general and Federal paychecks in particular. It also discusses the extent to which
we are capturing the expected number of Federal employees in the data. The number
of federal employees and their distribution across agencies paying them are in line
with what one would expect if these employees enroll in the app at roughly the same
frequency as the general population.
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2.4.2 Design: Treatment and Controls
Much of the following analysis uses a difference-in-differences approach to study
how Federal employees reacted to the effects of the government shutdown. The treat-
ment group consists of Federal employees whose paycheck income we observe chang-
ing as a result of the shutdown. The control group consists of employees that have
the same biweekly pay schedule as the Federal government who were not subject
to the shutdown (see the Appendix for more details). The control group is mainly
non-Federal employees, but also includes some Federal employees not subject to the
shutdown.9 Table 2 shows summary statistics from the app’s data for these groups of
employees. As in the CBO study cited above, Federal employees in our sample have
higher incomes. They also have higher spending, higher liquid balances, and higher
credit card balances.
We use the control group of employees not subject to the shutdown to account
for a number of factors that might affect income and spending during the shutdown:
these include aggregate shocks and seasonality in income and spending. Additionally,
interactions of pay date, spending, and day of week are important (see Gelman et al.
2014). Requiring the treatment and control to have the same pay dates and pay date
schedule (biweekly on the Federal schedule) is a straightforward and important way
to control for these substantial, but subtle effects.
There is, of course, substantial variability in economic circumstance across indi-
viduals both within and across treatment and controls. We normalize many variables
by average daily spending, or where relevant by average account balances) at the
9Employees not subject to the shutdown include military, some civilian Defense Department, Post
Office, and other employees paid by funds not involved in the shutdown. An alternative strategy
would use just the Federal workers not affected by the shutdown as the control. We do not adopt
this strategy because we believe a priori that it is less suitable because the workers exempted from
the shutdown are in non-random agencies and occupations. This selectivity makes them potentially
less suitable as a control. For completeness, however, the Appendix includes key results using the
unaffected Federal workers as the control. The findings are quite similar though less precise because
of smaller sample size.
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individual level. This normalization is a simple, and given the limited covariates in
the data, a practical way to pool individuals with very different levels of income and
spending. In particular, it serves to equalize the differences in income levels between
treatment and control seen in Table 2.
By showing a wide span of data before and after the shutdown, Figure 2 provides
strong evidence of the adequacy of the control group and the effectiveness of using
average daily spending as the normalization. Figure 2 shows that the employees not
subject to the shutdown have nearly identical movement in spending except during
the weeks surrounding the shutdown. Thus the controls appear effective at captur-
ing aggregate shocks, seasonality, payday interactions, etc. In particular, note the
regular, biweekly pattern of fluctuations in spending. It arises largely from the tim-
ing of spending following receipt of the bi-weekly paychecks. There are also subtler
beginning-of-month effects—also related to timing of spending. In subsequent figures
we use a narrower window to highlight the effects of the shutdown.
Gelman et al. (2014) shows that much of the sensitivity of spending to receipt of
paycheck, like that seen in Figure 2, arises from reasonable choices of individuals to
time recurring payments—such as mortgage payments, rent, or other recurring bills—
immediately after receipt of paychecks. Figure 2 makes clear that the control group
does a good job of capturing this feature of the data and therefore eliminating ordinary
paycheck effects from the analysis. The first vertical line in Figure 2 indicates the
week in which employees affected by the shutdown were paid roughly 40% less than
their average paycheck. There is a large gap between the treatment and control group
during this week. Similarly, the second vertical line indicates the week of the first
paycheck after the shutdown. The rebound in spending is discernable for two weeks.
The figure thus demonstrates that the control group represents a valid counterfactual
for spending that occurred in the absence of the government shutdown.
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2.4.3 Liquidity Before the Shutdown
To understand how affected employees responded to the shutdown, it is useful to
examine first how they and others like them managed their liquid assets prior to the
shock. Analysis of liquid asset balances before the shutdown shows that, while some
workers were well buffered, many were ill-prepared to use liquid assets to smooth even
a brief income shock.
We define liquid assets as the balance on all checking and savings accounts. The
measure of liquidity is based on daily snapshots of account balances. Hence, they are
measures of the stock of liquid assets independent from the transactional data used
to measure spending and income. Having such high-frequency data makes it possible
to observe distinctive, new evidence on liquidity and how it interacts with shocks.
Figure 3 shows median liquidity over the pay-cycle, by terciles of the distribution of
liquidity. Liquidity is expressed as a ratio of checking and savings account balances
to average daily total spending. The results are for the period prior to the shutdown
and aggregate over both treatment and control groups.10,11
While the optimal level of liquidity is not clear, the figure shows the top third
of the liquidity distribution is well-positioned to handle the income shock due to the
shutdown. The median of this group could maintain more than a month of average
spending with their checking and savings account balances, even in the days just
before their paycheck arrives.
10The distributions for treatment and control are similar. For example, in the control group the
median liquidity ratio for the first, second, and third, terciles of the liquidity distribution is, 2.9,
7.9, and 32.1, respectively. The analogous numbers for the treatment group are 3.3, 8.1, and 32.0.
11Liquidity peaks two days after a payday. The balance data are based on funds available, so
liquidity should lag payday according to the banks funds-availability policy. There is at least one-
day lag built into the data because the balances are scraped during the day, so will reflect a paycheck
posted the previous day. Appendix Figure A4 shows that the two-day delay in the peak of liquidity
is due to funds availability, not delays in posting based on interactions of day of payday and delays
in posting of transactions over the week-end. (As discussed in the Appendix, even within the
government bi-weekly pay schedule, there is some heterogeneity in day of week of the payday.)
Additionally, liquidity is, of course, net of inflows and outflows. Recurring payments made just after
the receipt of paycheck will therefore lead daily balances to understate gross liquidity right after the
receipt of the paycheck.
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The lower two-thirds of the liquidity distribution has a substantially smaller cush-
ion. Over the entire pay-cycle, the middle tercile has median liquid assets equal to
7.9 days of average spending. Liquidity drops to only 5 days of average spending in
the days just before their paycheck arrives. Thus, even in the middle of the liquidity
distribution many would be hard pressed to use liquid savings to smooth a tempo-
rary loss of 4 days pay. The bottom third of this population is especially ill-prepared.
Prior to the shutdown, the median of this group consistently arrives at payday with
precisely zero liquid balances. (Balances can be negative owing to overdrafts.) These
balance data thus reveal how, even among those with steady employment, large frac-
tions of consumers do not have the liquid assets to absorb a large, but brief, shock to
income.
2.5 Responses to the Shutdown
Having established that many (affected) workers had little liquidity prior to the
shutdown, we now examine how their income, and various form of spending responded
to the shutdown. Our method is to estimate the difference-in-difference, between







βk ×Weeki,k × Shuti + Γ′Xi,t + εi,t, (2.1)
where y represents the outcome variable (total spending, non-recurring spending, in-
come, debt, savings, etc.), i indexes individuals (i ∈ {1, ..., N}), and t indexes time
(t ∈ {1, ..., T}). Weeki,k is a complete set of indicator variables for each individual-
week in the sample, Shuti is a binary variable equal to 1 if individual i is in the treat-
ment group and 0 otherwise, and Xi,t represents controls to absorb the predictable
variation arising from bi-weekly pay week patterns.12 The βk coefficients capture the
12Specifically, Xi,t contains dummies for paycheck week, treatment, and their interaction. This
specification allows the response of treatment and control to ordinary paychecks to differ. These
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average weekly difference in the outcome variables of the treatment group relative
to the control group. Standard errors in all regression analyses are clustered at the
individual level and adjusted for conditional heteroskedasticity.
2.5.1 Paycheck Income and Total Spending
We begin with an examination of how income, as measured in these data, was
affected by the shutdown. External reports indicate that the paycheck income of af-
fected employees should have dropped by 40% on average. The analysis of paycheck
income here can thus be viewed, in part, as testing the ability of these data to accu-
rately measure that drop. Once that ability is confirmed, we move to an evaluation
of the spending responses.
Recall that we normalize each variable of interest, measured at the individual level,
by the individual’s average daily spending computed over the entire sample period.
The unit of analysis in our figures is therefore days of average spending. Figure 4
plots the estimated βk from equation (1) where y is normalized paycheck income.
We plot three months before and after the government shutdown to highlight the
effect of the event. The first vertical line (dashed-blue) represents the week that the
shutdown began and the second vertical line (solid-red) represents the week in which
pay dropped due to the shutdown, and the third when pay was restored.
Panel A of Figure 4 shows, as expected, a drop in income equal to approximately
4 days of average daily total spending during the first paycheck period after the
shutdown.13 This drop quickly recovers during the first paycheck period after the
shutdown ends, as all users are reimbursed for their lost income. Some users received
their reimbursement paychecks earlier than usual, so the recovery is spread across
controls are only necessary in the estimates for paycheck income.
13The biweekly paychecks dropped by 40 percent on average. For the sample, paycheck income
is roughly 70 percent of total spending on average because there are other sources of income. So a
drop of paycheck income corresponding to 4 days of average daily spending is about what one would
expect (4 days ≈ 0.4× 0.7× 14 days).
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two weeks. The results confirm that the treatment group is indeed subject to the
temporary loss and subsequent recovery of income that was caused by the government
shutdown, and that the account data allow an accurate measure of those income
changes.
Panel B of Figure 4 plots the results on total spending, showing the estimated βk
where y is normalized total spending. On average, total spending drops by about 2
days of spending in the week the reduced paycheck was received. Hence, the drop in
spending upon impact is about half the drop in income. That implies a propensity to
spend of about one-half—much higher than most theories would predict for a drop of
income that was widely expected to be made up in the relatively near future. In the
inter-paycheck week, spending is about normal. In the second week after the paycheck
affected by the shutdown, spending rebounds with the recovery spread mainly over
that week and the next one.
To ease interpretation we convert the patterns observed in Figure 4 into an esti-
mate of the marginal propensity to spend (which we call the MPC as conventional).
Let τ be the week of the reduced paycheck during the shutdown. The variable si,τ−k
denotes total spending for individual i in the k weeks surrounding that week. To
estimate the MPC, we consider the relationship,
si,τ−k = αk + β
MPC
k (Paychecki,τ − Paychecki,τ−2) + εi,τ−k, (2.2)
where (Paychecki,τ − Paychecki,τ−2) is the change in paycheck income. Both si,τ−k
and Paychecki,τ are normalized by individual-level average daily spending as dis-
cussed above. We present estimates for the one and two week anticipation of the
drop in pay (k = 1 and k = 2), the contemporaneous MPC (k = 0), and one lagged
MPC (k = −1). We do not consider further lags because the effect of the lost pay is
confounded by the effect of the reimbursed pay beginning at time τ + 2.
There are multiple approaches to estimating equation (2). The explanatory vari-
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able is the change in paycheck. We are interested in isolating the effect on spending
due to the exogenous drop in pay for employees affected by the shutdown. While in
concept this treatment represents a 40 percent drop in income for the affected em-
ployees and 0 for the controls, there are idiosyncratic movements in income unrelated
to the shutdown. First, not all employees affected by the shutdown had exactly a 40
percent drop in pay because of differences in work schedule or overtime during the
pay period. Second, there are idiosyncratic movements in pay in the control group.
Therefore, to estimate the effect of the shutdown using equation (2) we use an instru-
mental variables approach where the instrument is a dummy variable Shuti. The IV
estimate is numerically equivalent to the difference-in-difference estimator.14
Table 3 shows the estimates of the MPC. These estimates confirm that the total
spending of government employees reacted strongly to their drop in income and that
this reaction was focused largely during the week that their reduced paycheck arrived.
The estimate of the average MPC is 0.58 in this week, with much smaller coefficients
in the two weeks just prior. Thus, at the margin, about half of the lost income was
reflected in reduced spending.
2.5.2 Spending and Payments by Type
Analyzing different categories of spending offers further insight into the response of
these users to the income drop. We separate spending into non-recurring and recurring
components. Recurring spending is identified using patterns in both the amount
14Estimating equation (2) by least squares should produce a substantially attenuated estimate
relative to the true effect of the shutdown if there is idiosyncratic movement in income among the
control group, some of which results in changes in spending. In addition, if the behavioral response
to the shutdown differs across individuals in ways related to variation in the change in paycheck
caused by the shutdown (e.g., because employees with overtime pay might have systematically
different MPCs), the difference between the OLS and IV estimates would also reflect treatment
heterogeneity. This heterogeneity could lead the OLS estimate to be either larger or smaller than
the IV estimate, depending on the correlation between of the size of the shutdown-induced shock
and the MPC. The OLS estimate of the MPC for the week the reduced paycheck arrived is 0.123,
with a standard error of 0.004.
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and transaction description of each individual transaction.15 It identifies spending
that, due to its regularity, is very likely to be a committed form of expenditure
(see Grossman and Laroque (1990), Chetty and Szeidl (2007), and Postlewaite, et
al. (2008)). Non-recurring spending is total spending minus recurring spending.
These measures thus use the amount and timing of spending rather than an a priori
categorization based on goods and services. This approach to categorization is made
possible by the distinctive features of the data infrastructure.
Figure 5 presents estimates of the βk from equation (1) where the outcome variable
y takes on different spending, payment, or transfer categories. For each graph, the
data are normalized by individual-level averages for the series being plotted. In the
top two panels we can compare the normalized response of recurring and non-recurring
spending and see important heterogeneity in the spending response by category. The
results on total spending (Figure 4) showed an asymmetry in the spending response
before and after the income shock; total spending dropped roughly by 2 days of
average spending during the three weeks after the shutdown began and only rose by
1.6 days of average spending during the three weeks after the shutdown ended. The
reaction of recurring spending drives much of that asymmetry; it dropped by 2.6
days of average recurring spending and rose only by 0.84 days once the lost income
was recovered. Non-recurring spending exhibits the opposite tendency: it dropped
by 1.8 days of average non-recurring spending and rose by 2.0 days. Thus, recurring
spending drops more and does not recover as strongly as non-recurring spending.
To better understand this pattern of recurring expenditure and its significance we
focus on a particular, and especially important, type of recurring spending—mortgage
payments. Panel C of Figure 5 shows that, while the mortgage spending data is noisier
15We identify recurring spending using two techniques. First, we define a payment as recurring if
it takes the same amount at a regular periodicity. This definition captures payments such as rent
or mortgages. Second, we also use transaction fields to identify payments that are made to the
same payee at regular intervals, but not necessarily in the same amount. This definition captures
payments such as phone or utility bills that are recurring, but in different amounts. See appendix
for further details. Gelman et al. (2014) uses only the first technique to define recurring payments.
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than the other categories, there is a significant drop during the shutdown and this
decline fully recovers in the weeks when the employees’ missing income was repaid. In
this way, we see that some users manage the shock by putting off mortgage payments
until the shutdown ends. Indeed, many of those affected by the shutdown changed
from paying their mortgage early in October to later in the month as shown in Figure
6. The irregular pattern of payment week of mortgage reflects interaction of the bi-
weekly paycheck schedule with the calendar month. The key finding of this figure is
that the deficit in payments of the treatment group in the second week of October is
largely offset by the surplus of payments in the last two weeks of October.
Panel D of Figure 5 shows the response of account transfers to the income shock.16
During the paycheck week affected by the shutdown, transfers fell and rebounded
when the pay was reimbursed two weeks later. This finding implies a margin of
adjustment, reducing transfers out of linked accounts, during the affected week. One
might have expected the opposite, i.e., an inflow of liquidity from unlinked asset
accounts to make up for the shortfall in pay. That kind of buffering is not present on
average in these data.
Similar behavior is seen in the management of credit card accounts. Another
relatively low-cost way to manage cash holdings is to postpone credit card balance
payments. Panel E of Figure 5 shows there was a sharp drop in credit card balance
payments during the shutdown, which was reversed once the shutdown ended. For
users who pay their bill early, this is an easy and cost-free way to finance their current
spending. Even if users are using revolving debt, the cost of putting off payments
may be small if they pay off the balance right away after the shutdown ends. We
examine credit card balances in greater detail in the next section.
Indeed, as we see in Panel F of Figure 5, there was no average reaction of credit
16These are transactions explicitly labeled as “transfer,” etc. For linked accounts, they should net
out (though it is possible that a transfer into and out of linked accounts could show up in different
weeks). Hence, these transfers are (largely) to and from accounts (such as money market funds)
that are not linked.
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card spending to the shutdown. Thus, we find no evidence that affected employ-
ees sought to fund more of their expenditure with credit cards but instead floated,
temporarily, more of their prior expenditure by postponing payments on credit card
balances. Affected individuals who had ample capacity to borrow in order to smooth
spending, by charging extra amounts to credit cards, had other means of smoothing,
e.g., liquid checking account balances or the postponement of mortgage payments.
On the other hand, those who one might think would use credit cards for smoothing
spending because they had little cash on hand did not—either because they were
constrained by credit limits or preferred to avoid additional borrowing. In the next
section we will examine the consequences for credit card balances of these postponed
balance payments, and later probe the heterogeneous responses of individuals by their
level of liquidity.
This analysis of different categories of spending reveals that users affected by the
shutdown reduce spending more heavily on recurring spending and payments com-
pared to non-recurring spending. It is important to note that this behavior appears
to represent, in many cases, a temporal shifting of payments and neither a drop in
eventual spending over a longer horizon or a proportionate drop in contemporaneous
consumption. These results thus provide evidence of the instruments that individuals
use to smooth temporary shocks to income that has not been documented before.
The drop in non-recurring spending shows, however, that this method of cash man-
agement is not perfect; it does not entirely smooth spending categories that better
reflect consumption.
Spending could have fallen in part because employees stayed home and engaged
in home production instead of frequenting establishments that they encounter during
their work-day. Recall, however, that many employees affected by the shutdown were
not, in fact, furloughed. They worked but did not get paid for that work on the
regular schedule. In addition, Figure 7 shows that categories of expenditure that are
95
quite close to consumption, such as a fast food and coffee shops spending index, show
a sharp drop during the week starting October 10 when employees were out of work.
Given that a cup of coffee or fast food meal is non-durable, one would not expect
these categories to rebound after the shutdown. Yet, there is significant rebound after
the shutdown. We interpret this spending as resulting from going for coffee, etc., with
co-workers after the shutdown, perhaps to trade war stories.17 Hence, in a sense, a
cup of coffee is not entering the utility function as an additively separate non-durable.
2.5.3 Response of Liquid Assets
For users who have built up a liquid asset buffer, they may draw down on these re-
serves to help smooth income shocks. Figure 8 shows the estimated βk from equation
(1) where yi,t is the weekly average liquid balance normalized by its individual-level av-
erage (Panel A) or normalized by individual-level average daily total spending (Panel
B). Because of the heterogeneity in balances, normalizing by average liquid balances
leads to more precise results. Normalizing by total spending is less precise but al-
lows for a more meaningful interpretation because it is in the same units as Figure 4.
Consistent with the spending analysis, relative savings for the treatment group rises
in anticipation of the temporary drop in paycheck income. There is a steep drop in
the average balance the week of the lower paycheck as a result of the shutdown. The
drop in liquidity is, however, substantially attenuated relative to the drop in income
because of the drop in payments that is documented in the previous section. The
recovery of the lost income causes a large spike in the balances, which is mostly run
off during the following weeks. Figure 8B shows that liquid balances fell by around
2 day of average daily total spending. Therefore, on average, users reduced spending
by about 2 days and drew down about 2 days of liquidity to fund their consumption
17Interestingly, the rebound is highest for the most liquid individuals (figure not reported) who
are also higher income. This finding supports our notion that the rebound in coffee shop and fast
food arises from post-shutdown socializing.
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when faced with a roughly 4 days drop in income. These need not add up because of
transfers from non-linked accounts and because of changes in credit card payments,
though they do add up roughly at the aggregate level. In the next section, we explore
the heterogeneity in responses as a function of liquid asset positions where specific
groups of individuals do use other margins of adjustment than liquid assets.
2.6 Liquidity and the Heterogeneity in Response to the In-
come Shock
The preceding results capture average effects of the shutdown. There are impor-
tant reasons to think, however, that different employees will react differently to this
income shock, depending on their financial circumstances. Although all may have
a desire to smooth their spending in response to a temporary shock, some may not
have the means to do so.
In this section we examine the heterogeneity in the response along the critical
dimension of liquidity. For those with substantial liquid balances relative to typical
spending, it should be relatively easy to smooth through the shutdown. Section 4
showed, however, that many workers in these data have little liquidity, especially in
the days just before their regular paycheck arrives. For those (barely) living paycheck-
to-paycheck, even this brief drop in income may pose significant difficulties.
We investigate the impact of the shutdown for those with varying levels of liquidity
by first further quantifying the buffer of liquid assets that different groups of workers
had. Second, we return to each of the spending categories examined above and
compare how different segments of the liquidity distribution responded to the income
shock. Last, we study how the precise timing of the shock, relative to credit card due
dates, influenced credit card balances coming out of the shutdown.
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2.6.1 Liquidity and Spending
As before, we define the liquidity ratio for each user as the average daily balance of
checking and savings accounts to the user’s average daily spending until the govern-
ment shutdown started on October 1, 2013 and then divide users into three terciles.
Table 4 shows characteristics of each tercile. Users in the highest tercile have on aver-
age 54 days of daily spending on hand while the lowest tercile only has about 3 days.
This indicates that a drop in income equivalent to 4 days of spending should have
significantly greater effects for the lowest tercile compared with the highest tercile.
Figure 9 plots the estimates of βks from equation (1), for various forms of spending,
by terciles of liquidity. The results are consistent with liquidity playing a major role in
the lack of smoothing. Users with little buffer of liquid savings are more likely to have
problems making large and recurring payments such as rent, mortgage, and credit
card balances. In terms of average daily expenditure, spending for these recurring
payments drops the most for low liquidity users. In contrast, the drop in non-recurring
spending is similar across all liquidity groups. Like those with more liquidity, however,
low liquidity users refrained from using additional credit card spending to smooth the
income drop.
2.6.2 Liquidity and Credit Debt
The preceding results indicate that the sharp declines in recurring spending (es-
pecially mortgages) and credit card balance payments induced by the shutdown were
particularly important strategies for those with lower levels of liquidity. The gran-
ularity of the data shows, however, that fine differences in timing are consequential
when liquidity levels are so low.
To examine how individuals manage credit card payments and balances, we carry
out the analysis at the level of the individual credit card account, rather than aggre-
gating across accounts as in the previous section. The account-level analysis allows us
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to examine the role of payment due dates in the response to the shutdown. These due
dates may represent significant requirements for liquidity. That they are staggered
and unlikely to be systematically related to the timing of the shutdown provides an-
other means for identifying behavioral responses that exploits the high resolution of
the data infrastructure.
In this analysis, however, attention is restricted to the accounts of “revolvers.”
We focus, that is, on accounts held by those who, at some point during the study
period (including the period of the shutdown), incurred interest charges on at least
one of their credit cards, indicating that they carried some revolving credit card debt.
This represents 63% of the treatment group and 63% of controls; and 70% of these
workers fall in the lower two-thirds of the liquidity distribution. The complement
of the revolver group is the “transactors.” Members of this group routinely pay
their entire credit card balance, and have a distinct monthly pattern of balances that
reflects their credit card spending over the billing cycle and regular payment of the
balance at the end of the cycle. Only 44% of transactors fall in the lower two thirds
of the liquidity distribution. Including transactors would obscure the results for those
who carry credit card debt.18
Figure 10 shows the response of credit card balances, at the account level, to the
loss of income due to the shutdown. The estimates again present the difference-in-
difference between accounts held by revolvers in the treatment group and those held
by revolvers in the control group. These estimates are specified in terms of days
since the account’s August 2013 statement date instead of calendar time in order
to show the effect of statement due dates. In Figure 10, Days 0 through 30 on the
horizontal axis correspond to payment due dates in late August or in September 2013.
(Payments are due typically 25 days after the statement date.) The different panels of
18We investigated those who shifted from being transactors to revolvers at the time of the shut-
down. This group was so small (17%) that it did not yield interesting results. Given that transactors
tend to have high liquidity (15.9 median ratio vs 7.7 for revolvers), the lack of such transitions is
not surprising.
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Figure 10 show alternative cuts of the data that we will explain next. Focus, however,
on the first 25 days since the August statement date, i.e., due dates that occur in
advance of the shutdown. Regardless of cut on the data, the difference-in-difference
between treatment and control is essentially zero.
Panels A and B divide the sample of accounts into two groups based on the credit
card statement date and, in particular, whether the statement date places them “at
risk” for having to make a payment during the government shutdown. Panel A
shows the accounts with statement dates on September 16-30, 2013. Panel B shows
accounts that have statement dates on September 1-15. For those in the treatment
group, the accounts with September 16-30 due dates (Panel A) are at risk. Based on
our analysis of liquidity over the paycheck cycle (Figure 3) it is likely that the mid-
October paycheck that is diminished by the shutdown would have been a primary
source of liquidity for making the payment on these accounts that come due during
that pay period. Indeed, Panel A reveals this effect. Control and treatment accounts
start to diverge about a week to 10 days into the October billing cycle (days 35-37).
By the time the November statement arrives (days 58-60), a significant gap emerges;
relative to controls, treatment account balances are now significantly above average.
They return to average in a month, presumably as affected workers use retroactive
pay to make balance payments. Panel B, those who made their payments before the
shutdown, shows no such effect (the hump starting at day 30 is prior to the shutdown
and is not statistically significant.)
The high-resolution analysis made possible with the data infrastructure reveals
that, when liquidity is so low, small differences in timing can matter. Workers whose
usual credit card payment date fell before the shutdown adjusted on other margins;
their balances did not rise. For others, the shutdown hit just as they would have
normally made their credit card payment; they deferred credit card payments and
their balances were elevated for a billing cycle or two before returning to normal
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levels.
These findings for credit cards reinforce the findings for mortgage payments found
in the previous section and Figure 6. For those who typically made payments on
mortgages early in the month, that is, prior to the receiving the paycheck reduced
by the shutdown, there is little effect of the shutdown on mortgage payments. For
those who make payments in the second half of the month, they can and often did
postpone the mortgage payments as a way to respond to the shock to liquidity.
2.7 Conclusion
Living paycheck-to-paycheck lets workers consume at higher levels, but would
seem to leave them quite vulnerable to income shocks. The results of this paper
reveal how workers use financial assets and markets, sometimes in unconventional
ways, to reduce that vulnerability and adjust to shocks when they do occur. The
findings indicate that to the extent a large but brief shock to income is a primary
risk, a lack of liquid assets as a buffer is not necessarily a sign of myopia or unfounded
optimism. Rather, the reactions to the 2013 government shutdown studied in this
paper indicate that workers can defer debt payments and thus maintain consumption
(at low cost) despite limited liquid assets. They may face higher costs to access less
liquid assets. Such illiquidity may be optimal even if it leads to short- or medium-
run liquidity constraints (see Kaplan and Violante 2013). This paper shows that the
majority of households have such liquidity constraints, yet they have mechanisms for
coping with shocks to income so as to mitigate the consequences of such illiquidity.
This paper provides direct evidence on the importance of deferring debt payments,
especially mortgages, as an instrument for consumption smoothing. Mortgages func-
tion for many as a primary line of credit. By deferring a mortgage payment, they can
continue to consume housing, while waiting for an income loss to be recovered. For
changing the timing of mortgage payments within the month due, there is no cost.
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As discussed above, that is the pattern for the bulk of deferred mortgage payments.
Moreover, the cost of paying one month late can also be low. Many mortgages allow
a grace period after the official due date, in which not even late charges are incurred,
or charge a fee that is 4-6 percent of the late payment. Being late by a month adds
only modestly to the total mortgage when interest rates are low, and many mortgage
service companies will not report a late payment to credit agencies until it is at least
30 days overdue. Even if there are penalties or costs, late payment of mortgage is a
source of credit that is available without the burden of applying for credit.
Thus, this paper’s findings indicate that policies that encourage homeownership
and low-interest mortgages may have under-appreciated welfare benefits to those
mortgage holders. Our results suggest expansion of mortgage availability not only
finances housing, but has the added effect of making it easier to smooth through
shocks to income. As in Herkenhoff and Ohanian (2013), who show how skipping
mortgage payments can function as a form of unemployment insurance, the results
here reveal how the ability to defer mortgage payments can be an important source
of consumption insurance in the face of large, temporary income shocks.
The timing of credit card balance payments provides another source of managing
liquidity to buffer consumption against a temporary decline in income. For those with
low levels of liquid assets, deferring or reducing credit card payments is a convenient
and relatively low-cost way to address a temporary income shortfall. Among credit
card borrowers who had payment due dates during the pay period with the reduced
paycheck, we see significant deferral of payments. Their credit card balances rose,
and stayed elevated for a billing cycle or two before returning to normal.
The distinctive findings of this paper derive high-frequency data on transactions
and balances that provide new and distinctive evidence on consumer behavior. The
precision and resolution of these data allow insights into behavior that are obscured
by conventional data sources.
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CHAPTER III
The Response of Consumer Spending to Changes
in Gasoline Prices
3.1 Introduction
Few macroeconomic variables grab headlines as often and dramatically as do oil
prices. In 2014, policymakers, professional forecasters, consumers and businesses all
wondered how the decline of oil prices from over $100 per barrel in mid-2014 to less
than $50 per barrel in January 2015 would influence disposable incomes, employment,
and inflation. A key component for understanding macroeconomic implications of this
shock is consumers’ spending from resources freed up by lower gasoline prices. Es-
timating the quantitative impact of this element is central to policy decisions. Yet,
because of data limitations a definitive estimate has proved elusive. Recently, “big
data” has opened unprecedented opportunities to shed new light on the matter. This
paper uses detailed transaction-level data provided by a personal financial manage-
ment service to assess the spending response of consumers to changes in gasoline
prices over the 2013-2016 period.
Specifically, we use this information to construct high-frequency measures of spend-
ing on gasoline and non-gasoline items for a panel of more than one million U.S.
consumers. We use cross-consumer variation in the intensity of spending on gaso-
line interacted with the large, exogenous, and permanent decline in gasoline prices to
identify and estimate the partial equilibrium marginal propensity to consume (MPC)
out of savings generated by reduced gasoline prices. Our baseline estimate of the
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MPC is approximately one. That is, consumers on average spend all of their gasoline
savings on non-gasoline items. There are lags in adjustment, so the strength of the
response builds over a period of weeks and months.
Our results are useful and informative in several dimensions. First, our estimate
of the MPC is largely consistent with the permanent income hypothesis (PIH), a
theoretical framework that became a workhorse for analyses of consumption, and
that has been challenged in previous studies. Second, our findings suggest that,
ceteris paribus, falling oil prices can give a considerable boost to the U.S. economy
via increased consumer spending (although other factors can offset output growth).
Third, and also consistent with the PIH, we show that consumers’ liquidity was not
important for the strength of the consumer spending response to gasoline price shocks.
Fourth, our analysis highlights the importance of having high-frequency transaction
data at the household level for estimating consumer reactions to income and price
shocks.
This paper is related to several strands of research. The first strand, surveyed
in Jappelli and Pistaferi (2010), is focused on estimating consumption responses to
income changes. Typically, studies in this area examine if and how consumers react
to anticipated income shocks, which in many cases are transitory. As standard in
this literature, our estimate provides the partial equilibrium response of household
spending to a shock, not the general equilibrium outcome for aggregates. A com-
mon finding in this strand of research is that, in contrast to predictions of the PIH,
consumers often spend only upon the realization of an income shock, rather than
upon its announcement, although the size of this “excess sensitivity” depends on
household characteristics. For example, Kaplan and Violante (2014) and many oth-
ers document that consumers with low liquidity holdings respond more strongly to
anticipated income shocks. At the same time, estimating spending responses to unan-
ticipated, highly persistent income shocks has been challenging, because identifying
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such shocks is particularly difficult.
We contribute to this literature in several ways. First, we exploit a particu-
larly clear-cut source of variation in household budgets (spending on gasoline) with
a number of desirable properties. Specifically, we use a large, salient, unanticipated,
permanent (or perceived to be permanent) shock. Second, we examine spending re-
sponses at the weekly frequency while, due to data limitations, the vast majority of
previous studies estimate responses at much lower frequencies. As we discuss below,
the high-frequency dimension allows us to obtain crisp estimates of the MPC and
thus provide a more informative input for policy making.
The second strand to which we contribute studies the effects of oil prices on the
economy. In surveys of this literature, Hamilton (2008) and Kilian (2008) emphasize
that oil price shocks can influence aggregate outcomes via multiple channels (e.g., con-
sumer spending, changes in expectations) but disruption of consumers’ (and firms’)
spending on goods other than energy is likely to be a key mechanism for amplification
and propagation of the shocks. Indeed, given the low elasticity of demand for gaso-
line, changes in gasoline prices can materially affect non-gasoline spending budgets
for a broad array of consumers. As a result, a decrease in gasoline prices can generate
considerable savings for consumers which could be put aside (e.g., to pay down debt
or save) or used to spend on items such as food, clothing, furniture, etc.
Despite the importance of the MPC out of gasoline savings, research on the sen-
sitivity of consumer non-gasoline spending to changes in the gasoline price, has been
scarce. One reason for the dearth of research on the matter has been data limi-
tations. Available household consumption data tend to be low frequency, whereas
consumer spending, gasoline prices, and consumer expectations can change rapidly.
For example, the interview segment of the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX)
asks households to recall their spending over the previous month. These data likely
suffer from recall bias and other measurement errors that could attenuate estimates
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of households’ sensitivity to changes in gasoline prices (see Committee on National
Statistics 2013). The diary segment of the CEX has less recall error, but the panel
dimension of the segment is short (14 days), making it difficult to estimate the con-
sumer response to a change in prices. Because the CEX is widely used to study
consumption, we do a detailed comparison of our approach using the app data with
what can be learned from using the CEX. We find that analysis based on the CEX
produces noisy and attenuated estimates.
Grocery store barcode data, such as from AC Nielsen, have become a popular
alternative to measure higher-frequency spending. These data, however, cover only
a limited category of goods. For example, gasoline spending by households is not
collected in AC Nielsen, making it impossible to exploit heterogeneity in gasoline
consumption across households. As a result, most estimates of MPC tend to be
based on time series variation in aggregate series (see e.g. Edelstein and Kilian 2009).
There are a few notable exceptions. Using loyalty cards, Hastings and Shapiro
(2013) are able to match grocery barcode data to gasoline sold at a select number of
grocery stores with a gasoline station on site. Perhaps not surprisingly, we show that
households typically visit multiple gasoline station retailers in a month, suggesting
limitations to focusing on consumer purchases at just one gasoline retailer. There
is also some recent work using household data to identify a direct channel between
gasoline prices and non-gasoline spending. Gicheva, Hastings and Villas-Boas (2010)
use weekly grocery store data to examine the substitution to sale items as well as the
response of total spending. They find that households are more likely to substitute
towards sale items when gasoline prices are higher, yet they focus only on a subset of
goods bought in grocery stores (cereal, yogurt, chicken and orange juice), making it
difficult to extrapolate.
Perhaps the closest work to ours is a policy report produced by the J.P. Mor-
gan Chase Institute (2015), which also uses “big data” to examine the response of
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consumers to the 2014 fall in gasoline prices, and finds an average MPC of approx-
imately 0.6. This report differs from our study in both its research design and its
data. Most important, our data include a comprehensive view of spending, across
many credit cards and banks. In contrast, the Chase report covers a vast number of
consumers, but information on their spending is limited to Chase accounts. If, for
example, consumers use a non-Chase credit card or checking account, any spending
on that account would be missed in the J.P. Morgan Chase Institute analysis, and
measurement of household responses may therefore be importantly incomplete. In
this paper, we confirm this by showing that an analysis based on accounts in one
financial institution leads to a significantly attenuated estimate of the response of
spending to changes in gasoline prices.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes trends in gasoline prices,
putting the recent experience into historical context. In Section III, we discuss the
data, Section IV describes our empirical strategy, and Section V presents our results.
Specifically, we report baseline estimates of the MPC and the elasticity of demand
for gasoline. We contrast these estimates with the comparable estimates one can
obtain from alternative data. In Section V we also explore robustness of the baseline
estimates and potential heterogeneity of responses across consumers. Section VI
concludes.
3.2 Recent Changes in Gasoline Prices: Unanticipated, Per-
manent and Exogenous
In this section, we briefly review recent dynamics in the prices of oil and gasoline
and corresponding expectations of future prices. We document that the collapse of
oil and gasoline prices in 2014-2015 was highly persistent, unanticipated, and exoge-
nous to demand conditions in the United States. These properties of the shock are
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important components of our identification strategy.
3.2.1 Unanticipated and Permanent
In Panel A of Figure 1, the solid black line shows the spot price of gasoline at
New York Harbor, an important import and export destination for gasoline. The New
York Harbor price is on average 70 cents lower than average retail prices, although
the two series track each other very closely. The dashed line shows the one-year-ahead
futures price for that date. The futures price tracks the spot price closely, suggesting
the market largely treats gasoline price as a random walk—i.e., the best prediction
for one-year-ahead price is simply the current price.
Panel B shows the difference between the realized and predicted spot price. The
behavior of one-year-ahead forecast errors indicates that financial markets anticipated
neither the run-up nor the collapse of gasoline prices in 2007-2009. Likewise, the
dramatic decline in gasoline prices in 2014-2015 was not anticipated.
The Michigan Survey of Consumers has asked households about their expectations
for changes in gasoline prices over the next one-year and five-year horizons. Panel C of
Figure 1 plots the mean and median consumer expectations along with the actual price
and the mean one-year-ahead prediction in the Survey of Professional Forecasters.
While consumers expect a slightly higher price relative to the present price than
professional forecasters, the basic pattern is the same as in Panel A: the current
price appears to be a good summary of expected future prices. Consistent with this
observation, Anderson, Kellogg and Sallee (2012) fail to reject the null of a random
walk in consumer expectations for gasoline prices. Thus, consumers perceive changes
in gasoline prices as permanent. Also similar to the financial markets, consumers
were not anticipating large price changes in 2007-2009 or 2014-2015 (Panel D).
Figure 1 shows large movements in prices during the Great Recession (shaded).
Unlike the recent episode that is the subject of this paper, we would not use it to
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identify the MPC because this fluctuation in commodity prices in the Great Recession
surely represents an endogenous response to aggregate economic conditions.
When put into historical context, the recent volatility in gasoline prices is large.
Table 1 ranks the largest one-month percent changes in oil prices since 1947. When
available, the change in gasoline prices over the same period is also shown.1 The price
drops in 2014-2015 are some of the largest changes in oil and gasoline prices in the last
60 years. Note that in 1986, gasoline prices and oil prices actually moved in opposite
directions, indicating that the process generating gasoline prices can sometimes differ
from oil.
3.2.2 Exogenous
Why did prices of oil and oil products such as gasoline fall so much in 2014-2015?
While many factors could have contributed to the dramatic decline in the prices, the
consensus view, summarized in Baffes et al. (2015), attributes a bulk of the decline
to supply-side factors. Specifically, this view emphasizes that key forces behind the
decline were, first, OPEC’s decision to abandon price support and, second, rapid
expansion of oil supply from alternative sources (shale oil in the U.S., Canadian oil
sands, etc.). Consistent with this view, other commodity prices had modest declines
during this period, which would not have happened if the decline in oil prices was
driven by global demand factors. Observers note that the collapse of oil prices in
2014-2015 is similar in many ways to the collapse in 1985-1986, when more non-
OPEC oil supply came from Mexico, the North Sea and other sources, and OPEC
also decided to abandon price support. In short, available evidence suggests that
the 2014-2015 decline in oil prices is a shock that was supply-driven and exogenous
1Oil spot prices exist back to 1947, while the BLS maintains a gasoline price series for urban
areas back to 1976. In our analysis, we use AAA daily gasoline prices retrieved from Bloomberg
(3AGSREG). The series comes from a daily survey of 120,000 gasoline stations. These data almost
perfectly track another series from the EIA which are point in-time estimates from a survey of 900
retail outlets as of 8am Monday.
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to U.S. demand conditions. In contrast, for the 2007-2009 episode, Hamilton (2009)
and others observe that the run up in oil and gasoline prices around 2007-2009 can
be largely attributed to booming demand, stagnant production, and speculators, and
the consequent decline of the prices during this period, to collapsed global demand
(e.g. the Great Recession and Global Financial Crisis).
3.3 Data
Our analysis uses high-frequency data on spending from a financial aggregation
and bill-paying computer and smartphone application (henceforth, the “app”).2 The
app had approximately 1.4 million active users in the U.S. in 2013.3 Users can
link almost any financial account to the app, including bank accounts, credit card
accounts, utility bills, and more. Each day, the app logs into the web portals for
these accounts and obtains central elements of the user’s financial data including
balances, transaction records and descriptions, the price of credit and the fraction of
available credit used.
We draw on the entire de-identified population of active users and data derived
from their records from January 2013 until February 2016. The app does not collect
demographic information directly and instead uses a third party business that gath-
ers both public and private sources of demographics, anonymizes them, and matches
them back to the de-identified dataset. Table 1 in Gelman et al. (2014) (replicated
in Appendix Table C2) compares the gender, age, education, and geographic distri-
butions in a subset of the sample to the distributions in the U.S. Census American
Community Survey (ACS), representative of the U.S. population in 2012. The app’s
2These data have previously been used to study the high-frequency responses of households to
shocks such as the government shutdown (Gelman et al. 2016) and anticipated income, stratified by
spending, income and liquidity (Gelman et al. 2014).
3All data are de-identified prior to being made available to the project researchers. Analysis is
carried out on data aggregated and normalized at the individual level. Only aggregated results are
reported.
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user population is not representative of the U.S. population, but it is heterogeneous,
including large numbers of users of different ages, education levels, and geographic
location.
3.3.1 Identifying Spending Transactions
Not every transaction reported by the app is spending. For example, a transfer
of funds from one account to another is not spending. To avoid double counting,
we exclude transfers across accounts, as well as credit card payments from checking
accounts that are linked within the app. If an account is not linked, but we still
observe a payment, we count this as spending when the payment is made. We identify
transfers in several ways. First, we search if a payment from one account is matched
to a receipt in another account within several days. Second, we examine transaction
description strings to identify common flags like “transfer”, “tfr”, etc. To reduce
the chance of double counting, we exclude the largest single transaction that exceeds
$1,000 in a given week, as this kind of transaction is very heavily populated by
transfers, credit card payments, and other non-spending payments (e.g., payments to
the U.S. Internal Revenue Service). We include cash withdrawals from the counter
and ATM in our measure of spending. To ensure that accounts in the app data are
reasonably linked and active, we keep all users who were in the data for at least 8
weeks in 2013 and who did not have breaks in their transactions for more than two
weeks. More details are provided in Appendix A.
3.3.2 Using Machine Learning to Classify Type of Spending
Our analysis requires classification of spending by type of goods. To do so, we
address several challenges in using transactional data from bank accounts and credit
cards. First, transactional data are at the level of a purchase at an outlet. For
many purchases, a transaction will include many different goods. In the case of
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gasoline, purchases are carried out mainly at outlets that exclusively or mainly sell
gasoline. Hence, gasoline purchases are relatively easy to identify in transactional
data. Second, for the bulk of transactions in our data, we must classify the outlet
from the text of the transaction description, rather than classifications provided by
financial institutions. We therefore use a machine learning (ML) algorithm to classify
spending based on transaction descriptions. In this section, we provide an outline of
the classification routine, and compare our ML predictions in the data provided by the
app with external data. As economic analysis increasingly uses naturally-occurring
transactional data to replace designed survey data, applications of ML like the one
in this study will be increasingly important.
We use an ML algorithm to construct a set of rules for classifying the data as
gasoline or non-gasoline. This requires a training data set to build a classification
model, and a testing data set not used in the training step to validate the model
predictions. Two of the account providers in the data classify spending directly in
the transaction description strings, using merchant category codes (MCCs). MCCs
are four digit codes used by credit card companies to classify spending and are also
recognized by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service for tax reporting purposes. Our main
MCC of interest is 5541, “Automated Fuel Dispensers.” Purchases of gasoline could
also fall into MCC code 5542, “Service Stations,” which in practice covers gasoline
stations with convenience stores.4 Because distinguishing gasoline purchases classified
as 5542 or 5541 is nearly impossible with the information in transaction descriptions,5
we group transactions with these two codes together.
A downside of this approach is that transactions at the convenience store associ-
ated with a gasoline station can be classified as a purchase of gasoline; that is, buying
a food item in a gasoline station’s convenience store can be classified as a purchase
4To be clear, “Service Stations” do not include services such as auto repairs, motor oil change,
etc.
5E.g., a transaction string with word “Chevron” or “Exxon” could be classified as either MCC
5541 or MCC 5542.
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of gasoline. According to the National Association of Convenience Stores (NACS),
which covers gasoline stations, purchases of non-gasoline items at gasoline stations
with convenience stores (i.e. “Service Stations”) account for about 30 percent of sales
at “Service Stations.” Although the app data do not permit us to differentiate gaso-
line and non-gasoline items at “Service Stations,” we can use transaction data from
“Automated Fuel Dispensers” (which do not have an associated convenience store),
as well as external survey evidence to separate purchases of non-gasoline items from
purchases of gasoline. Specifically, according to the 2015 NACS Retail Fuels Report
(NACS 2015), only 35 percent of gasoline purchases are associated with going inside
a gasoline station’s store. Conditional on going inside the store, the most popular
activities are to “pay for gasoline at the register” (42%), “buy a drink” (36%), “buy a
snack” (33%), “buy cigarettes” (24%), and “buy lottery tickets” (22%). The last four
items are likely to be associated with small amounts of spending. This conjecture
is consistent with the distribution of transactions for “Service Stations” and “Auto-
mated Fuel Dispensers” in the data we study. In particular, approximately 60 percent
of transactions at “Service Stations” are less than $10 while the corresponding share
for “Automated Fuel Dispensers” is less than 10 percent. As we discuss below, the
infrequent incidence of gasoline purchases totaling less than $10 is also consistent
with other data sources. Thus, we exclude transactions less than $10 to filter out
purchases of non-gasoline items at “Service Stations.”
Using one of the two providers with MCC information (the one with more data), we
train a Random Forest ML model to create binary classifications of transactions into
those made at a gasoline station/service station and those that were made elsewhere.
Figure 2 shows an example of decision trees used to classify transactions into gasoline
and non-gasoline spending. A tree is a series of rules that train the model to classify
a purchase as gasoline or not. The rules minimize the decrease in accuracy when a
particular model “feature,” in our case transaction values and words in the transaction
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strings, is removed. In the Figure 2 example, the most important single word is “oil.”
If a transaction string contains the word oil, the classification rule is to move to the
right, otherwise the rule is to move to the left. If the string does not contain the word
oil, the next most important single word is “exxonmobil.” Figure 2 also demonstrates
how the decision tree combines transaction string keywords with transaction amounts.
For example, “oil” is a very strong predictor of gasoline purchase but it can be further
refined on the transaction amount. The tree continues until all the data are classified.
We then use the second provider to validate the quality of our ML model.6 The
ML model is able to classify spending with approximately 90% accuracy in the second
provider not used to train the model, which is a high level of precision. Both Type
I and Type II error rates are low. See Appendix Table B.1. More details on the
procedure can be found in Appendix B.
We can also use the app data to investigate which gasoline stations consumers
typically visit. The top ten chains of gasoline stations in the app data account for
most of gasoline spending. On average, the app data suggest that the typical consumer
does 66 percent of his or her gasoline spending in one chain and the rest of gasoline
spending is spread over other chains. Thus, while for a given consumer there is
a certain degree of concentration of gasoline purchases within a chain, an analysis
focusing on only one gasoline retailer, such as in Gicheva, Hastings and Villas-Boas
(2010) or Hastings and Shapiro (2013), particularly one not in the top ten chains,
would miss a substantial amount of gasoline spending.
6Card providers use slightly different transaction strings, and one may be concerned that training
the model on a random subsample of data from both card providers, and testing it on another random
subsample, can provide a distorted sense of how our ML model performs on data from other card
providers. Thus, using a card from one account provider to train, and testing on an entirely different
account provider, helps to assure that the ML model is valid outside of the estimation sample.
Classification of transactions based on ML applied to both card providers yields very similar results.
132
3.3.3 Comparison with the Consumer Expenditure Survey
We compare our measures of gasoline and non-gasoline spending with similar
measures from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). We use both the CEX Diary
Survey and Interview Survey. In the diary survey, households record all spending
in written diaries for 14 days. Therefore, this survey provides an estimate of daily
gasoline spending that should be comparable to the daily totals we observe in the app.
In Figure 3, we compare the distribution of spending in our data (solid lines) and in
the diary survey (dashed line). We find that the distributions are very similar, with
one notable exception: the distribution of gasoline purchases in the app data has more
mass below $10 (solid gray line) than the CEX Diary data. As we discussed above,
this difference is likely to be due to our inability to differentiate gasoline purchases
and non-gasoline purchases at “Service Stations.” In what follows, we restrict our
ML predictions to be greater than $10 (solid black line).
The CEX Diary Survey provides a limited snapshot of households’ gasoline and
other spending. In particular, since a household on average only makes 1 gasoline
purchase per week in the diary, we expect only to observe 2 gasoline purchases per
household, which can be a noisy estimate of gasoline spending at the household level.
Idiosyncratic factors in gasoline consumption that might push or pull a purchase
from one week to the next could influence the measure of a household’s gasoline
purchases by 50% or more. In addition, because the survey period in the diary is so
short, household fixed effects cannot be used to control for time-invariant household
heterogeneity. Hence, while a diary survey could be a substitute for the app data in
principle, the short sample of the CEX diary makes it a poor substitute in practice.7
7We have done a comparison of the CEX diary spending for January 2013 through December 2014
(the last time period that the CEX is available at this point). In a regression of log daily spending
for days with positive spending on month time effects and day of week dummies, the month effects
estimated in the CEX and app have a correlation of 0.77. (Finer than monthly comparison of the
app and CEX is not possible because the CEX provides only the month and day of week, but not
the date, of the diary entry.)
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The CEX Interview Survey provides a more complete measure of total spending,
as well as a longer panel (4 quarters), from which we can make a comparison with
estimates based on spending reported by the app at longer horizons. Panel A of
Figure 4 reports the histogram (bin size is set to $1 intervals) of monthly spending on
gasoline in the CEX Interview data for 2013-2014.8 The distribution has clear spikes
at multiples of $50 and $100 with the largest spikes at $0 and $200. In contrast, the
distribution of gasoline purchases in the app data has a spike at $0 but the rest of
the distribution exhibits considerably less bunching, particularly at large values like
$200 or $400 that correspond with reporting $50 or $100 per week, respectively. In
addition, the distribution of gasoline spending has a larger mass at smaller amounts
in the app data than in the CEX Interview data. These differences are consistent with
recall bias in the CEX Interview Survey data. As argued by Binder (2015), rounding
in household surveys can reflect a natural uncertainty of households about how much
they spent in this category.
Table 2 compares moments for gasoline and non-gasoline spending across the
CEX and the app data. We find that the means are similar across data sources. For
example, mean biweekly gasoline spending in the CEX Diary Survey is $84.72, while
the app counterpart is $81.68. Similarly, non-gasoline spending is $1,283 in the CEX
Diary Survey and $1,469 in the app data. The standard deviation, however, tends
to be larger in the app data than in the CEX, which reflects a thick right tail of
spending in the app data. This pattern is consistent with under-representation of
higher-income households in the CEX, a well-documented phenomenon (Sabelhaus
et al. 2015). Medians and inter-quartile ranges, measures of central tendency and
variations that are less sensitive to the tails, are smaller in the app data than the CEX
Diary Survey’s counterparts. The moments in the CEX Interview Survey (quarterly
frequency) are generally closer to the moments in the app data. For example, mean
8The CEX Interview Survey question asks households to report their “Average monthly expense
for gasoline.”
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(median) spending on gasoline is $647 ($540) in the CEX Interview Survey data and
$628 ($475) in the app data, while the standard deviations (interquartile ranges) are
$531 ($630) and $588 ($660) respectively. In each panel of Table 2, we also compare
the distribution of the ratio of gasoline spending to non-gasoline spending, a central
ingredient in our analysis. The moments for the ratio in the CEX and the app data
are extremely similar. For instance, the mean ratio is 0.08 for the CEX Interview
Survey and 0.07 for the app data, while the standard deviation of the ratio is 0.07
for both the CEX Interview Survey and the app data.9
In summary, spending in the app data is similar to spending in the CEX data.
Thus, although participation in the app is voluntary, app users have spending patterns
similar to the population. Some of the differences could reflect survey recall bias,
consumers buying gasoline on cards that are not linked to the app (such as credit
cards specific to gasoline station chains), the ML procedure missing some gasoline
stations, or gasoline spending done in cash that we could not identify.10 We will
address these potential issues in our robustness tests.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
The discourse on potential macroeconomic effects of a fall in gasoline prices centers
on the question of how savings from the fall in gasoline prices are used by consumers.
Specifically, policymakers and academics are interested in the marginal propensity to
consume (MPC) from savings generated by reduced gasoline prices.11 Define MPC
as
9Appendix Figure C1 shows the density of the gasoline to non-gasoline spending ratio for the
CEX and app data.
10According to the 2015 NACS Retail Fuels Report (NACS 2015), approximately 80 percent of
gasoline purchases are made with debit or credit card.
11For example, Janet Yellen (Dec 2014) compared the fall in gasoline prices to a tax cut: “[The
decline in oil prices] is something that is certainly good for families, for households, it’s putting more
money in their pockets, having to spend less on gas and energy, so in that sense it’s like a tax cut
that boosts their spending power.”
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dCit = −MPC ∗ d(PtQit)
where i and t index consumers and time, C is spending of non-gasoline items, P
is the price of gasoline, and Q is the quantity of consumed gasoline. Note that we
define the MPC as an increase in spending in response to a decrease in the price of
gasoline.12
Equation (1) is a definition, not a behavioral relationship. Of course, Qit, the
quantity of gasoline purchased, and overall non-gasoline spending, Cit, are simulta-
neously determined, with simultaneity being an issue at the individual as well as
aggregate level. In this section, we develop an econometric relationship that yields
identification of the MPC based on the specific sources of variation of gasoline prices
discussed in the previous sections.
At the aggregate level, one important determinant of gasoline spending is ag-
gregate economic conditions. As discussed in Section II, the 2007-2008 collapse in
gasoline prices has been linked to the collapse in global demand due to the financial
crisis; demand for gasoline fell driving down the price, at the same time demand was
falling for other goods. Individual-level shocks are another important source of simul-
taneity bias and threat to identification. Consider a family going on a road trip to
Disneyland; this family will have higher gasoline spending (long road trip) and higher
total consumption in that week due to spending at the park. Yet another example
is a person who suffers an unemployment spell; this worker will have lower gasoline
spending (not driving to work) and lower other spending (a large negative income
shock).
This discussion highlights that gasoline purchases and non-gasoline spending are
affected by a variety of shocks. Explicitly modelling all possible shocks, some of
12The MPC is likely different across groups of people, but our notation and estimation refers to
the average MPC.
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which are expected in advance by households (unobservable to the econometrician),
would be impossible. Fortunately, this is not required to properly identify the policy-
relevant parameter–the sensitivity of non-gasoline spending to changes in gasoline
spending induced by exogenous changes in the price of gasoline. This parameter may
be interpreted as a partial derivative of non-gasoline spending with respect to the
price of gasoline and thus could be mapped to a coefficient estimated in a regression.
For this, we only need to satisfy a weaker set of conditions. First, we need exogenous,
unanticipated shocks to gasoline prices. These shocks should be unrelated to the
regression residual absorbing determinants of non-gasoline consumption unrelated to
changes in gasoline prices. Second, we need to link non-gasoline spending to the price
of gasoline (i.e., Pt), rather than purchases of gasoline (PtQit).
As we established in Section II, shocks to gasoline prices in the period of our
analysis were unanticipated, exogenous, and permanent so that we have an exogenous
source of variation. To link the partial derivative of interest to a regression coefficient
and to link it with cross-sectional variation in pre-determined propensity to spend on
gasoline, we manipulate equation (1) as follows:
dCit
Ci
= d logCit = −MPC × d(PtQit)
Ci




= −MPC × d(PtQit)
(PQ)i
× si
= −MPC × QidPt+PdQit
(PQ)i
× si
= −(MPC × si × dPt
P
+MPC × si × dQit
Qi
)









= −MPC × si × dlogP t −MPC × si × ε× d logPt
= −MPC × (1 + ε)× si × d logPt (2)
where bars denote steady-state values, si ≡ (PQ)i
Ci
is the ratio of gasoline spending
to non-gasoline spending,13 and ε is the price elasticity of demand for gasoline (a
13We calculate si as the ratio of consumer i ’s annual spending on gasoline to his/her annual spend-
ing on non-gasoline items in 2013. Using annual frequency in this instance helps to address seasonal
variation in gasoline spending as well as considerable high frequency variation in the intensity of
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negative number). Now the only source of time variation in the right-hand side of
the equation is the price of gasoline. The identifying variation in equation (2) comes
from time-series fluctuations in the price of gasoline interacted with the predetermined
cross-sectional share of spending on gasoline.14 The cross-section variation is essential
for this paper since there is single large episode of gasoline price movements in the
sample period. One can also derive the specification from a utility maximization
problem and link the MPC to structural parameters (see Appendix D). Thus, when
we regress log non-gasoline spending on the log of gasoline price multiplied by the
ratio of gasoline spending to non-gasoline spending, we get −MPC (1 + ε).
Note that we have an estimate of MPC scaled by 1 + ε, but the scaling should
be small if demand is inelastic. As discussed below, there is some variation in the
literature on ε’s estimated using household versus aggregate data. To ensure that a
measure of ε is appropriate for our sample, we note:
d logPtQit = d logPt + d logQit









= (1 + ε)× d logPt. (3)
Similar to equation (2), the only source of time variation in the right-hand side
of equation (3) is the price of gasoline. Thus, a regression of d logPtQit on d logPt
yields ˆ(1 + ε), which is the partial derivative of gasoline spending with respect to the
price of gasoline, and the residual in this regression absorbs determinants of gasoline
purchases unrelated to the changes in the price of gasoline.15 The estimated (1 + ε)
and −MPC (1 + ε) can be combined to obtain the MPC.
In the derivation of equations (2) and (3) we deliberately did not specify the time
gasoline spending (e.g., trips to gasoline stations, spending per trip). Additionally, the use of 2013
data to calculate the share makes it pre-determined with respect to the shock to gasoline prices in
the estimation period. Given that gasoline prices are approximately random walks, we take si values
in 2013 as stochastic steady-state values.
14Edelstein and Kilian (2009) consider a similar specification at the aggregate level.
15Because the dependent variable is spending on gasoline rather than volume of gasoline, elasticity
estimated by this approach also includes substitution across types of gasoline (Hastings and Shapiro
2013).
138
horizon over which sensitivities are computed, as these may vary with the horizon. For
example, with lower prices, individuals may use their existing cars more intensively or
may purchase less fuel-efficient cars. There may be delays in adjustment to changes
in prices (e.g., search for a product). It might take time to notice the price change
(Coibion and Gorodnichenko 2015). The very-short-run effects may also depend on
whether a driver’s tank is full or empty when the shock hits.
To obtain behavioral responses over different horizons, we build on the basic
derivation above and estimate a multi-period “long-differences” model, where both
the MPC and the price elasticity are allowed to vary with the horizon. Additionally,
we introduce aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks to overall spending, and idiosyncratic
shocks to gasoline spending. Hence,
∆klogC it = βk × si ×∆k logPt + ψt + εit (4)
∆klog PQit = δk logPt + uit (5)
where β = −MPC (1 + ε), δ = (1 + ε), ∆kxt = xt − xt−k is a k-period-difference
operator, ψt is the time fixed effect, and εit and uit are individual-level shocks to
spending.16 By varying k, we can recover the average impulse response over k-periods
so that we can remain agnostic about how quickly consumers respond to a change in
gasoline prices.17 Given that our specification is in differences, we control for consumer
time-invariant characteristics. Because we are interested in the first-round effects of
the fall in gasoline prices on consumer spending, we include the time fixed effects
in specification (4). As a result, our estimate obtains after controlling for common
16Note that there are time effects only in equation (4). Since we have argued that changes in
gasoline prices are exogenous over the time period, time effects are not needed for consistency of
estimation of either (4) or (5). In (4), they may improve efficiency by absorbing aggregate shocks
to overall spending. It is not possible to include time effects in (5) because they would completely
absorb the variation in gasoline prices. But again note that the presence of an aggregate component
in u does not make the estimates of biased under our maintained assumption that gasoline prices are
exogenous to the U.S. economy in the estimation period. (The standard errors account for residual
aggregate shocks.)
17For example, if logCit =
∑∞
s=0 ψsshockt−s + ut and ut summarizes variation orthogonal to the
shock series of interest, then the impulse response is {ψs}∞s=0 and the long-difference regression




macroeconomic shocks and general equilibrium effects (e.g., changes in wages, labor
supply, investment). Thus, consistent with the literature estimating MPC for income
shocks (e.g., Shapiro and Slemrod 2003, Johnson et al. 2006, Parker et al. 2008,
Jappelli and Pistaferi 2010), we estimate a partial equilibrium MPC.
Note that gasoline and oil prices are approximately random walks and thus logPt
can be treated as an unanticipated, permanent shock. To the extent oil prices and,
hence, gasoline prices are largely determined by global factors or domestic supply
shocks, rather than domestic demand—which is our maintained assumption for our
sample period—OLS yields consistent estimates of MPC and ε. Formally, we assume
that the idiosyncratic shocks to spending are orthogonal to these movements in gaso-
line prices. Given the properties of the shock to gasoline prices in 2014-2015, the PIH
model predicts that the response of spending from the resulting change in resources
should be approximately equal to the change in resources (MPC ≈ 1) and take place
quickly.
The approach taken in specifications (4) and (5) has several additional advantages
econometrically. First, as discussed in Griliches and Hausman (1986), using “long
differences” helps to enhance signal-to-noise ratio in panel data settings. Second,
specifications (4) and (5) allow straightforward statistical inference. Because our
shock (∆k logPt) is national and we expect serial within-user correlation in spending,
we cluster standard errors on two dimensions: time and person. This simplicity is
particularly convenient in our case because we estimate equations (4) and (5) as a
system to recover MPC from estimates of −MPC (1 + ε) and (1 + ε).
To summarize, our econometric framework identifies the MPC from changes in
gasoline prices by interacting two sources of variation: a large, exogenous, and perma-
nent change in gasoline prices, with the pre-determined share of spending on gasoline.
The econometric specification also accounts for the response of spending on gasoline
to lower prices by allowing a non-zero elasticity of demand for gasoline and allowing
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for lagged adjustment of gasoline spending to changes in gasoline prices.
3.5 Results
In this section, we report estimates of MPC and ε for different horizons, frequen-
cies, and populations. We also compare estimates based on our app data to the
estimates based on spending data from the CEX.
3.5.1 Sensitivity of Expenditure to Gasoline Prices
We start our analysis with the estimates of MPC and ε at weekly frequency for
different response horizons. Panel A of Figure 5 shows ε̂ and 95 percent confidence
bands for k = 0, . . . , 26 weeks. Table 3, Row 1, gives the point estimates for selected
horizons. The point estimates indicate that the elasticity of demand for gasoline is
increasing in the horizon (i.e., over time, consumers have greater elasticity of demand):
estimated elasticity changes from -0.20 at the horizon of 15 weeks to -0.24 at the
horizon of 25 weeks. Confidence intervals are very wide at short horizons; estimates
become quite precise at horizons of 12 weeks and longer.
This estimate is broadly in line with previously reported estimates. Using ag-
gregate data, the results in Hughes, Knittel and Sperling (2008) suggest that U.S.
gasoline demand is significantly more inelastic today compared with the 1970s. Re-
gressing monthly data on aggregate per capita consumption of gasoline on changes
in gasoline prices, they estimate a short-run (monthly) price elasticity of -0.034 to
-0.077 for the 2001 to 2006 period, compared with -0.21 to -0.34 for the 1975-1980
period. The Environmental Energy Institute (EIA 2014) also points to an elasticity
close to zero, and also argues this elasticity has been trending downward over time.18
18EIA (2014) reports, “The price elasticity of motor gasoline is currently estimated to be in the
range of -0.02 to -0.04 in the short term, meaning it takes a 25% to 50% decrease in the price of
gasoline to raise automobile travel 1%. In the mid 1990’s, the price elasticity for gasoline was higher,
around -0.08.”
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In contrast to Hughes, Knittel and Sperling (2008), our findings suggest that gasoline
spending could still be quite responsive to gasoline price changes. In general, our
results lie in between the Hughes, Knittel and Sperling’s estimates and previous esti-
mates using household expenditure data to measure gasoline price elasticities. Puller
and Greening (1999) and Nicol (2003) both use the CEX interview survey waves from
the 1980s to the early 1990s to estimate the elasticity of demand. The approaches
taken across these papers are very different. Nicol’s (2003) approach is to estimate
a structural demand system. Puller and Greening (1999), on the other hand, take
advantage of the CEX modules about miles traveled that were only available in the
1980s, as well as vehicle information. Both of these papers find higher price elastic-
ities of demand at the quarterly level, with estimates in Nicol (2003) ranging from
-0.185 for a married couple with a mortgage and 1 child, to -0.85 for a renter with two
children, suggesting substantial heterogeneity across households. Paul and Greening’s
(1999) baseline estimates are -0.34 and -0.47, depending on the specification. A more
recent paper by Levin, Lewis and Wolak (2016) uses city level price data and city
level expenditure data obtained from Visa credit card expenditures. They estimate
the elasticity of demand for gasoline to be closer to ours, but still higher, ranging from
0.27 to 0.35. Their data are less aggregate than the other studies, but more aggregate
than ours because we observe individual level data. Also, we observe expenditures
from all linked credit and debit cards and are not restricted only to Visa.
Panel B of Figure 5 shows the dynamics of ˆMPC and 95 percent confidence bands
over the same horizons with point estimates at selected horizons in the first row of
Table 3. At short time horizons (contemporaneous and up to 3 weeks), the estimates
vary considerably from nearly 2 to 0.5 but the estimates are very imprecise. Starting
with the four-week horizon, we observe that ˆMPC steadily rises over time and be-
comes increasingly precise. After approximately 12 weeks, ˆMPC stabilizes between
0.8 and 1.0 with a standard error of 0.3. The estimates suggest that, over longer
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horizons, consumers spend nearly all their gasoline savings on non-gasoline items.
The standard errors are somewhat smaller at monthly horizons (4-5 weeks) since the
shock. We suspect this is because the residual variance in consumption tends to be
lower at monthly frequency due to factors like recurring spending, bill pay, and rules
of thumb/behavioral reasons (shopping once per month), while in other weeks, the
consumption process has considerably more randomness.19
There are not many estimates of the MPC derived from changes in gasoline prices.
The JPMorgan Institute (2015) report examines the same time period that we do
using similar data. It finds an MPC of 0.6, lower than our estimate. This finding likely
arises from the use of data from a single financial institution rather than our more
comprehensive data. This is an important advantage of the app data because many
consumers have multiple accounts across financial institutions. The app’s users have
accounts on average in 2.6 different account providers (the median is 2). As a result,
we have a more complete record of consumer spending. To illustrate the importance
of this point, we rerun our specification focusing on a subgroup of consumers with
accounts at the top three largest providers.20 Specifically, we restrict the sample to
accounts only at a specific provider so that we can mimic the data observed by a single
provider. In rows (2), (4) and (6) of Table 3 we report estimates of ε and the MPC
at horizons 5, 15 and 25 weeks for the case when we use any account at the provider.
The MPC estimates based on data observed by a single provider are lower and have
larger standard errors than the baseline, full-data MPC estimates reported in row (1).
For example, the ˆMPC for Provider 1 (row 2) at the 25-week horizon is 0.515, which
is approximately half of the baseline ˆMPC at 0.963, but the standard error for the
former estimate is 0.387, so that we cannot reject equality of the estimates as well as
19Although there is some regional variation in the level of gasoline prices, the comovement of
gasoline prices is very strong and thus little is lost by using aggregate gasoline prices. Furthermore,
when computing si we use gasoline spending rather than gasoline prices and thus our measure of
si takes into account geographical differences in gasoline prices. We find nearly identical estimates
when we use local gasoline prices.
20These providers cover 49.6 percent of accounts in the data and 55.0 percent of total spending.
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equality of the former estimate to zero.
One may be concerned that having only one account with a provider may signal
incomplete information because the user did not link all accounts with the app. To
address this concern, we restrict the sample further to consider users that have at
least one checking and one credit-card account with a given provider. In this case,
one may hope that the provider is servicing “core” activities of the user. In rows (3),
(5) and (7), we re-estimate our baseline specification with this restriction. We find
estimates largely similar to the case of any account, that is, the estimated sensitivity
to changes in gasoline prices is attenuated and more imprecise relative to the baseline
where we have accounts linked across multiple providers.
These results for the single-provider data are consistent with the view that con-
sumers can specialize their card use. For example, one card (account) may be used
for gasoline purchases while another card (account) may be used for other purchases.
In these cases, because single-provider information systematically misses spending on
other accounts, MPCs estimated on single-provider data could be attenuated severely.
3.5.2 Robustness
While our specification has several important advantages, there are nevertheless
several potential concerns. First, if si in specification (4) is systematically underesti-
mated because a part of gasoline spending is missing from our data, for instance, due
to gasoline retailer cards that are not linked to the app, then our estimate of the MPC
will be mechanically higher. Second, suppose instead that we are misclassifying some
spending, or that consumers buy a large portion of their gasoline in cash, so that this
spending shows up in our dependent variable. Misclassifying gasoline spending as
non-gasoline spending will generate a positive correlation between gasoline spending
and the gasoline price. Third, while a random walk may be a good approximation
for the dynamics of gasoline prices, one may be concerned that gasoline prices have
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a predictable component, so that estimated reaction mixes up responses to unantic-
ipated and predictable elements of gasoline prices. Indeed, some changes in gasoline
prices are anticipated due to seasonal factors.21
A practical implication of the first concern (i.e., cases where consumers use gasoline
retailer cards that are not linked to the app) is that consumers with poorly linked
accounts should have zero spending on gasoline. To evaluate if these cases could be
quantitatively important for our estimates of MPC and ε, we estimate specifications
(4) and (5) on the sample that excludes households with zero gasoline spending in
2013 (recall that the app data have a larger spike at zero than the counterpart in the
CEX Interview Survey). Row (2) of Table 4 reports MPC estimates for this restricted
sample at horizons k = {5, 15, 25}. We find that these estimates are very close to the
baseline reported in row (1).
To address the second concern about cash spending, we note that cash spending
only shows up in the dependent variable, generating a positive correlation that will
cause us to underestimate the MPC. In a robustness check, we exclude ATM and
other cash withdrawals from the dependent variable. We find (row 3) that both the
MPC and elasticity of demand estimated on these modified data are nearly identical
to the baseline estimates. This finding is consistent with the intensity of using cash
as means of payment being similar for gasoline and non-gasoline spending.
For the third concern relating to expected changes in gasoline prices, we turn to
data from the futures market. In particular, we use changes in one-month-ahead
futures for spot prices at New York Harbor (relative to last week’s prediction for
the month ahead) instead of the change in gasoline prices since last week. Specif-
ically, let F ht denote the futures price at time t for month t + h. Then, in lieu of
∆klogPt in our baseline specification (4), we instead use ∆klogFt ≡ logF 1t − logF 1t−k
for k ∈ {1, . . . , 25}. While the focus on one-month change is arguably justified
21In the summer, many states require a summer blend of gasoline which is more expensive than a
winter blend.
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given approximate random walk in gasoline prices, we also try the average change
in the yield curves for gasoline prices over longer horizons (two years) to have a






logF ht − logF ht−k
)
. In either one-month change (row 4 of Table 4) or aver-
age change over two years (row 5), the results are very similar to our baseline.
3.5.3 Comparison with MPC using CEX
To appreciate the significance of using high-quality transaction-level data for es-
timating the sensitivity of consumers to income and price shocks, we estimated the
sensitivity using conventional, survey-based data sources such as the Consumer Ex-
penditure Survey (CEX). This survey provides comprehensive estimates of household
consumption across all goods in the household’s consumption basket and is the most
commonly used household consumption survey. In this exercise, we focus on the in-
terview component of the survey which allows us to mimic the econometric analysis
of the app data.
In this survey, households are interviewed for 5 consecutive quarters and asked
about their spending over the previous quarter. Note that the quarters are not calen-
dar quarters; instead, households enter the survey in different months and are asked
about their spending over the previous three months. The BLS only makes available
the data from the last 4 interviews; therefore, we have a one-year panel of consump-
tion data for a household. Given the panel design of the CEX Interview Survey, we
can replicate aspects of our research design described above. Specifically, we calculate
the ratio of gasoline spending to non-gasoline spending in the first interview. We then
estimate the MPC in a similar regression over the next three quarters for households
in the panel.22 For this specification, we use BLS urban gasoline prices which provide
a consistent series over this time period (see note for Table 1).
22Our build of the CEX data follows Coibion et al. (2012).
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In the first row of Table 5, we estimate our baseline specification for the app data
at the quarterly frequency: the estimates are slightly different from the estimates
based on the weekly frequency, though much less precise. The standard errors are so
large that we cannot reject the null of equality of the estimates over time or across
frequencies.
Panel B of Table 5 presents estimates based on the CEX. To maximize the preci-
sion of CEX estimates, we apply our approach to the CEX data covering 1980-2014.
The point estimates (row 3) indicate that non-gasoline spending declines in response
to decreased gasoline prices. Standard errors are so large that we cannot reject the
null of no response. The estimated elasticity of demand for gasoline is approximately
-0.4, which is a double of the estimates based on the app data and is similar to some
of the previous CEX-based estimates (e.g., Nicol, 2003).
One should be concerned that the underlying variation of gasoline prices is poten-
tially different across datasets. The dramatic decline in gasoline prices in 2014-2015
was largely determined by supply-side and foreign-demand factors, but it is less clear
that one may be equally confident about the dominance of this source of variation
over a longer sample period. Indeed, Barsky and Kilian (2004) and others argue that
oil prices have often been demand-driven in the past. In this case, one may find
wrong-signed or a non-existent relationship between gasoline prices and non-gasoline
spending. To address this identification challenge, we focus on instances when changes
in oil prices were arguably determined by supply-side factors.
Specifically, we follow Hamilton (2009, 2011) and consider several episodes with
large declines in oil prices: (i) the 1986 decline in oil prices (1985-1987 period); (ii)
the 1990-1991 rise and fall in oil prices (1989-1992 period); (iii) the 2014-2015 decline
on oil prices. Estimated MPCs and elasticities for each episode are reported in rows
(4)-(6). The 1986 episode generates positive MPCs but the standard errors continue
to be too high to reject the null of no response. The 2014-2015 episode generates
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similar, implausible large estimates of MPC, although the estimates are more precise.
The 1990-1992 episode yields negative MPCs with large standard errors. In what
follows, we investigate to what extent the research design of the CEX contributes to
these estimates.
Note that in estimates from the app in row 1 we continue to use complete histories
of consumer spending over 2013-2016 while the CEX tracks households only for four
quarters. To assess the importance of having a long spending series at the consumer
level, we “modify” the app data to bring it even closer to the CEX data. Specifically,
for every month of our sample, we randomly draw a cohort of app users and track
this cohort for only four consecutive quarters, thus mimicking the data structure of
the CEX. Then, for a given cohort, we use the first quarter of the data to calculate
si and use the remainder of the data to estimate ε and MPC. Results are reported
in row 2 of Table 5. Generally, patterns observed in row 1 are amplified in row 2. In
particular, the elasticity of demand for gasoline is even lower at shorter horizons and
even greater at the longer horizons. In a similar spirit, the estimated MPC increases
more strongly in the horizon when we track consumers for only four quarters relative
to the complete 2013-2016 coverage.
In summary, the CEX-based point estimates are volatile and imprecise. The data
are inherently noisy. Moreover, when limited to sample periods that have credibly
exogenous variation in gasoline prices, the sample sizes are far too small to make pre-
cise, robust inferences. Furthermore, these estimates do not appear to be particularly
robust. These results are consistent with a variety of limitations of the CEX data such
as small sample size, recall bias, and under-representation of high-income households.
These results also illustrate advantages of using high-frequency (weekly) data relative
to low-frequency (quarterly) data for estimating sensitivity of consumer spending to
gasoline price shocks. The app’s comprehensive, high frequency data, combined with
a natural experiment—the collapse of oil and gasoline prices in 2014—help us resolve
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these issues and obtain precise, stable estimates of MPC and elasticity of demand for
gasoline.
3.5.4 Heterogeneity in Responses
Macroeconomic theory predicts that the responses of consumers to changes in
income (or prices) could be heterogeneous with important implications for macroeco-
nomic dynamics and policy. For example, Kaplan and Violante (2014) present a theo-
retical framework where consumers with liquidity constraints (“hand-to-mouth” con-
sumers, HtM) should exhibit a larger MPC to transitory, anticipated income shocks
than consumers for whom these constraints are not binding (non-HtM consumers).
Kaplan and Violante (2014) document empirical evidence consistent with these pre-
dictions and quantify the contribution of consumer heterogeneity in terms of liquidity
holdings for the 2001 Bush tax rebate. In a similar spirit, Mian and Sufi (2014),
McKay, Nakamura and Steinsson (2016), and many others document that consumers’
liquidity and balance sheets can play a key role for aggregate outcomes.
The conventional focus in this literature is the consumption response to transitory,
anticipated income shocks because the behavior of HtM and non-HtM consumers
should be particularly different in this case. First, HtM consumers spend an income
shock when it is realized rather than when it is announced, while non-HtM consumers
respond to the announcement and exhibit no change in spending at the time the shock
is realized. Second, the MPC of non-HtM consumers should be small (this group
smooths consumption by saving a big fraction of the income shock), while the MPC
of HtM consumers should be large (the income shock relaxes a spending constraint
for these consumers).
This sharp difference in the responses hinges on the temporary, anticipated nature
of the shock. For other shocks, the responses may be alike across HtM and non-HtM
consumers. For example, when the shock is permanent and unanticipated, HtM and
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non-HtM consumers should behave in the same way (Mankiw and Shapiro 1985):
both groups should have MPC = 1 at the time of the shock. Intuitively, non-HtM
consumers have MPC = 1 because their lifetime resources change permanently and,
accordingly, these consumers adjust their consumption by the size of the shock when
the shock happens. HtM consumers have MPC = 1 because they are in a “corner
solution” and would like to spend away every dollar they receive in additional income
the moment they receive it. Thus, macroeconomic theory predicts that, in this case,
the MPC should be similar across HtM and non-HtM consumers and that the MPC
should be close to one. Given that the shock to the price of gasoline in our analysis
was unanticipated and perceived as permanent, we focus this section on testing these
two predictions.
For these tests one needs to identify HtM and non-HtM consumers. This seem-
ingly straightforward exercise has proved to be a challenge in applied work due to
a number of data limitations, which have made researchers use proxies for liquidity
constraints. As a result, estimated MPCs should be interpreted with caution and im-
portant caveats. For example, Kaplan and Violante (2014) argue that identification
of “hand-to-mouth” consumers requires information on consumers’ liquidity holdings
just before they receive pay checks.23 Because the Survey of Consumer Finances
(SCF), the dataset used in Kaplan and Violante (2014), reports average balances
for a household as well as average monthly income, Kaplan and Violante are forced
to make assumptions about payroll frequency (also not reported in the SCF) and
behavior of account balances (e.g., constant flow of spending). Given heterogene-
ity in payment cycles (i.e., weekly, biweekly, monthly) and spending patterns across
consumers, this procedure can mix hand-to-mouth (HtM) and non-hand-to-mouth
(non-HtM) consumers. As a result, MPC estimated in Kaplan and Violante (2014)
23Intuitively, hand-to-mouth consumers do not carry liquid assets from period to period. Hence,
just before receiving a pay check (an injection of liquidity), a hand-to-mouth consumer should have
zero liquid wealth.
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could provide a lower bound for the true MPC.
In contrast, the app data allow us to take Kaplan and Violante (2014)’s definition
literally. We identify the exact day of a consumer’s payroll income (if any), and
examine bank account and credit card balances of the consumer the day before this
payment arrives. A consumer is classified as HtM in a given month if, in the previous
month, the consumer has virtually no liquid assets (less than $100 in the consumer’s
checking or savings accounts net of credit card debt), or the consumer is in debt (the
sum of the consumers’ liquid assets and available balance on credit cards is negative)
and is within $100 of the consumer’s credit card limits. Denote the dummy variable
identifying hand-to-mouth consumers at this frequency with D∗it. We find that, in the
app data, roughly 20% of consumers are HtM, which is in the lower end of the range
reported in Kaplan and Violante (2014).24
To allow for heterogeneity in the MPC by liquidity, we add interaction terms to
the baseline specification (4)-(5):
∆klogC it = β1 × si ×∆k logPt + β2 × s
gas
i ×∆k logPt ×Dit
+µ0 ×Dit + µ1 × si ×Dit + ψt + ωt ×Dit + εit (6)
∆klog PQit = δ1 × logPt + δ2 × logPt ×Dit + ξ ×Dit + uit (7)
where Dit is a variable measuring the presence/intensity of liquidity constraints
identifying HtM consumers, and ωt × Dit is the time fixed effect specific to HtM
consumers.
We have several options for Dit. One could use a dummy variable equal to one if a
consumer is liquidity constrained in period t−k−1 (recall that ∆k operator calculates
the growth rate between periods t − k and t). We denote this “lagged” measure of
HtM with D̃it ≡ D∗i,t−k−1 where D∗it is a dummy variable equal to one if consumer i
24While the app data are close to ideal for identification of hand-to-month (i.e., low liquidity) con-
sumers, the app data are not suitable for further disaggregation of consumers into wealthy hand-to-
mouth and poor hand-to-mouth because the app does not collect information on consumer durables
(e.g., vehicles), housing and other illiquid assets which are not backed by corresponding loans and
mortgages.
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at time t satisfies Kaplan-Violante’s HtM criteria and zero otherwise. Alternatively,
because liquidity constraints may be short-lived, one may want to use measures that
are calculated over a longer horizon to identify “serial” HtM consumers. To this end,
we construct three measures on the 2013 sample which are not used in the estimation
of MPC and ε. Specifically, for each month of data available for consumer i in 2013,
we use three metrics to classify consumers as hand-to-mouth or not. We consider
the average value of D∗it (this continuous variable provides a sense of frequency of
liquidity constraints; we denote this measure with Di,2013), the modal value of D
∗
i,t
(most frequent value;25 we denote this measure with
˘
Di,2013), or the minimum value
of D∗i,2013 during the 2013 part of the sample. The latter measure, which we denote
with D̂i,2013, is equal to one only if a consumer is identified as HtM in every month
in 2013.
Irrespective of which measure we use, we find in results reported in Table 6 that
estimated MPCs are very similar for HtM and non-HtM consumers. Although the
point estimates for HtM consumers tend to be larger at short horizons (e.g., 5 weeks),
we cannot reject the null of equal MPCs across the groups for any horizon or definition
of HtM status. Furthermore, we cannot reject that estimated MPCs are equal to one.
These results are consistent with theoretical predictions and thus lend more credibility
to our baseline estimate of MPC equal to one.
3.6 Conclusion
How consumers respond to changes in gasoline prices is a central question for
policymakers and researchers. We use big data from a personal financial management
service to examine the dynamics of consumer spending during the 2014-2015 period
when gasoline prices plummeted by 50 percent. Given the low elasticity of demand for
gasoline, this major price reduction generated a large windfall for consumers equal
25We classify a household as HtM if there is a tie.
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to approximately 2 percent of total consumer spending. (Average total household
spending in 2014 was $53,495 total, while the average household spending on gasoline
was $2,468.)
We document that the marginal propensity to consume out of these savings is
approximately one, which is consistent with the predictions of the permanent income
hypothesis, given that the change in gasoline prices was unexpected and permanent.
This partial equilibrium estimate provides a first-step input for quantifying the ef-
fects on the aggregate economy, which depend on a number of factors. The aggregate
effects of changes in gasoline prices potentially depend on general equilibrium effects
and redistribution of resources in the economy. The aggregate response to a gaso-
line price shock may be a function of the sensitivity of, for example, sectoral wages
and employment to energy price shocks (see Appendix D for a model). Depending
on specific assumptions about utility and production functions, general equilibrium
effects can amplify or attenuate the first-round effects that we estimate. Moreover,
there are income effects arising from the ownership of energy resources both domes-
tically and abroad that will have macroeconomic effects. Nevertheless, any offsetting
macroeconomic effects, e.g., from changes in oil field production or from exports to
foreign, oil-rich countries, do not obviate the interest in estimates of response of U.S.
consumers to a very significant shock to their budget sets coming from gasoline prices.
While estimating the aggregate effects of the change in oil prices is beyond the scope
of this paper, it is clear that a persistent increase of spending of 2 percent on the part
of households purchasing gasoline is a large macroeconomic shock.
We also show why previous attempts to estimate the MPC out of gasoline sav-
ings led to lower and/or more imprecise estimates due to data limitations (e.g., low
frequency of data, incomplete coverage of consumer spending, short panel) in earlier
studies. Our analysis highlights enormous potential of big data for enhancing na-
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CHAPTER IV
The Self-Constrained Hand to Mouth
4.1 Introduction
Ever since Hall’s seminal work on testing the Life-cycle/permanent-income hy-
pothesis (LC-PIH) (Hall, 1978), many studies have documented the fact that con-
sumption responds to the arrival of predictable income (excess sensitivity). Many of
these studies show that the strength of the consumption response varies by some mea-
sure of liquidity constraints such as income, liquid wealth, age, or occupation. These
empirical results have led researchers to conclude that excess sensitivity is caused by
temporary liquidity constraints.
This paper challenges this notion by arguing that individuals who receive regular
paychecks are unlikely to be liquidity constrained during the week in which they are
paid. This intuition is formalized by specifying a parsimonious buffer stock model
of consumption with realistic paycheck dynamics. Model simulations show that in
the week the paycheck is received, consumption behavior is unlikely to be affected
by liquidity levels and so behavior is driven purely by preferences. By using a novel
dataset on high frequency joint expenditure and liquid savings behavior, I show that
indeed expenditure behavior on pay weeks is not affected by how much liquidity an
individual holds. This simple buffer stock model can explain both patterns in the
level of expenditures as well as the joint behavior of expenditure growth and liquidity
levels. The main contribution of the paper is to show that the correlation between low
average liquidity and excess sensitivity is not necessarily a sign of temporary liquidity
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constraints. The alternative explanation is that individual preferences determine both
excess sensitivity and low average liquidity, thus generating the correlation seen in
the data. We can then interpret excess sensitivity not as a failure of the LC-PIH, but
as optimal behavior that reflects preferences.
The idea that excess sensitivity is caused by preferences and not temporary liq-
uidity constraints is not new. There are a few papers such as Laibson (1997) and
Shapiro (2005) which argue that quasi-hyperbolic discounting can explain the high
frequency responses to changes in income. However, this is the first paper to show
empirically that indeed individuals aren’t liquidity constrained during the week that
they receive their paychecks. This paper is is also related to Gelman (2017) which
uses the same data set and also attempts to disentangle preferences and constraints.
The main difference is that this paper uses high-frequency weekly data and focuses
on the response to paychecks while Gelman (2017) focuses more on monthly data and
examines the response to receiving a tax refund.
4.2 Data
This section describes the data source, sample filters, variable definitions and
descriptive statistics.
4.2.1 Data source
This paper utilizes a novel dataset derived from de-identified transactions and
account data, aggregated and normalized at the individual level. The data are cap-
tured in the course of business by a personal finance app.1 More specifically, the
app offers financial aggregation and bill-paying services. Users can link almost any
1These data have previously been used to study the high-frequency responses of households to
shocks such as the government shutdown (Gelman et al., 2015) and anticipated income, stratified
by spending, income and liquidity (Gelman et al., 2014). Similar account data from other apps have
been used in Baugh, Ben-David and Park (2014), Baker (2015), Kuchler (2015), and Ganong and
Noel (2016).
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financial account to the app, including bank accounts, credit card accounts, utility
bills, and more. Each day, the app logs into the web portals for these accounts and
obtains central elements of the user’s financial data including balances, transaction
records and descriptions, the price of credit and the fraction of available credit used.
Prior to analysis, the data are stripped of personally identifying information such
as name, address, or account number. The data have scrambled identifiers to allow
observations to be linked across time and accounts.
We draw on the entire de-identified population of active users and data derived
from their records from December 2012 until July 2016. For a subset of the data,
we have made use of demographic information provided to the app by a third party.
Table 4.1 compares the age, education, gender, and geographic distributions in the
sample that matched with an email address to the distributions in the U.S. Census
American Community Survey (ACS), representative of the U.S. population in 2012.
Table 4.1: App user demographics
Education Not Completed College Completed College Completed Graduate School
ACS 66.62 24.02 9.36
App 70.42 23.76 5.83
Ages 25 and over. Sample size - ACS: 2,176,103 App: 28,057
Age 18-20 21-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+
ACS 5.85 7.28 17.44 17.24 18.78 16.00 17.41
App 0.59 5.26 37.85 30.06 15.00 7.76 3.48




Sample size - ACS: 2,436,714 App: 59,072
Region Northeast Midwest South West
ACS 17.77 21.45 37.36 23.43
App 20.61 14.62 36.66 28.11
Sample size - ACS: 2,441,532 App: 63,745
Source: Gelman et al. (2014).
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Figure 4.2.1 compares the income distribution in the app to total family income
in the ACS. Users who use the app are on average higher income than individuals
surveys in the ACS.
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Source: Gelman et al. (2014).
In summary, the app is not perfectly representative of the US population, but it is
heterogeneous, including large numbers of users of different ages, education, income,
and geographic location.
4.2.2 Defining the sample
The sample is filtered on various characteristics to mitigate measurement error. I
filter users based on length of panel, number of accounts, connectedness of accounts,
regular paycheck status, and no missing income data.
4.2.2.1 Defining account linkage
If all accounts that are used for receiving income and making expenditures are
not observed, we may mistake mismeasurement for excess sensitivity. For example,
an individual may have a checking account that is used to pay most bills and a credit
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card that it used when income is low. If credit card expenditures are not properly
observed, it may look like expenditures is lower the week after a paycheck is received
relative to the week in which the paycheck is received.
In order to identify linked accounts, I use a method that calculates how many
credit card balance payments are also observed in a checking account. I define the
variable linked as the ratio of the number of credit card balance payments observed
in all checking accounts that matches a particular payment that originated from all
credit card accounts. For example, a typical individual will pay their credit card
bill once a month. If they existed in the data for the whole year, they will have 12
credit card balance payments. If 10 of those credit card payments can be linked to a
checking account the variable linked = 10
12
≈ 0.83.
One drawback to this approach is that it requires individuals to have a credit
card account. To ensure that those without credit cards are still likely to have linked
accounts, I also condition on individuals who have three or more accounts.
4.2.2.2 Identifying regular paychecks
In order to identify regular paychecks, I start by using keywords that are commonly
associated with these transactions.2 I condition on four statistics to ensure that these
transactions represent regular paychecks.
1. Number of paychecks ≥ 5
2. Median paycheck amount > $200
3. Median absolute deviation of days between paychecks is ≤ 5
4. Coefficient of variation of the paycheck amount ≤ 1
2Keywords used to identify paychecks are “dir dep”,“dirde p”,“salary”,“treas xxx fed”,“fed
sal”,“payroll”,“ayroll”,“payrll”,“payrl”,“payrol”,“pr payment”,“adp”,“dfas-cleveland”,“dfas-in”
and DON’T include the keywords “ing direct”,“refund”,“direct deposit advance”,“dir dep adv.”
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5. Weekly or bi-weekly payroll schedule
For bi-weekly paychecks there are two possible payment schedules. I define these
bi-weekly payroll patterns by “odd” or “even.” Although this is an arbitrary defini-
tion, the main role of this variable is to create two mutually exclusive groups. My
definition of week starts on Thursday and week 0 is December 6, 2012. Therefore
“even” weeks are the weeks starting Dec 20, 2012, Jan 3, 2012, etc. I define a payroll
schedule for a particular individual as “even” if 90% of paychecks are received on an
even week. The odd week schedule is defined similarly.
4.2.3 Variable definitions
Most survey data sets such as the consumer expenditure survey (CEX), panel
study of income dynamics (PSID), and survey of consumer finances (SCF) are created
with the explicit goal of facilitating academic research. The data set used in this study
is naturally occurring and was not explicitly designed for use in academic studies.
Constructing variables in this data set to match our models is not necessarily a
trivial exercise. In order to study the expenditure response to receiving a paycheck,
the main variables I utilize are expenditure, paycheck income, and liquid assets.
4.2.3.1 Expenditures
The empirical analysis will focus on food expenditures befcause they are highly
nondurable. In particular, I attempt to follow the widely used “strictly non-durable”
definition from Lusardi (1996).
The raw data consists of individual transactions with characteristics such as
amount, transaction type (debit or credit), and transaction description. While the
type of expenditure (food, non-food) is not directly observed, I use a machine learn-
ing (ML) algorithm (see Appendix 4.8.1 for more details) to aid in categorization.
The goal of the ML algorithm is to provide a mapping from transaction descriptions
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to expenditure categories. For example, any transaction with the keyword “McDon-
alds” should map into “Fast Food.” A subset of these categories are then combined
to create the expenditure variable.
The finest level of categorization is derived from merchant category codes (MCCs)
which are directly observable in two of the account providers in the data. MCCs are
four digit codes used by credit card companies to classify expenditures and are also
recognized by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service for tax reporting purposes. The ML
algorithm works by using a subset of the data where the truth is known in order to
create a mapping from transaction description to MCCs.
After training the ML algorithm on the data where the truth is known, the al-
gorithm is then applied to the rest of the data set. I then define expenditure as
expenditures on fast food and restaurants.
4.2.3.2 Cash on hand and liquid assets
Cash on hand is defined as Xit = Ait−1 +Yit where Ait−1 represents liquid balances
for individual i in the previous period and Yit represents income received in the current
period.
Liquid balances (A) are defined as the sum of checking and saving account balances
observed in the app. These balances are captured daily as the app takes a snapshot
of the balance from each provider.
4.3 The expenditure response to paycheck arrival
This section documents the expenditure response to the arrival of a bi-weekly
paycheck. By using two different bi-weekly schedules, I show that the expenditure
response seen in the data is due to the receipt of a paycheck and not confounded with
other events such as first of the month effects.
176
4.3.1 Time series figures
When analyzing high frequency excess sensitivity, it’s important to focus on non-
durable expenditures to make sure expenditures line up with consumption as much
as possible. As discussed in the previous section, I use fast food and restaurant
expenditures to test excess sensitivity of expenditure. Figure 4.3.2 compares this
expenditure measure to a comparable expenditures series from the Census Bureau.3
Because the app data and the Census data are in different units, I plot the log
difference relative to Jan 2013 on the y-axis. While the app data is more volatile
than the Census data, they both exhibit an upward trend over the time period.












































































App data Census data
Using the high frequency nature of the data, Figure 4.3.3 plots weekly food expen-
ditures for bi-weekly and weekly paycheck receivers. For bi-weekly paycheck receivers,
I further distinguish between “odd” and “even” pay schedules. It’s clear from the fig-
ure that there is a strong bi-weekly pattern in food expenditures. Furthermore, the
opposing bi-weekly pay schedules make it clear that the spikes are associated with
3I combine the series “7221: Full service restaurants” and “7222: Limited service eating places”
from the U.S. Census Bureau Monthly Retail Trade and Food Services report.
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paycheck receipt and not other recurring events like the first of the month. The
weekly paycheck series is much smoother but still follows the overall trend seen in the
bi-weekly paycheck schedules.






















































4   
Bi−weekly paycheck: Odd schedule
Bi−weekly paycheck: Even schedule
Weekly paycheck
4.3.2 Excess sensitivity of food expenditures
The time series for bi-weekly paycheck receivers in Figure 4.3.3 indicate that
expenditures rise in sync with weeks in which individuals are paid. The time series for
weekly paycheck receivers reveal that expenditures rise in some weeks even for those
that receive a paycheck every week. In order to estimate the rise in expenditures from
receiving a paycheck while controlling for seasonal expenditure fluctuation, I estimate
the following specification.




it + εit (4.1)
where Event is an indicator variable for whether week t is an even week, Payweek
Even
it
and PayweekOddit are indicator variables for whether individual i receives bi-weekly
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paychecks on week t on the even and odd schedule respectively, and αi represents an
individual fixed effect. β2 and β3 capture the growth rate of food expenditures on
payweeks for those on the bi-weekly even and odd schedule respectively. β1 captures
the growth rate of food expenditures on even weeks. Including the weekly paid
individuals helps to control for these seasonal trends that aren’t necessarily associated
with receiving a paycheck like first of the month effects or holidays that tend to fall
on even weeks.
Table 4.2 shows the coefficient estimates from estimating specification (4.1). The
estimate of 0.012 on Evenit represents the fact that food expenditures grow by 1%
on average during even weeks. The coefficients on PayweekEvenit and Payweek
Odd
it
are nearly identical and we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the magnitudes
are the same. These estimates imply that food expenditures grow by an additional
5.5% on weeks in which bi-weekly individuals are paid after controlling for general
seasonal trends. The magnitude of these estimates are in line with Stephens (2003),
Shapiro (2005), Stephens (2006), and Kuchler (2015). The granularity of the data
allow for much more accurate measurement of receipt of paychecks which results in
more precise estimates relative the the previous studies.











Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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The standard explanation for the excess sensitivity seen in table 4.2 is that in-
dividuals are temporary liquidity constrained. Following the literature, table 4.3
re-estimates equation (4.1) for three different terciles of 2013 average liquidity. The
estimation only uses data from 2014 and onward to ensure that there is no mechanical
correlation with the measure used to split the sample. In line with the previous lit-
erature, individuals that have lower levels of liquidity tend to react more strongly to
the receipt of a paycheck relative to those with higher levels of liquidity. For example,
food expenditures increase by 10% on average during weeks in which a paycheck is re-
ceived for individual with low average levels of liquidity relative to 2% for individuals
with high levels of liquidity. The coefficient on Event is fairly similar across liquidity
terciles. This is consistent with the view that that Event captures aggregate trends
that are common to all individuals.
Table 4.3: Excess sensitivity estimates by liquidity tercile
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Low avg liquidity Medium avg liquidity High avg liquidity
Event 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.014***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
PayweekEvenit 0.100*** 0.043*** 0.021***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
PayweekOddit 0.099*** 0.039*** 0.017***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 748,692 754,908 701,221
R-squared 0.292 0.305 0.306
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
This section has documented the presence of excess sensitivity of food expenditures
to the receipt of a paycheck using financial account data from a personal finance
app. The estimates are in line with the previous literature and provide more precise
estimates than previous studies. The main goal of this section is to set the stage
to further investigate whether the standard explanation that liquidity constraints
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explain excess sensitivity of expenditure to paychecks is correct. The next section
introduces a theoretical model of consumption which will allow us to more formally
test the standard explanation.
4.4 Buffer stock model of consumption
This section describes the model used to analyze consumption decisions. Indi-
viduals behave according to the standard “buffer-stock” saver model in the spirit of
Zeldes (1989), Deaton (1991), and Carroll (1997).















At+1 = (1 + r) (At + Yt − Ct) (4.3)
At+1 ≥ b (4.4)
Yt = Ȳ + εt (4.5)
εt
iid∼ N(µy, σ2y) (4.6)
where β, r, Ct, At and Yt represent the time discount factor, the interest rate, consump-
tion, liquid assets, and income respectively. Each period t represents a bi-weekly pay
period. Yt is further broken down into a constant term Ȳ which represents a recurring
paycheck and a stochastic term εt that represents non-paycheck income.
Income process I model the income process to match individuals who receive
bi-weekly paychecks. Therefore, individuals receive a paycheck every other period.
Overall, paycheck income comprises 70% of total income.
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Solution The consumption problem specified above does not admit a closed form
solution and is therefore solved computationally. I reformulate the individual’s prob-
lem in terms of a functional equation and define cash on hand xt = at + yt to simplify
the state space. This variable represents the amount of resources available to the
individual in the beginning of the period.
The individual then solves the optimization problem
V (xt) = max
at+1
{u(ct) + βE[V (xt+1)]} (4.7)
subject to
xt+1 = (1 + r) (xt − ct) + yt+1 (4.8)
and the previous constraints (4.4), (4.5), and (4.6).
Substituting in for ct and xt+1 results in an equation in terms of xt, at+1, and yt+1









+ βE[V (at+1 + yt+1)]
}
(4.9)
The individual maximizes utility by choosing next period saving (at+1) conditional
on cash on hand (xt). The model is solved using value function iteration which
results in the value function V (xt) and the policy function at+1(xt) which maps the
state variable xt into the optimal control variable at+1. The consumption function is
calculated using constraint (4.4) so that ct(xt) = xt − at+11+r .
4.5 Model analysis
The buffer stock model introduced in the previous section can help us understand
the cause of the excess sensitivity observed in section 4.3.2. In this section, I test
whether the model can generate similar patterns as seen in the data. Furthermore,
I explore which parameters are important for explaining the observed data. The
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parameter values used to calibrate the model are listed in Table 4.4 and represent
weekly time periods. The utility function is specified as constant relative risk aversion
(CRRA) with θ = 1.
Table 4.4: Parameter values
Parameter Value Notes Description
u(x) x
1−θ
1−θ CRRA utility utility function
θ 1 standard coefficient of relative risk aversion
µy 0.30 non-paycheck income share of 30%
σy 0.10 estimated from dataset S.D. of temporary shocks
ȳ 1.4 paycheck income share of 70%
r 0.01 / 52 weekly r on checking/saving interest rate
b 0 no borrowing condition borrowing limit
Notes: The parameters correspond to a weekly frequency.
4.5.1 Understanding excess sensitivity
As seen in figure 4.3.3, one important feature of the data when observed at a
weekly aggregation is the consistent spike in expenditures during the paycheck week
with a subsequent drop in the non-paycheck week. Figure 4.5.4 panel (a) below plots
weekly log deviations of food expenditures to their average from March to October of
2014. Panel (b) plots a random subsample of simulated time series in the buffer-stock
model. By modeling the receipt of a bi-weekly paycheck, the model can easily explain
the spikes in expenditures upon paycheck receipt.
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The model further allows us to investigate what causes these spikes in expen-
ditures. In this particular model, the time discount factor is the most important
parameter that influences the spike in expenditures. This is seen in figure 4.5.5 panel
(b) where I simulate the model for different time preference parameters. For patient
individuals with high time preference, the time series is relatively smooth. Con-
versely, impatient individuals with low time preference exhibit much larger spikes. In
the data, splitting up individuals into average liquidity terciles as in panel (a) leads to
differences in the peaks and troughs of log deviations. Individuals with low average
liquidity tend to react more strongly to the receipt of a paycheck relative to individ-
uals with high average liquidity. Most studies see this evidence and conclude that
temporary liquidity constraints explains excess sensitivity. However, in the model,
temporary liquidity constraints cannot explain excess sensitivity because individuals
are rarely constrained during the week in which they receive their paycheck. It is
during the week in which they are paid that individuals make the decision on how to
allocate expenditures between this week and next week. The week after the paycheck
is received is simply a reaction to the decisions made during the paycheck week. The
next section will make this more clear by more formally exploring how expenditure
growth is determined in the paycheck week and the non-paycheck week.
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4.5.2 Excess sensitivity and liquidity constraints
The excess sensitivity documented in the previous sections can be interpreted
as positive consumption growth in weeks in which a paycheck is not received and
negative consumption growth in weeks in which a paycheck is received. In order to
understand excess sensitivity, it’s important to understand what influences consump-
tion growth. Luckily, the model provides a key equation that can help make this clear.
The key equation can be derived from the optimality conditions of the consumption
optimization problem specified in section 4.4. The second order approximation of the













+ λt(xt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
liquidity constraints
+ εt+1 (4.10)
where ct is consumption, δ =
1
β
− 1 is the discount rate, θ is the coefficient of relative
risk aversion, σ2t is a measure of consumption growth volatility, r is the interest rate,
and εt is a mean zero rational expectations error.
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The equation shows that consumption growth is influenced by three terms. The
first term is constant and represents desired consumption growth in the absence of any
precautionary savings or liquidity constraints. It is driven by the difference between
the interest rate and the time discount rate scaled by the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution.
The second term represents precautionary savings motives. As explained in Kim-
ball (1990), a positive third derivative of the utility function induces a precautionary
savings motive which will tend to cause individuals to save for tomorrow in favor of
consuming today. This term will tend to increase consumption growth by lowering
consumption today.
Lastly, the third term represents liquidity constraints. If the constraint is binding,
this term will also increase consumption growth because individuals cannot increase
consumption today relative to their desired amount.
In general, it is difficult to derive analytical expressions for the precautionary
savings and liquidity constraint terms. However, we do know that they are functions
of cash on hand xt. Variation in xt is driven by both uncertainty income as well
as predictable changes that arise from different consumption levels in paycheck and
non-paycheck weeks. For the liquidity constraint term, there is a value of xt for which
the constraint will begin to bind and so it is a increasing function of xt. Similarly,
the precautionary savings motive is an increasing function of xt. The intuition is
that when xt is small, an individual is not able to smooth shocks very well leading
to a wide range of possible consumption values in the next period depending on
the realization of the labor income shock. This translates into high variability in
consumption growth. Conversely, when xt is high, an individual is easily able to
smooth consumption in the face of income shocks so there will be little variation in
consumption growth. In the limit, as xt → ∞, liquidity constraints will be unlikely
to bind and precautionary fears become irrelevant. In that case, consumption growth
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will be dominated by the impatience term.
In order to better understand these mechanisms, panel (a) of figure 4.5.6 plots
expected consumption growth from the model on the y-axis against relative liquidity
for weeks in which the paycheck is not received on the x-axis. Relative liquidity is
defined as the log difference of liquidity in time t from it’s average. In general, ex-
pected consumption growth is positive because consumption tends to be lower in the
non-paycheck week relative to the paycheck week. Furthermore, expected consump-
tion growth increases as relative liquidity falls. Because the impatience term is not
a function of liquidity, we can interpret the joint movement of consumption growth
and liquidity as being driven by precautionary savings and liquidity constraints.
Typically, the theoretical relationship plotted in panel (a) is hard to estimate
empirically. There are few datasets where liquidity is observed at such a high fre-
quency jointly with expenditure growth and the timing of paycheck arrival. Utilizing
these unique features of the financial app data, panel (b) of figure 4.5.6 estimates the
empirical analogue to panel (a) by using realized food expenditures growth. More
specifically, panel (b) plots a smoothed local linear relationship between food expen-
diture growth and log deviations from average liquidity in the week in which the
paycheck is not received. This relationship is estimated for each tercile of average
liquidity. Similar to the theoretical predictions, food expenditure growth is increas-
ing as relative liquidity falls. During weeks in which individuals do not receive their
bi-weekly paycheck, individuals are likely to be very sensitive to changes in liquidity
and therefore, will have to lower their food expenditures when liquidity is low. Lastly,
individuals with low average liquidity tend to have higher levels of food expenditure
growth in non-pay weeks and are more sensitive to changes in relative liquidity. The
interpretation under the buffer stock model is that low levels of time preference will
jointly produce higher expenditure growth, higher sensitivity to relative liquidity, and
low levels of average liquidity.
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Figure 4.5.6: consumption/expenditure growth and relative liquidity (non-pay week)
(a) Model
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It’s intuitive that liquidity constraints play an important role during the week
in which inidivdiuals are not paid. However, it’s harder to make the case that liq-
uidity constraints are important during pay weeks. Figure 4.5.7 panel (a) confirms
this intuition by plotting expected consumption growth against relative liquidity in
weeks in which individuals are paid. In stark contrast to non-pay weeks, expected
consumption growth is relatively flat. We can interpret this flatness as the absence
of the precautionary savings and liquidity constraint terms in the euler equation. In
the absence of these terms, equation (4.10) implies that impatience will determine
expected expenditure growth. This is reflected in the fact that individuals with low
time preference have lower rates of expenditure growth relative to individuals with
high time preference. Panel (b) plots the empirical analogue to the theoretically
derived relationships. Consistent with the model, food expenditure growth is much
less sensitive to liquidity during pay weeks relative to non-pay weeks. Furthermore,
individuals with low average liquidity tend to have lower levels of expenditure growth
relative to those with high average liquidity.
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Figure 4.5.7: consumption/expenditure growth and relative liquidity (pay week)
(a) Model
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The empirical relationship between food expenditure growth and relative liquidity
is summarized in the table below. The table lists the estimated coefficients from the
specification
∆ln(foodit+1) = αi × payweekit + β2 × liqpayit−1 + β3 × liq
nopay
it−1 + εit+1 (4.11)
where αi×payweekit represents individual fixed effects for both paycheck and non-
paycheck weeks, and liqpayit−1 and liq
nopay
it−1 represent t − 1 log liquidity in the payweek
and non-pay week respectively for individual i. I use t− 1 liquidity because I want to
measure the resources individual have when they enter period t. The individual fixed
effects for both paycheck and non-paycheck weeks allow us to interpret liquidity as
the percent change in the previous week relative to the pay and non-pay week. This
relative measure is important because the liquidity levels are different in pay and
non-pay weeks. Equation 4.11 is then estimated for each liquidity tercile. Intuitively,
the coefficients from the econometric specification estimate the slope of the linear
relationship captured in panel (b) of figures 4.5.6 and 4.5.7.
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Table 4.5: Relationship between expenditure growth and relative liquidity
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Low avg liquidity Medium avg liquidity High avg liquidity
Pay week 0.001 -0.003 -0.002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Non pay week -0.037*** -0.026*** -0.009**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Observations 363,714 416,502 383,654
R-squared 0.056 0.036 0.033
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The results suggest that relative liquidity matters in non-pay weeks but not for
pay weeks. This is in line with the model as well as the intuition that individuals are
very unlikely to be constrained in the week in which they receive their paycheck and
so should not respond much to their liquidity levels at the beginning of the week.
In previous studies, researchers have often observed that average liquidity levels
are strong predictors of how individuals respond to paychecks. The analysis in this
section makes it clear that we shouldn’t interpret these results as evidence that tem-
porary liquidity constraints explain excess sensitivity. Instead, the results are more
consistent with a model in which time preferences jointly generate excess sensitivity
as well as lower levels of average liquidity. In this simple buffer stock model, excess
sensitivity reflects preferences and not constraints.
4.5.3 Excess sensitivity and income
If the explanation in the previous section is true, average liquidity can be thought
of as a proxy for preferences. Conversely, paycheck income in the model is exogenous
and so does not reflect preferences. To test this assumption, figure 4.5.8 estimates
the relationship between food expenditure growth and relative liquidity for different
terciles of paycheck income. The results show that paycheck income terciles do not
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differentiate between different levels of food expenditure growth as well as liquidity
terciles. Furthermore, the ordering of the relationships by tercile doesn’t generally
match the model predictions.
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4.6 Testing the implications of liquidity constraints using tax
refunds
The main result in the paper is that expenditure growth is relatively unaffected
by liquidity in the pay week while it is significantly affected by liquidity during the
non-pay week. One way to see this mechanism in action is by looking at the response
to receiving a tax refund. More specifically, if individuals are liquidity constrained
during the non-pay week, we should observe a stronger reaction to the refund if it is
received during a non-pay week relative to a pay week.
4.6.1 Expenditure growth
This section estimates the effect of receiving a tax refund on expenditure growth.
It also tests whether the effect is different depending on whether the week in which





where refundit and payweekit are indicator variables for whether a refund or a
paycheck was received for person i in week t and αi is an individual-level fixed effect.
Table 4.6 shows the results from estimating equation 4.12 for each liquidity tercile.
The coefficient on payweekit shows that expenditure growth is negative in weeks in
which a paycheck is received. This is in line with the excess sensitivity captured
in earlier results. The coefficient on refundit shows that for individuals with low
and medium average liquidity, expenditure growth is negative in weeks in which a
a tax refund is received. This indicates that individuals increase expenditures when
they receive a tax refund. The positive coefficients on refundit×payweekit show that
expenditure growth is less negative when the refund is received during weeks in which
the paycheck is also received. This is consistent with the notion that individuals are
more liquidity constrained in weeks in which they don’t receive a paycheck. More
specifically, for individuals with low average liquidity, expenditure growth is 12%
lower during weeks in which a refund is received and a paycheck is not received. If
the refund is received in the same week that the paycheck is received, expenditure
growth is only 3% lower relative to weeks in which the refund is not received.
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Table 4.6: Coefficient estimates
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Low avg liquidity Medium avg liquidity High avg liquidity
refundit -0.118*** -0.056*** -0.010
(0.023) (0.021) (0.023)
payweekit -0.221*** -0.094*** -0.047***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
refundit × payweekit 0.084*** 0.012 0.006
(0.032) (0.029) (0.032)
Observations 375,965 419,802 385,760
R-squared 0.013 0.005 0.004
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
4.6.2 Expenditure growth by relative liquidity
This section takes a closer look at how receiving a tax refund affects the rela-
tionship between expenditure growth and relative liquidity. Figure 4.6.9 shows the
relationship between expenditure growth and relative liquidity during weeks in which
the paycheck is not received. As seen earlier, in weeks in which the paycheck is not
received, expenditure growth has a strong negative relationship with relative liquid-
ity. However, on weeks in which the tax refund is received, that strong negative
relationship no longer holds. One way to interpret this is that individuals are usually
very cash starved during weeks in which they don’t receive their paycheck because
they choose to consume more during weeks in which they receive their paychecks.
Receiving a tax refund relaxes the liquidity constraints that usually bind. Due to the
constraints being relaxed, expenditure growth is no longer affected by the amount of
liquidity individuals carry over from the previous period.
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Figure 4.6.10 performs the same analysis but for weeks in which a paycheck is
received. As seen in the previous sections, the relationship between expenditure
growth and relative liquidity is much weaker during weeks in which the paycheck is
received. Furthermore, because an individual typically has so much liquidity during
pay weeks, the relationship does not appear to be very different in weeks in which a
tax refund is also received.
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Because tax refunds are only received once a year, the results conditioning on
weeks in which a tax refund is received are much less precise. In order to more
formally analyze how receiving a refund affects the relationship between expenditure
growth rate and relative liquidity, I estimate the following econometric specification
∆ln(foodit+1) = αi + αi × payweekit + β1 × liqpayit−1 + β2 × liq
pay
it−1 × refundit+
β3 × liqnopayit−1 + β4 × liq
nopay
it−1 × refundit+
β5 × refundit + β6 × refundit × payweekit + εit+1 (4.13)
where liqpayit−1 and liq
nopay
it−1 capture the log of liquidity in the previous period when
the current period is a pay week or non-pay week respectively. The specification aims
to capture the differential marginal effect of relative liquidity on expenditure growth in
weeks in which a tax refund is received. The negative coefficient on liqnopayit−1 replicates
the earlier result that relative liquidity is an important determinant of expenditure
growth in non-pay weeks. Furthermore, the small and statistically insignificant re-
195
sult on liqpayit−1 replicates the earlier result that relative liquidity is not an important
determinant of expenditure growth in pay weeks. The new results of interest are the
coefficients on liqpayit−1×refundit and liq
nopay
it−1 ×refundit. They represent the additional
effect on liquidity on expenditure growth on weeks in which the tax refund is received.
The small and statistically insignificant coefficient on liqpayit−1× refundit confirms that
since liquidity is already high on pay weeks, receiving additional liquidity in the form
of a tax refund does not have much of an effect. The positive and statistically sig-
nificant coefficient on liqnopayit−1 × refundit confirms that since individuals tend to be
liquidity constrained during non-pay weeks, receiving extra liquidity cancels out the
negative relationship between relative liquidity and expenditure growth during non-
pay weeks. To test this idea more formally, I calculate β3 +β4 = 0.0116 with a p-value
of 0.201. Therefore, the econometric specification confirms the results in figure 4.6.9
that liquidity no longer affects expenditure growth in non-pay weeks after the tax
refund relieves liquidity constraints.
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Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
To summarize, this section tested the implications of the effects of liquidity on
expenditure growth during pay and non-pay weeks. The main analysis suggests that
liquidity only affects expenditure growth in non-pay weeks because this is when liq-
uidity is low. It tests this implication by studying a case in which liquidity is increased
in the form of a tax refund. Similarly to what the theory and empirics suggest, receiv-
ing a tax refund has different effects whether it is received on a pay week or non-pay
week. In general, expenditure growth is negative in weeks in which a tax refund is
received as individuals increase expenditure relative to weeks in which a tax refund is
not received. However, the analysis in this section shows that the impact of receiving
a tax refund is greater in non-pay weeks. The analysis then proceeds by studying the
effect of receiving a tax refund on the relationship between expenditure growth and
relative liquidity. The analysis shows that in weeks in which the tax refund is received,
liquidity no longer affects expenditure growth in the non-pay week. These results are
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consistent with the interpretation that individuals are liquidity constrained during
the non-pay week. The receipt of the tax refund allows us to test this assumption
and confirms that indeed when liquidity constraints are relaxed, relative liquidity no
longer affects expenditure growth.
4.7 Conclusion
This paper has re-examined whether excess sensitivity of expenditure to the re-
ceipt of a paycheck is caused by temporary liquidity constraints. The main argument
against such an interpretation is that individuals who receive paychecks are unlikely
to be liquidity constrained in the weeks in which they receive their paychecks. There-
fore, their expenditure reaction to a paycheck represents behavior that is driven by
preferences rather than constraints. To formalize this intuition, I specify a parsimo-
nious buffer stock model of consumption with realistic paycheck dynamics. Model
simulations show that during the week in which a paycheck is received, consumption
growth is not affected by changes in liquidity. I then test this assumption in the data
and show that indeed liquidity does not affect expenditure growth in the week in
which the paycheck is received.
Under the specified model, the spike up in expenditures during the pay week is
driven by the fact that some individuals are impatient and prefer to consume more
when they have resources. Indeed, in the data, excess sensitivity is strongest for those
with low average liquidity. This is consistent with the model as impatient individuals
react more strongly to paychecks while at the same time holding less liquidity on
average.
In the model, impatient individuals intentionally leave less liquidity for themselves
next period thus making them vulnerable to shocks in weeks in which a paycheck is
not received. I further test this assumption by showing how an influx of liquidity
affects expenditure behavior. In pay weeks, individuals are already awash with liq-
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uidity so they should not react much to extra liquidity. Conversely, in non-pay weeks,
individuals have left themselves fewer resources and so should react strongly to liq-
uidity. Using the extra liquidity provided by the receipt of a tax refund, I find that
expenditure behavior once again matches the predictions of the model.
Both the model and the empirical results imply that excess sensitivity is not caused
by temporary liquidity constraints. Instead, excess sensitivity is an optimal outcome
for impatient individuals that face high frequency fluctuations in income.
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4.8 Appendix
4.8.1 Machine learning algorithm
Most transactions in the data do not contain direct information on expenditure
category types. However, category types can be inferred from existing transaction
data. In general, the mapping is not easy to construct. If a transaction is made
at “McDonalds,” it’s easy to surmise that the category is “Fast Food Restaurants.”
However, it is much harder to identify smaller establishments such as “Bob’s store.”
“Bob’s store” may not uniquely identify an establishment in the data and it would
take many hours of work to look up exactly what types of goods these smaller es-
tablishments sell. Luckily, the merchant category code (MCC) is observed for two
account providers in the data. MCCs are four digit codes used by credit card compa-
nies to classify spending and are also recognized by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service
for tax reporting purposes. If an individual uses an account provider that provides
MCC information “Bob’s store” will map into a expenditure category type.
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The mapping from transaction data to MCC can be represented as Y = f(X)
where Y represents a vector of MCC codes and X represents a vector of transactions
data. The data is partitioned into two sets based on whether Y is known or not.4
The sets are also commonly referred to as training and prediction sets. The strategy
is to then estimate the mapping f̂(·) from (Y1, X1) and predict Ŷ0 = f̂(X0).
One option for the mapping is to use the multinomial logit model since the de-
pendent variable is a categorical variable with no cardinal meaning. However, this
approach is not well suited to textual data because each word would need its own
dummy variable. Furthermore, interactions may be important for classifying expen-
diture categories. For example “jack in the box” refers to a fast food chain while
“jack s surf shop” refers to a retail store. Including a dummy for each word can
lead to about 300,000 variables. Including interaction terms will cause the number of
variables to grow exponentially and will typically be unfeasible to estimate.
In order to handle the textual nature of the data I use a machine learning algorithm
called random forest. A random forest model is composed of many decision trees that
map transaction data to MCCs. This mapping is created by splitting the sample up
into nodes depending on the features of the data. For example, for transactions that
have the keyword “McDonalds” and transaction amounts less that $20, the majority
of the transactions are associated with a MCC that represents fast food. To better
understand how the decision tree works, Figure 4.8.11 shows an example. The top
node represents the state of the data before any splits have been made. The first
row “transaction amount ≤ 19.935” represents the splitting criteria of the first node.
The second row is the Gini measure which is explained below. The third row show
that there are 866,424 total transactions to be classified in the sample. The fourth
row “value=[4202,34817,. . . ,27158,720]” shows the number of transactions in each
expenditure category. The last row represents the majority class in this node. Because
4Y0 represents the set where Y is not known and Y1 represents the set where Y is known.
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“Restaurants” has the highest number of transactions, assigning a random transaction
to this category minimizes the categorization error without knowing any information
about the transaction. At each node in the tree, the sample is split based on a
feature. For example, the first split will be based on whether the transaction amount
is ≤ 19.935. The left node represents all the transactions for which the statement
is true and vice versa. Transactions ≤ 19.935 are more likely to be “Restraunts”
expenditure while transactions > 19.934 are more likely to be “Gas and Grocery.”
In our example, the sample is split further to the left of the tree. Transactions with
the string “mcdonalds” are virtually guaranteed to be “Restaurant” expenditure. A
further split shows that the string “amazon” is almost perfectly correlated with the
category “Retail Shopping.” How does the algorithm decide which features to split
the sample on? The basic intuition is that the algorithm should split the sample based
on features that lead to the largest disparities in the different groups. For example,
transactions that have the word “mcdonalds” will tend to split the sample into fast
food and non-fast food transactions so it is a good feature to split on. Conversely,
“bob” is not a very good feature to split on because it can represent a multitude of
different types of expenditure depending on what the other features are.




value = [4202, 34817, 19656, 198096, 24857, 10180, 29834, 887, 18074





value = [1259, 17899, 9809, 86867, 7595, 1928, 13651, 115, 6478, 16220





value = [2943, 16918, 9847, 111229, 17262, 8252, 16183, 772, 11596
35241, 79070, 96222, 15886, 596]





value = [1259, 17899, 9809, 86866, 7595, 1928, 13651, 115, 6478, 16220








value = [1259, 17899, 9809, 86862, 7595, 1928, 13602, 115, 6478, 16199




value = [0, 0, 0, 4, 0, 0, 49, 0, 0, 21, 0, 9791, 0, 0]
class = Retail Shopping
I state the procedure more formally by adapting the notation used in (Pedregosa
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et al., 2011). Define the possible features as vectors Xi ∈ Rn and the expenditure
categories as vector y ∈ Rl. Let the data at node m be presented by Q. For each
candidate split θ = (j, tm) consisting of a feature j and threshold tm, partition the
data into Qleft(θ) and Qright(θ) subsets so that
Qleft(θ) = (X, y)|xj ≤ tm (4.14)
Qright(θ) = Q \Qleft(θ) (4.15)
The goal is then to split the data at each node in the starkest way possible. A






where pmk = 1/Nm
∑
xi∈Rm I(yi = k) represents the proportion of category k obser-
vations in node m.
If there are only two categories, the function is is minimized at 0 when the transac-
tions are perfectly split into the two categories5 and maximized when the transactions
are evenly split between the two categories.6
Therefore, the algorithm should choose the feature to split on that minimizes the








The algorithm acts recursively so the same procedure is performed on Qleft(θ
∗)
and Qright(θ
∗) until a user-provided stopping criteria is reached. The final outcome
is a decision rule f̂(·) that maps features in the transaction data to expenditure
5because 0*1 + 1*0 = 0.
6because 0.5*0.5 + 0.5*0.5 = 0.5.
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categories.
This example shows that decision trees are much more effective in mapping high
dimensional data that includes text to expenditure categories. However, fitting just
one tree might lead to over-fitting. Therefore, a random forest fits many trees by
bootstrapping the samples of the original data and also randomly selecting the fea-
tures used in the decision tree. With the proliferation of processing power, each tree
can be fit in parallel and the final decision rule is based on all the decision trees. The
most common rule is take the majority decision of all the trees that are fit.
208
